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AN OUTLINE
OF THE
IDEALISTIC CONSTRUCTION
OF EXPERIENCE

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AN OUTLINE
OF THE
IDEALISTIC CONSTRUCTION
OF EXPERIENCE

BY

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PREFACE

AN idealistic theory of experience generally presents a somewhat perplexing appearance. It seems either to go too far, and to make experience intelligible by merely resolving it into ideal elements; or not far enough, and to leave experience, of which it professes to give the principle, outside the explanation altogether. The "explanation" in the first case is little better than a truism: it means that experience is intelligible if it is resolved into ideal, *i.e.* into intelligible elements. In the second case the "explanation" is a paradox, since we are unable to read our experience by the light of the "explanation." Both start from the duality of subject and object, which is certainly essential to experience. But the first destroys the distinction in the process of showing the unity between the two; the second destroys the unity of experience in the attempt to do justice to the distinction on which it rests. The result is that neither common sense nor the ordinary scientific mind is convinced by idealism. The idealistic argument may seem unassailable, and its ingenuity

may be beyond dispute, but it fails to give the mental security which everyday thought seems to possess. Idealism is left to take its own course; and common reflection remains within its own distinctions unaffected by the idealistic analysis. The concession, granted by idealism, that the truths of common sense or science are "valid so far as they go, but are one-sided in character," is accepted quite readily by both attitudes of mind, because they only pay attention to the first half of the statement and ignore the qualification implied in the second. For a qualification which is not shown to affect their procedure vitally is rightly considered irrelevant.

This incongruity between the idealistic argument and the course of experience is seen in the character of the argument itself as well as in its results. The procedure is arbitrary in form and disconnected in its content. Sometimes, as, for example, in Green's theory, purely psychological distinctions determine how the argument is to proceed and what it is to deal with. No logically necessary unity connects the analysis of "the spiritual principle in man as intelligence" with that in "man as moral." Elements are somehow "given" to man as spirit, which he manipulates for one purpose "intellectually," for another "morally." Where they come from, or what value each has for the totality of man's spiritual life, is not explained, nor even considered. Somehow the elements are simply *there* to begin

with ; and it is supposed to be sufficient if we can show that man *quâ* spirit is different from man as animal. But it seems evident that all distinctions, even that between man's lower nature and man's "spiritual principle," must fall *within* and be *phases* of man's *total* experience ; and all phases must be shown to have a *necessary* place in the activity of his life. It is not enough to draw the distinction between man and natural existence ; still less is it justifiable to regard an explanation of the distinction between the two aspects as equivalent to a synthesis of his entire experience.

In order to avoid such difficulties in the idealistic position we ought to show how experience is from one end to the other a realisation of a spiritual principle. We must at once do justice to the very form and content of experience on the one hand, and the nature of spirit on the other. We should be able to feel that, in the result, we are in touch with actual experience, and also that we are dealing with a single principle controlling all its movements. We cannot dismiss any phase of experience either as illusory or as merely "one-sided" ; we have to give each a necessary place in the whole in order to show wherein that "one-sidedness" lies. We cannot resolve one "aspect" into another, for that still leaves us without any explanation of what its *distinctive* nature involves. It may be quite true, *e.g.*, that Perception involves a "universal" principle. But we want to know how

that principle works in concrete experience so as to give us what normally we call Perception. In actual experience Perception is just Perception, neither more nor less; if we "resolve it" into something "higher" we still must state what it is in itself. To do anything else is not to explain *it*, but to explain it away. To describe it as "undeveloped reflection" does not show what kind of experience *it* gives us as it stands, but what it is *from the point of view of reflection, i.e. another* kind of experience. The same holds good when we consider Science or Morality, or any other form of experience. "One-sided" each may be. But that is only from the point of view of the *whole*. Yet experience is not simply *the whole*; it is a whole through its *mutually independent* parts. Experience lives and moves through different forms each with a distinctive nature of its own. The essential factors are the same all through: a subject in relation to, and united with, an object. The distinction between these factors creates the movement of experience, the life of which consists in the gradual assimilation of these fundamental elements to one another.

The relation is not sustained everywhere in the same way; the end of experience as a living process is not realised to the same extent in each special form of experience. A complete idealistic explanation of experience ought therefore to show (1) that each phase of experience embodies in a specific way the one spiritual prin-

ciple animating all; (2) that each is distinct from every other simply by the way it embodies that principle; (3) that each is connected with the others and so with the whole in virtue of its realising that principle with a certain degree of completeness; (4) that the whole of experience is a necessary evolution of the one principle of experience through various forms, logically connected as a series of stages manifesting a single principle from beginning to end. Such an explanation must have the character of developmental construction.

The attempt is made in the following chapters to expound the idealistic argument from this point of view. It has long seemed to the author to be much the most fruitful line that argument can take; and no other seems so completely to avoid the difficulties and ambiguities of the views above referred to. It is hoped that this attempt at a constructive exposition of the idealistic principle will, in spite of the many imperfections of which the author is very well aware, prove of some value to students of philosophy, and of some assistance to those who have felt with Green that the work of the great idealists must "all be done over again."

The author does not profess to put forward a view that is altogether new. For the form of this outline of idealism, more particularly in the case of the earlier stages in the argument, he is indebted to the great masterpiece of idealistic reflection in modern philosophy, Hegel's *Phenomenology of*

Mind. More might perhaps have been made of the analysis of "Sense-experience," "Perception," and "Understanding." The point of view from which they are here treated is capable of throwing much valuable light on the difficult and intensely interesting questions suggested by these forms of experience. The limits of an "outline," however, could hardly have justified discussion in greater detail.

The author has sought to bring out the force of the position here taken up by connecting and contrasting it with that of Kant, with which in many ways it has considerable historical affinities. He has found this method throughout both useful and instructive, and believes it may prove so to the student.

He has also tried as far as possible to bring the argument to bear on the solution of problems which are of pressing importance for philosophy at the present time; and is not without hope that some help has been given towards clearing up some of the dark places of experience.

The importance of the point of view here adopted has been frequently recognised in recent reflection. The author would refer in particular to the work of such different thinkers as Adamson, in his lectures on "Theory of Knowledge" (in vol. i. part v. of his *Lectures*); Professor Ward, in his *Naturalism and Agnosticism*; and Professor Laurie, in the original and illuminating argument developed

in his *Synthetica*. In each of these we find the same position insisted upon which is here traced in outline—that subject and object constitute the life of experience and develop *pari passu* from the very first, and in developing give rise to all the wealth of human experience in its various forms.

It should be mentioned that Chapters II.–VI. contain the substance of the Shaw Fellowship Lectures delivered at Edinburgh University during the winter session 1904-5.

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KING'S COLLEGE, ABERDEEN,

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

It can hardly be doubted that the Idealistic Interpretation of Experience in recent philosophy has been determined and guided by the results of Kant's analysis of knowledge. The criticism or further development of Kant's position has, however, by no means led to agreement amongst the exponents of Idealism, either as regards their premises or conclusions. We cannot but feel that this is not merely due to the many-sided character of Kant's theory, many-sided to the extent of inconsistency, but also to the inheritance or reappearance of the assumptions of Dualism from which he started. So far has this disagreement gone that it seems almost necessary for idealism to try to understand itself, to see what it wants or aims at before it attempts to carry out its principle. The difficulty of idealism in any form has no doubt been increased by the growth of a more intimate and a wider acquaintance with reality than existed at Kant's time, more particularly in regard to facts of history and biology. These have tended to give still greater emphasis to just the element that Kant tried to surmount—the empirical or temporal character of all human

Modern
Idealism
and Kant.

experience. The increased weight given to the methods and results arrived at in these departments of experience has gradually shifted the focus of idealism altogether, until in more recent times it has assumed a form not very far removed from what used to be called Subjective Idealism.

Kant's
twofold
result.

The positive outcome of Kant's analysis may be said to have been the justification of the actuality of a Universal Experience, and the Anthropocentric Conception of Knowledge. Now it is the opposition and the connexion between these two that have determined the direction of idealistic reflection. Both are essential to his view; both must be taken account of by any interpretation that derives its principle from him. The one lays stress on the fact of necessity and universality in experience, the other on the fact that experience is only for a human subject.

Develop-
ment of
the first in
two forms.

In the course of further reflection one or other of these two has tended to become primarily emphasised, the other being derived from it. Thus at the outset stress was laid on the former—the reality of universal experience. This first took the form of elaborate systematic construction of the entire content of such experience—universal experience as Metaphysical Knowledge. Another but less elaborate development of the same position lay in the tendency to emphasise the purely scientific attitude in knowledge, with its methods of hypothesis and verification,—universal experience as Scientific Knowledge. In the former the human subject with its processes and apparent limitations seemed to disappear in the process of a Whole which contained it, and controlled or

corrected its limitations; the anthropocentric element in Kant's result, along with its complementary conception of a thing-in-itself, was thereby dropped. In the latter, the anthropocentric element was brought in merely to justify the restriction of the range of universal experience to the scientific mood, and so to round off the limitation of its content to necessary truth, on which it insisted, by an appeal to an Unknown or Unknowable beyond human ken.

The two quite distinct developments of the idea of universal experience could not long exist side by side without some conflict arising and some reconciliation being called for. And the demand was on the whole forced primarily from the side of the second form. For, while universal experience in the form of science necessarily tends to the elimination of the individual, because it claims to present truth for all independent of any one (and in this respect the relation of scientific truth to the individual mind resembles what we find in universal experience taken as metaphysical knowledge), there is no limit to the kind of object-matter of actual experience which it may take up. Science can discuss any object that falls inside experience, and never doubts that it can do so with full assurance of achieving universal results. Its attention therefore, while to begin with directed primarily to "natural phenomena," was soon directed to the individual conscious subject itself and its processes, which are likewise "phenomena." It may have been driven to consider the subject for some special reason, but the direction of attention upon it was in the long run inevitable, both because, in one aspect, the individual is a part of organic "nature," and, in another aspect, its processes are

Conflict between them.

part of the historical sequence in time. The analysis of the development and processes of the conscious subject as such (Empirical Psychology in all its forms) leads us to look on everything in experience, of whatever kind, as having its source and place in the life-history of the individual. But this primary emphasis on the individual tended to throw the whole responsibility for knowledge, in whatsoever form, on to the subject of knowledge, and thus to lead to a reinterpretation of the reality of universal (scientific) experience from that point of view. The other element in the Kantian result (the anthropocentric conception of knowledge) now came to be taken as primary and ultimate, and universal experience as derivative—the reverse of what we found when emphasis was laid primarily on universal experience. From this point of view conceptions, which were the universals, and the principles of necessity, in experience, are themselves seen to have their origin and place in the history of individual experience, and the insistence by science on the “relativity of knowledge,” which was maintained before, is now made with stronger emphasis than ever. It does justice, and more than justice, to the anthropocentric element in Kant’s result.

The result of over-emphasis on the subjective process in knowledge.

But no sooner is this line of development pursued to its logical issue than a startling result is seen. The outcome of such a movement is plain. Exclusive emphasis on the subject and its processes leads us to look upon all experience as subjective only; knowledge has its source and conditions determined by the life-history of the individual mind in time. The result is that universal experience in the

Kantian sense disappears, or is dissipated, into a series of processes in time with no "objective" necessity, and no determinate universality in it. But if this is so, where then are we to get for science the universality and necessity on which Kant insisted, and which are essential if science is to claim to present "truth"? It is no answer to say that this analysis merely affects the value of the scientific interpretation of "nature" and the conceptions there used. It affects equally the scientific value or pretensions of the *psychological analysis itself*. This, too, can have no value as science (which it claims to be), if science in general with its conceptions and universals is dissipated into the stream of events of mental history. In other words, just as primary emphasis on universal experience tended to eliminate the individual centre of knowledge (the individual subject), primary emphasis on the processes and history of the individual subject tends to do away with the very idea of universal experience. Whereas when emphasis was laid primarily on universal experience we seemed to be placed in the position of having universal experience indifferent to or even without the individual subject's life, here we seem to have the individual subject without any universal experience at all.

To preserve equally *both* elements on which Kant laid stress now becomes the problem for idealism. It must at all costs save the reality of universal experience, and it must accept the scientific facts of the life-history of the individual and its changing and varying processes, since the statement of such a history is itself the product of universal experience (science). To do so, a distinction, hard

The next
step :
"value"
and
"fact."

and fast, but, so far as it goes, satisfactory, is drawn between the logical or cognitive "worth" and "value" of a conception, and its "existence" as a "fact," with historical connexions before and after its immediate appearance. To the former is assigned all universal experience; to the latter all the life-history of the individual subject. They belong to two distinct spheres of experience. They run parallel and "correspond," but have not even a asymptotic relation to each other.

Lotze.

It is at this stage that Lotze¹ has his place in the history of idealism. He mediates the opposition between the claims of science to be universal experience in Kant's sense, with the claims of the individual subject to be the source and origin of all experience whatsoever, and does so by drawing the distinction between "validity" and "origin" just mentioned. For him, since universal experience has its rights *per se* as the sphere of thoughts and conceptual activity, there is no limit to the *extent* of its activity, and hence it is not restricted to scientific activity but embraces and legitimises even metaphysical knowledge as well. And there is no danger of pursuing the analysis of the individual too far; for all such analysis contains is "facts" of mental history, which in themselves are something apart from the world of "values."

The
character
of this
distinc-
tion.

But the distinction, while it allays conflict, is rather of the nature of an *eirenikon* than a synthesis. For the standing opposition between them is never reconciled, and leaves a cleft running through his interpretation from beginning to end. On the one hand, the "facts" that "exist" set a boundary to

¹ And after him, Bradley.

the sphere of conceptual or universal experience: "reality is richer than thought," and the achievement of a complete synthesis is a mere "ideal" for thought. On the other, while the basis of fact starts thought, "suggests" it, "stimulates" it, yet, in the long run, we never get beyond the range of ideal activity, never reach the reality even of the "external" world. "This varied world of ideas within us (*started* by the external world) forms the sole material directly given to us for reflection." In this position, therefore, we find, superadded to the Kantian dualism between mind and things without, a dualism between "validity" and "origin," conception and existence, falling *inside the individual subject itself*.

It was impossible that this result should stand as a final idealistic expression of experience.¹ Hence the further development of idealism consists in an attempt to *unite*, in some form or other, and not merely to distinguish, these two aspects to which Lotze seeks to do justice. Here again emphasis is still laid on the individual subject and the processes of his history. It is *inside* his experience that the distinction insisted on by Lotze falls. The universal experience is universal within his experience as a whole, and the events of his history *take place* there also. There is no need and no possibility of going beyond him. But the distinction mentioned cannot possibly be an absolute *separation* or *cleft* in his experience. That is inconsistent with the unity of individual experience, and with the process which actually takes place in gaining universal experience.

It requires
a further
unity.

¹ I need here only refer to the masterly criticism of Lotze by Prof. Dewey in his *Logical Studies*, without working out in detail the main points of criticism he there emphasises.

It is inconsistent with the former, because a unity which spells dualism or parallelism between "validity" and "history" is no unity even in name; and it is inconsistent with the latter, because universal experience takes its start from actual events in the life-history of the subject, varies with the life of the subject, and is realised in and through such events only. Events are not the less events because they have conscious "validity"; and "validity" is not the less so because it "happens" to be in conscious experience. Universal experience is not something *per se* apart from the process of history: it is *in* that process, or rather that process is the way in which it appears. Even, therefore, if we could and do speak of universal experience, it is only universal in the sense of common to individual minds sharing the same historical conditions of growth. So, too, when we find it by itself (as we may), this "common" consciousness within which universal experience falls, contains precisely the same antithesis within itself which we find in the individual consciousness as such. The same antithesis and the same problem of reuniting the antithesis are presented whether we take the individual conscious subject, or the consciousness of a group, however large, of individual minds.

The new
problem.

We have thus to show how these two distinct phases of "truth" and "fact," "what" and "that," "content" and "existence," "thought" and "reality" can be elements in the life of the individual's conscious experience. To do so necessarily involves the abandonment of a universal experience *per se*. Its reality "*per se*" is not to be found, and, if found, would be needless, since all it contains can be shown to fall *within* individual experience as

such, where it alone exists in any case and on *any* view of what it means. We need not therefore regret the disappearance of a universal experience *per se*, for we do not *require* such an entity for actual experience at all. With this admission, therefore, we part not merely with metaphysical knowledge *per se*, which threatened the reality of the individual subject, but with scientific knowledge *per se*, which treated the processes of the individual subject as irrelevant to, or at least as quite immaterial to, its fixed and final "necessary truths" independent of any individual mind whatsoever. There *is* neither the one nor the other, if the very reality of universal experience (the concepts, judgments, etc., which make up its characteristic features) falls within a process making up the life-history of the individual's experience.

How then is the union and the distinction of the two elements to be made? By observing that the characteristic feature of self-conscious individual experience is the same in principle as that of all living individual experience, and is merely a particular form of it suited to and expressing the special nature of human experience. That general feature is Purposiveness. In man, purposiveness is more developed than in other forms of conscious animal experience, and more complicated. It consists in activity directed by *conscious* pursuit of ends, which are contrasted with what does not contain them, and can therefore be determined by them. Man, like other living individuals, has a variety of ends to realise in order to maintain his plane of self-preservation. One, but only one of these, is to order the course and contents of his varied

The unity
found in
the idea of
Purpose :
Prag-
matism.

presentational or ideal life, put it into coherent shape. This is only one form of the manifestation of his purposiveness. There are others concerning his emotional life, concerning his life amongst other individuals of the same species, as a part of "nature," and so on. In *every* case the result is the same,—the establishing, as a conscious fact, of the sense of "unity in his individual experience." What, in particular, subserves this, has achieved its meaning for the individual subject, and *has* significance accordingly, *i.e.* "significance" with reference to the one supreme fact—the unity spoken of. Its *value* lies in that and that only. Moreover, that is just what "value," "validity," "significance" *means*.

It terminates in a feeling of satisfaction.

But again, as it is primarily the individual subject's experience that is here concerned, or thought of, the guarantee or indication of the attainment of that result must lie *primarily* with the subject, be a *conscious* fact, which cannot of itself be communicated but only shared by a number in *common*, if it be shared at all. It must be a "feeling," a "sense," a "sentiment"—the feeling of "satisfaction," the "sentiment" of rationality.

The result twofold : objective and subjective.

Hence the double character of the completed result. On the one side, the reinstatement of the unity of experience as a conscious fact, attained by and through a process taking place in time, implies that the process to that end has been achieved, that the specific adjustment in question has been "successful," has "worked" out. The test of "value" lies just in "success" or "efficiency." That test, and so the "value," or "validity" is *objective*,

in the sense that the unity re-established is secured. That unity is what is *always* aimed at; it therefore endures permanently throughout all the experience of the individual, and merely changes its form according to circumstances in the life-history of the individual's experience. Because that unity is thus permanent and sought after by *every* individual, this *objective* character of every special adjustment is capable of being communicated to others. From such communication and inter-relation of individuals is built up a fabric of mutually recognised and acknowledged forms of adjustment which we call the general order of experience wherever it is found, in common Morality, in common Knowledge, etc. On the other side there is the "sense" peculiar to the individual consciousness as *such*, the "feeling of satisfaction" which is altogether his own, *cannot* be communicated, is both underivable and underived. That is his *special* test, and is *subjective* only. The latter is ultimate not merely in time but in sufficiency for the individual. Whether other people feel it or not is a secondary result brought about by the "significance" which his successful adjustment possesses. But the "sentiment" and the "successful adjustment" *both* fall inside the individual's experience solely. Hence for *him* there is both a subjective and an objective side to the result achieved. That the objective may be communicated does not *make* it successful for him: its success makes it possible for him to communicate it. The objectivity of the result is not *derived* from communication to others; at best it is merely *confirmed* by so doing. Its being communicated is derived from its being objective for him.

The case
of know-
ledge.

All this applies generally to *all* the processes of individual experience, and in particular to knowledge as one process of that experience. In this special case adjustments, as it happens, take the peculiar form of connecting and relating and gathering together the diversity of presentational life. That is endlessly manifold and varied in character; *per se* indeed a "chaos,"¹ a puzzling multiplicity. What we have to do here is to secure and keep the unity of experience at all costs in the midst of this endless change and variety. The kind of unity required depends on the "situation"² raising the need for it. That situation is always specific, and the unity demanded is thus always definite in character. Now "conceptions," "judgments," etc., are just ways in which this result is achieved in the case of knowledge. They gather together a whole range of variety into a single form of unity. They sum it up into a formula which enables us to maintain unity in multiplicity; they give a compact or condensed expression for a number of detailed elements. They are merely a "conceptual shorthand"³ "devices for saving time." Or, to put it otherwise, we seek to control, in the interests of the unity of our experience, the variety and opposition of presentational elements in a given conscious situation; and conceptions, judgments, etc., are ways in which we bring about this result. They are modes or functions adopted to meet the requirements of the given situation, and are dictated partly by it as regards the *matter*, partly by the unity of experience as regards the *form*. Successfully to realise that purpose is to

¹ See James, "Humanism and Truth" in *Mind*, vols. xiii. and xiv.

² Dewey's expression.

³ v. Karl Pearson, *Grammar of Science*.

do all that knowledge in the given situation requires—*i.e.* is to attain “*truth*” as regards that situation. Conceptions, judgments, etc., are conscious “instruments” designedly selected and employed to work out the unity required in a given case. They are “truth” if they accomplish this end, if they “work” successfully. Knowledge is a conscious operation whose “validity” lies in its efficiency to do its work, to control the presentational variety of conscious experience; its end lies merely in its operation being successful, and that end *is* truth. Or, finally, since it is one of the many processes for achieving the essentially purposive character of man’s experience, and is determined, therefore, solely by his specific purposes and interests, knowledge is a human means or device for realising a human end.

The above way¹ of bringing together the different elements in the Kantian result is what has been made familiar to us recently under the names of “Pragmatism” and “Humanism.”

There are certain aspects of this view which any thorough idealistic interpretation must regard as satisfactory. We may agree (1) that any kind of experience must somehow be individual; (2) that universal experience does and must in some way fall within the life-history of the conscious subject; (3) that the principle of unity in such a life must be expressed by a term wider than, and including as one of its phases, reflective knowledge; (4) that nothing can lie “beyond” reflective knowledge so far as its special activity is concerned; (5) that there is no possible separation in experience between truth and fact, at

¹ In the above statement of the Pragmatist position I have in mind the argument of Professor Dewey in his *Logical Studies*, which seems to me much the ablest and most forcible exposition of this view.

most there is only a distinction between them; (6) that reflective knowledge as such must always be concrete, and is never merely formal *within* the sphere to which, in experience, it belongs: for it always works within and with reference to a determinate "situation": hence the distinction of form and matter falls *within* the knowledge-situation and is created by it: there is no thought *per se* and no matter *per se* over against thought; (7) that reflective knowledge is a self-contained sphere of experience, with ends of its own which have to be realised and satisfied, and which do not conflict with other parts of experience.

The sole question is whether such a view does or can do justice to the elements it thus seeks to bring together—the objective universality in conscious experience and the reality of individual experience. Can it satisfy what these two require?

Objections. There are many points of difficulty in the way of accepting this view as final. Let us confine attention to a few—those by reference to which it will be possible to throw light on the argument of the succeeding pages. We may pass by certain technical difficulties, such as those suggested by the use of the term "works," as the characteristic qualification of the idea of "validity"; the "relativity" of "satisfactions"; the want of clearness in the use of the term "satisfaction" as a standard of truth, since it seems that the kind of satisfaction that is "truth" is just "true" satisfaction! These difficulties, however, are formal in character.

Restricting
the concep-
tion of the
unity of
experience.

In the long run it will be found that all the defects of the position arise from restricting the conception of the "unity of experience," to the life of the

historical or, as it is sometimes termed, the "psychological" individual. That conception is essential to the theory, as it is to every form of idealism. It is from the unity of experience that the various "purposes" or "ends" are derived which determine the processes of reflection, for the attainment of which thinking is "instrumental." Without that we should never know where or why a thought "worked," we should never know why it should stop "working" at one point rather than at another, or whether it should stop at all. The "working" of thought would not merely be interminable but futile. The fact that the result, however varied, is uniformly registered "satisfying," "successful," *implies* the perpetual presence within *all* the processes of a single principle which is being realised. And it is "satisfied" because it ultimately *dictates* the purpose for a specific situation, and does so in order to meet its demand—the demand for unity.

But such a unity cannot in the nature of the case be restricted to the "mere" individual. For how-
The unity
not merely
individual.
ever large the "span" of the individual's experience from stage to stage, from moment to moment in its experience, that unity is always wider than such a span. For it determines how in each moment and at each stage the purpose is to be realised, how the specific unity or the specific "satisfaction" is to be attained. It does not just *arise* with the satisfaction of the moment: if so, it certainly might be regarded as limited to his experience as this exists from time to time. It only *appears* in a *series* of realisations. But these, *each* and *all*, are attempts to satisfy and secure *one and the same ultimate unity*. This unity is not completely realised in *any* of its expressions

at all: otherwise why does it ever need to be "satisfied" again? Why is the problem of getting "satisfaction" endlessly set to the individual? Moreover, that it is not attained by any number of such expressions is not merely proved by the fact that it has to be reinstituted, re-established as a conscious result. It is admitted that it is this unity which in a given case sets the question in a particular situation. There could be no sense of "discomfort," of "antagonism of elements" in a given conscious state, unless on the basis of an implied unity of these elements. It is because of this, that it is worth while trying to unite the opposition, reconcile it, and establish the unity. We could never *feel* the opposition unless the unity were there. That is the only reason why certain kinds of distinction of elements do demand and lead us to expect a "solution" of a given problem, while others do not. Quite different elements may coexist in conscious life without there being any sense of the "tension" which we try to remove by thinking until a successful issue is attained. We can, *e.g.*, be conscious of a "fourth dimension" and the "yellow peril" at one and the same moment: but this never leads us to any attempt to reconcile or unite them. There is no sense of "tension" between them as a crying problem. Why? Because there is no implied unity in them, no identity of content between them of such a kind that the immediate unity of experience is staked on the explicit fusion of the two in a continuous conscious result. The unity we demand is always relative to the situation presented, because it is implied *within* that situation, and historically creates it, gives rise

to it. Those incessant attempts to meet situations are not due merely, or at least so much, to accretion of "experience" from without, as to growth from within, an ever-increasing assertion of the presence of the unity in experience "over against" different elements consciously presented together. The unity is itself gradually being made determinate as experience advances, "laws" are formed, etc., and this sets up ever new efforts for a fresh reconstitution of unity in experience. But for the implicit unity there would then be no problem. The problem, as a felt question, is the hint that the unity is *there* implicitly. The problem would be equally impossible if we had mere difference of content, as it would be if we had clear conscious unity of experience. It is because the diversity *is* a clear conscious fact which the unity is *not*, and *both* coexist as factors in the total experience, that a "problem" can possibly be felt to arise. Because, then, the unity awakens the problem of the moment, and because the unity is ever creating the problems of experience and cannot be completed or exhausted in any one realisation of it, the unity of experience must be something wider than the span of any individual experience.

If it be said that it is simply the total unity of the individual's total experience that is meant, then this is wider than any historically individual experience. It then becomes an *ideal beyond* the moment of the individual's life—"beyond" in the sense that in some real way it actually *is*, and is yet wider than the momentary stages in the individual experience. But such an unity is universal, if universal is to have any meaning; and is not individual in any

It must in
some sense
be wider.

sense in which the historical individual can be, and is taken to be so. It then becomes the ultimate unity of *all* his experience implicitly present at each moment, and expressing its existence in his conscious life by its ceaselessly setting the problem of consciously attaining and reinstating it. If we do not take this view, then the ideal becomes a "mere ideal," "constructed" and looked on as outside the present. But if so, it is quite futile because it does not assist the actual problem of a given situation. It does not create its specific character; and hence we cannot account for the perpetual recurrence of the necessity for reinstating the unity. Unless that ideal is in some real sense bound up with the existence of the demand for unity at each moment, it is ineffective and useless. But if it is so bound up, then it is not a "mere" ideal: it is a constitutive element in individual experience all through its process. The unity is then *not* confined to the individual experience from moment to moment; it is both prior to it and ahead of it—it is universal. It is that from which the demand for unity in a given case starts, that in which its satisfaction terminates. And once it is admitted to be beyond the unity of the individual's temporal experience, as this incessantly appears, the *degree* of universality, the amount and extent of it, is merely a further question which does not affect the principle. The fact that the unity is universal is all we need here insist on. But since it does and must govern all the individual's experience, it is plain, at any rate, that it cannot be short of the totality of all his experience actual and possible.

The unity
not merely
a series.

Another alternative is to resolve the individual's experience simply into a series of reinstatements or

re-establishings of the unity required by specific problems. We then have a series of unities without any permanent centre to which to refer the successive "satisfactions," without any centre from which and in which the series happens to be an experience at all, and without which it seems obvious that the successive demands for unity would not arise. If this is what the issue comes to, then it seems clear that, instead of having a subject without universal experience, or universal experience without a subject, we have here neither a subject nor universal experience. It is a reappearance of Hume's position under the guise of satisfying the claims of science which Hume rejected. The final criticism of this view, however, has surely been once for all gained for philosophy, and need not be repeated here.

It is only by the confusion of the unity satisfied at each given moment with the unity from which individual experience starts *all* its problems and in which *all* are satisfied, that such a position could be maintained.

It would be merely extending the above argument into detail to point out that the actuality of a universal unity in the individual experience is even historically evident in a concrete way from the facts of Inheritance, Language, Society, etc., from the basis of which the individual life starts. These are themselves merely phases of the comprehensive universality which that unity, fully interpreted, possesses. For they, too, are expressions of it which have grown up historically and been incorporated in the constitution making up an individual life.

That this unity is not really an individual unity at all is acknowledged by Humanism in the constant

The confusion of phenomenalism.

Specific forms of this universal unity.

The significance of the social factor in Humanism.

appeal to "social" consciousness which it makes. That is the *only* form in which it admits a universal unity to appear; so much so that at times the "truth" of knowledge is something confined simply to the needs of communication required by and making possible a society. "Rationality" is held to be just common agreement between intelligent individuals. Knowledge expresses that, starts from it, and its special processes and ends are determined by the general purposes of social unity and social order. Science is a "social phenomenon." The general conscious unity of society necessitates and conditions the formulation of the "laws," the "conceptions," the "unities," the "truths" of knowledge. A language is the medium of such communication, and thought is dependent on and limited by the character of this medium.

It implies universality.

Now if all this is admitted, and if it is granted that this social unity *precedes* and conditions the kind of unity realised in any individual experience, then obviously we have given up a purely individual point of view. We now take the unity "aimed at" and "satisfied" to be strictly universal, and one which *determines* the unity in the individual life. If we *confine* it to such a restricted universal as "social mind," we shall indeed not do justice to the unity which a Whole of experience implies. But that is a further question. At any rate such a social unity is wider than and does contain and determine the individual unity.

Humanism tends to regard the social unity as derivative.

In point of fact, however, the tendency of this view is rather to regard the unity of a social consciousness as itself *derived* from the unity of the individual life, and to be neither constitutive nor, in

the long run, as such, regulative of that life, but a mere *product* of the activity of individual minds. In such a case, the "common agreement" as to the unity established is merely a peculiar characteristic of what is essentially confined to individual minds. It is due to a further "use" of the individual unity. Clearly a unity of different minds obtained by an agreement which happens to be effected after unity is secured by the individual, cannot itself be wider than the individual with whom it starts. For the "agreement" is an attribute of the individual unity, and does not extend its meaning, does not carry the individual beyond himself, is *not* universal. And to this view what is said above will strictly apply.¹

But, further, the unity of experience, which determines the purposes of all the process of "thinking," for which thinking is "instrumental," cannot possibly be confined to the individual if it is to operate effectually at all. Every train of thinking has an end, which is admittedly not arbitrarily fixed. Selection there no doubt may be, but it is always selection within a certain range, and the selected purpose when adopted cannot be tampered with at will. It carries compulsion along with it, a compulsion which defies all our efforts to put it aside. The "success," the "satisfaction," carries with it convincingness, as well as quiescence, of mental state. However we may express this characteristic

The unity of experience must be extra-individual and objective.

¹ The inconsistency of appealing to a social consciousness to confirm the judgments of the individual mind seems, curiously enough, to have escaped the notice of Humanists. But it is surely transparent that if Society is created or derived as a significant fact from intercommunication between individual units, it cannot be appealed to in order to determine the worth of what individuals say or do. If the value of social life is derivative, it cannot in any sense be a standard of value for that from which it derives its own value.

of a successfully established unity, whether as the incapacity to tolerate a contradiction or otherwise, it is there. And only if it is there can we *rest* in the unity when found. Now this means that the specific unity we realise in a given situation, the thought which is "true," is not dependent on the mere processes in the life-history of the individual. These, being events, merely happen and may be directed at will. It is because they can be that certain of these directions are *not* true, and others may be. The process which is "true," therefore, is determined by conditions in some way independent of the mere presentations of the moment. Moreover, the very solution is itself a process inside the individual life, and as such, therefore, can be purely arbitrary. The characteristic of the unity, however, is that it is *not* arbitrarily realised; it exerts control on all that takes place. Such control, therefore, cannot itself be determined solely inside the processes which are themselves regulated by its action. The control is brought about by an agency *in some sense* independent of *all* such processes which make up mere life-history. Such processes from the point of view of the controlling agency vary with the life-history of the individual, and fall solely within its scope. They make up its constitution at a given moment. They are "subjective." As distinguished from them, the controlling agency is "objective"; it abides through and distinct from the changing content of the individual, and remains after any change has run its course. And it does so *because* it in some way preceded the change, as the condition determining one direction and not another. The agency has "reality," "validity," "objectivity."

To accept this result does not at all settle where the "objectivity" lies; least of all does it imply that it is outside all experience. The latter is the position of "Realism" or "Natural Dualism"; but it by no means follows from the general character of objectivity. The nature of objectivity depends entirely on how experience as a *whole* is conceived. But *objectivity*, as the control exerted by the unity, *does* imply that *as such* it cannot fall solely and simply within the life-history of the mere individual. In some way it must lie beyond its processes, no matter what their span, or how long they continue. To let it fall *within* their processes is necessarily to make the direction decided on one of the processes themselves; and this prevents us arriving at any finality in the result. To put it outside all the processes, but somehow still inside the individual life-history, would split up the continuity of individual life. We should have to put on one side the processes, on the other the unity that controls them; they would then remain for ever *apart*. But this would reinstate the dualism of truth and fact, objectivity and subjectivity, in a form similar in kind to that found in "realism," which this view under consideration seeks to overcome. In a word, either the direction falls absolutely within the process of the individual life, in which case there is no selection; the whole process is necessitated from first to last, and the very peculiar character of thinking, the realisation of a conscious and consciously selected end, is lost: or else the controlling unity is in some way distinct from the process, independent of it, in which case it falls outside the limits of individual life and

"Objectivity" cannot fall within the individual.

history, and can be exerted upon it *just for that reason*.

The objectivity not merely that of a social whole.

If, however, we grant that this controlling unity is objective, the range and extent of the objectivity are such that at least it cannot be bounded by any form or appearance of finite conscious life. It is, therefore, impossible to limit it to a "social unity" inside which the individual life-history is spent. For social life has itself a history, itself has a process, determined likewise by ends and for ends. The latter may be final for the individuals *within it*, so far as concerns their relation to it; but its own processes must be determined by reference to a wider controlling unity still, if "objectivity" is to be given to the results of social activity. Moreover, we cannot draw a sharp line between the control exerted by the social unity and that exerted on the individual life as such; and in some cases they are not separate at all. We seem bound, therefore, to admit that, in the long run, the only objectivity which is final is that in which the unity determining finite processes within experience is simply *the unity of all experience as such*. That is behind all forms in which objectivity appears, whether in the life-history of the individual or in that of social process. Its unity merely gets specified to meet the demands created by the particular situations arising within the various spheres of finite conscious process. It remains one and the same through all. In interpreting the nature of "truth," of "objectivity," in *any* form, therefore, we not merely can but must start from the unity of experience as a whole.

Now if the unity at work in all finite individual experiences of whatever kind is a comprehensive

universal unity, and if the unity of all experience is the ground of all forms of "objectivity" in finite experience, then, to explain the nature of universality in Knowledge or in Morality or anywhere, and to explain the ground of the objectivity which all forms of finite experience claim to possess, we must start from the idea of an Absolute Single Experience. It must be absolute, for nothing less will meet the case *completely*; it must be single, for the experience is a unity. Being experience it must be the experience of a conscious life, and being a unity, consciously referred to as such, it must be the experience of a single subject, an Absolute Individuality. Universal experience is not something apart and *per se*; it is universal experience to and in some single life. For a completely universal experience, therefore, there must be an individually complete subject. The "objectivity" of Knowledge, Morality, etc., does not mean that truth is apart from all minds, or any minds; it exists as the truth for a mind—an Absolute Mind. But since experience is wider than reflective Knowledge as such, or wider than Morality as such, we must interpret such an experience by a term which will embrace all forms of experience within its sweep, and yet refer them to itself as its own, as belonging to its unity. The term best expressing such an individuality is Spirit, and the forms of experience where we most clearly perceive the possible workings of such a Spirit are Religion and Philosophy. Hence the real starting-point for the complete understanding of objectivity in knowledge, whether in Perception or Morality, or any other forms, which are modes of finite experience, is in the self-conscious activity implied in the processes of

The Unity
must be
that of an
Absolute
Experi-
ence.

Religion and Philosophy, where *we are at the point of view of the whole as such*, and think in terms of it.

Only the point of view of Absolute Experience is adequate. We cannot take a lower form of experience as our base line.

We cannot begin short of this, say, with the validity and objectivity of Perception or Science, and thence endeavour to establish or overthrow the claims to objectivity which Philosophy or Religion may put forward. Either attempt is futile: for we cannot establish or destroy the objectivity of what we hold to be a restricted type of knowledge by taking as our basis that found in another form. The process is quite arbitrary; for the form we fix on as the basis of objectivity is selected because of our special interest in it, its power to appeal to us, its prominence in our experience, or what not. Everything in such a case depends on our specific point of view. If we happen to regard Perception as primary and ultimate, then everything else is tested by an appeal to that, and derives its objectivity accordingly; a position we find assumed in the scientific appeal to perceived "fact" as a test of "truth," the appeal to "observation" and "experiment," etc. If, again, we take Moral Knowledge as the primary reality of experience, the reason and the result are similar. And so on. The reality of experience becomes focussed in such a form; everything else is referred to it, and all objectivity is derived from its peculiar conditions. Not merely is the process arbitrary, but it cannot attain its end, for it *assumes* what has itself to be determined,—the ground for the objectivity of that particular form we choose to regard as ultimate. The only ground we can adopt, if we do not submit it to examination, is that of feeling, our "satisfaction" in it, the "compulsion" it has over us, the "sense" of immediate constraint

it has over us. This is just what we might have expected. For the special appeal such a particular form of experience made to us, was due to our individual interest in it, our individual selection of it, and hence the ground of its value can only be a subjective one, the "feeling" of necessity it gives to *us*. But this is not a "reason"; for it lacks the essential character of reason — universality — and defies communication. Each individual, therefore, is left to himself; and one type of knowledge being as good as another to select as ultimate, human experience is dissolved into a variety of individual attitudes. The very principle *all* professes to accept, the *unity* of their experience, is given up straight away, and the objectivity claimed by one can be at once denied by another, and no experience is left with any objectivity at all. In other words, if we start from a restricted form of experience, and regard that as supplying the test of objectivity for all others, we are unable to supply ground for the objectivity of that one we select, and *therefore* unable to guarantee the objectivity of any experience whatever. We are not merely *able* to *deny* the claim to objectivity, say, of the philosophical form of experience, if we take, *e.g.*, Sense-experience or Science as our base line. That we can do legitimately enough from such a position. But we are unable to *assert* the objectivity of the special form of experience we take as ultimate. While if we try to prove the objectivity of all others by reducing them to terms of this one we adopt, our attempt must fail from the start, since we are assuming what itself requires proof—that the one we have selected does supply all the objectivity knowledge claims. Such

a claim the others are *prima facie* entitled to dispute; and the development of reflection as well as the process of experience are perpetually putting it aside in favour of some other form. We *can* only demonstrate and establish the objectivity of any form of knowledge if we are prepared to demonstrate the objectivity of *all* forms of knowledge. We *can* only show that the unity of experience, in one particular form of experience, *e.g.* scientific thinking, supplies validity, objectivity, to that form of knowledge, if we are prepared to accept *the unity of experience as a whole as the ground of all objectivity whatsoever*. It is because the unity of experience as a whole is the source of all objectivity that any particular kind of objectivity can arise in any particular form of experience; for that particular "compulsion," "constraint," which any particular form possesses, is due to the fact that the unity at work in its concrete life is a form of the unity at work in the whole of experience.

Philosophy and Religion at the point of view of Absolute Experience.

Now it is in Philosophy and Religion that we take up the point of view of the unity of the whole of experience. They assert and embody in self-conscious experience the unity of the Whole, and of our individual minds with the Whole. They therefore, as modes of experience, *stand for* the absolute objectivity of all knowledge whatsoever. To *derive* their complete unity from any other form of experience, *e.g.* Perception or Science, is necessarily a *ὑστερον πρότερον*, even if it have the semblance of success. It may have a semblance of success, *e.g.*, where Philosophy is set merely to "criticise" the conditions or conceptions of Science, as if Philosophy were a kind of additional

Science. To confine Philosophy to this is futile; for all other problems raised *by experience itself*, e.g. the place of Morality in experience or the Aesthetic ideal in experience, become then merely borderland questions. Indeed, to take as final a lower form of experience, such as Perception, leads in general to pure scepticism regarding the nature and value of all Philosophy. That is inevitably so; for if the limited sphere of interest is final, the point of view of the Whole is either impossible or worthless. Scepticism in Philosophy, however, can never coexist with belief in Science. In the long run, the distrust of the former passes into the sphere of interest of the latter, and the stability and objectivity of *any* and all knowledge are imperilled. Even a confessed and acknowledged ignorance about the unity of experience as a whole, soon leads to doubt of our knowledge in any form whatever; and doubt is a preparatory stage for silent or open distrust.

We can see this in the present attitude in regard to science assumed by many of its exponents. "Reality" as a whole, they say, they know nothing about, and cannot even name. What then is the view taken of science? It consists of mere "descriptive formulæ," a "conceptual shorthand," which we contrive and use to get along in dealing with this reality. But it seems evident that a description of what is admitted to be incognisable, or at least unknown, is absolutely cut off from having any import except for the mind describing. If the reality exercises a check on the character of the description, it seems illogical to say it is not known, for the coherence of knowledge just

Illustration, in the case of science, of the result of taking a lower point of view.

consists in being so controlled ; and that control must come from the object described, because the object is so constituted and not otherwise. If it does not come from the reality, one description is as good as another, and the very progress of knowledge becomes purposeless. When this objection is put aside by pointing to the fact that we can prophesy and anticipate by means of our descriptions what reality will do, the extremity of the dualism seems given up altogether. For to speak of calculating an unknown is to use terms without a meaning. A "shorthand" is surely indecipherable if we are not in touch with the meaning of the language we have taken down in symbol. If it be said that the descriptions are truer, because *for us* they are simply "better" descriptions, better fulfil our needs, then this leaves altogether unanswered, positively or negatively, the question whether these needs may not just be a fuller appreciation of reality. In short, this restriction imposed on science is due to a prior restriction placed upon knowledge as a whole, a sceptical attitude regarding philosophical knowledge. It is typical of every such attempt. It either compels us to accept two heterogeneous kinds of knowledge, a descriptive and a non-descriptive, which have no continuity of purpose with each other, and yet profess to deal with the same reality ; or else to make knowledge purely of presentational "phenomena" hold, and to leave "reality" out of account altogether.

An
absolute
point of
view
avoids
these
difficulties.

If, then, we consciously take up the point of view of the unity of the whole of experience—as we do in Philosophy and Religion—we avoid the incoherencies into which we must fall if we take

anything less as our *ποῦ στῶ*. For Religion and Philosophy, in one aspect, simply stand for absolute objectivity in knowledge. In them the "ideal" at which finite forms of knowledge "aim," the "unity" these finite forms seek to establish point by point and moment by moment, as each stage of experience calls for it, is established and completely attained, not as an ideal but as *an actuality*. All Philosophy and Religion do is to give it detailed expression and detailed coherence. They exist solely and simply within its realisation: in them all other experience is "completed," "culminates," as we say, because in them we consciously assert and consciously live within the complete unity of all experience. They are the attitudes of which this unity constitutes the substance. Nowhere else in experience do we consciously take up such an attitude to this complete unity. Without them we should never be conscious of the unity of all experience; to be conscious of it *is* to take up the religious or philosophical attitude. They therefore *embody* all that the other modes of experience *aim* at. Hence from them, in a real sense, all the objectivity other forms of experience possess is derived, because the objectivity of these other forms is justified in the long run by the absolute unity *realised* in Philosophy and Religion. Certainly but for this absolute unity being realised, we should not, as we have seen, be able to assert objectivity anywhere in finite experience.

We do not take up this position of the absolute unity of experience by *choice*. Apart from the historical fact that it has always been adopted by the human spirit, and that in Religion and Philosophy the human spirit invariably does obtain the sense

It is not
arbitrarily
adopted.

x of absolute completeness and unity, we must adopt the unity of all experience as the absolute ground of all forms of knowledge, for it is the ground of *any* kind of "absoluteness" knowledge may and does claim to possess. For only if any given act or form of knowledge has an acknowledged place in the whole can it be said to be "absolutely valid." And we cannot, by mere choice, put aside all "absoluteness" from experience, because to *do so is to exercise just an absolute claim*. Since we must take some kind of knowledge as final, even though that knowledge may be merely the knowledge that no finite form *is* final, we thereby create that knowledge into "absolute" knowledge. We cannot dismiss absoluteness from experience by an act of will. If we do not find absoluteness in one way we are certain to set it up in another.¹

Qualifica-
tions.

But this position must not be misunderstood. It is not meant to imply that, when we take up the point of view of the absolute unity of experience in Religion and Philosophy, everything that Religion and Philosophy as a matter of fact do express, reveals everywhere and always all that this unity contains. The history of Religion and Philosophy contains the answer to that claim. In the nature of the case this cannot be so, because the point of view of the Whole is conditioned by the detailed character and contents of the Whole as these appear from time to time historically. These affect the particular expression which they will obtain from Philosophy and Religion. Hence arise the various forms of

¹ There is a lack of humour in the antipathy to absoluteness in experience expressed by Mr. Schiller. It amounts to saying, almost in so many words, that the term "absolute" must be *absolutely* eliminated from philosophical discussion!

Religion and Philosophy which the human spirit, whose complete unity they express, has adopted. All it means is that this point of view is not simply one which is *aimed* at, but is one which *can* be adopted and actually developed into detailed coherence.

Now when we admit in this way that, on the one hand, the unity of all experience is self-conscious Spirit, and that, on the other, we can take up in Religion and Philosophy the point of view of this unity and express what it contains, and thus embody in a distinct mode of experience the final and objective ground of all knowledge, we can do justice to the difficulties Humanism tries to meet, without falling into the relativistic position it adopts. We can also find a starting-point from which to explain and justify the "objectivity" attaching to the various forms of experience. It is quite true to maintain, as Humanism does, that there is no universal experience by itself which either works *in vacuo* apart from individual mind, or creates individual minds in its process. It is quite true to maintain that if this were so we could never see how it got into the concrete life-history of the individual, and made his knowledge valid. To explain knowledge would be indeed hopeless if we put on one side an abstract universal experience, and on the other the historical conscious individual, and then tried to show how these two came together in the acts and processes of knowledge. There is no universal experience which is not individualised. At the same time it must be acknowledged that the historical individual, as such, is also a mere *ens rationis*, the creation of abstract thinking, and a creation of *exactly the same kind* as that of a universal experience *per se*. For it is just

The value
of this
position.

Universal
experience
must be
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ated.

the thought of a mere universal experience which makes it possible for us to think its exact antithesis—a mere individual experience; and the one is as false as the other, if taken by itself as a starting-point from which to look at knowledge. Hence, just as we may very reasonably object to the suggestion that universal experience gives rise, in the course of its own movement, to the truths which individual experience contains, creates them so to say out of itself; so we may very well object to the attempt to create, justify, or explain, universal experience from the process of an individual's life-history. The former tends to treat the individual as a mere casual embodiment of its processes; the latter to treat universal experience as a contingent result of individual activity. We thereby overlook the other half of the truth already stated, but left unstated by Humanism. As there is no universal experience which is not individualised, so there is no individual experience which does not point beyond itself to universal experience. The truth is we cannot have individuality at all unless it is constituted of both universal and specific elements, whether the individuality be a pebble or a person. The union of these two elements in individuality gives rise to all the process of change and variety of which it is capable, and the way in which they are united determines the kind and place of the individuality in question. Experience is individual all through, and from first to last, no matter where we take it; and that means not an abstract isolated individual, but concretely individual, a unity of universal and specific factors. All types and forms of experience contain in them these two elements, and a kind of

experience is just a form of individuation. The history of experience is the history of self-conscious individuality—Spirit.

Thus the explanation of the nature and validity of reflective knowledge or Science is a special case of the general problem of showing how experience becomes individuated, maintains the stability, the unity amid variety, which characterises individuality. It does not consist, therefore, in relating an abstract universal experience to an abstract individual experience, either by way of showing how the former gives rise to the latter or the latter to the former. It consists in showing how the individuality of the experience we call "knowing" is established, built up, and maintained. The explanation therefore assumes a standard, or, as we call it, an "ideal" of individuality, and this in the long run, as we have seen, is the complete and single unity of all experience—Absolute Individuality. It consists, therefore, to put it otherwise, in showing how the Absolute Individuality which is Absolute Experience becomes specified and realised in that special case of individuation, the conscious relation of particular to universal (conceptual activity), which constitutes the process of reflective knowledge. The interpretation of reflective knowledge ("Logic" in the narrower sense of "Theory of Knowing") is part of the larger question of the interpretation of experience as a whole—of the "Logic of Experience."¹ There is no break or gap between the special interpretation of reflective thought and that of other forms of individual experience, just as there is, in concrete experience as a whole, no gap between, e.g.,

Reflective
knowledge
a form of
individuation.

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¹ Prof. Dewey's term and also Hegel's.

reflective thought and "perceiving" or "common sense." There is continuity from first to last. The interpretation of the one form of individuality, therefore, must be one which embraces in its sweep that of every other. Reflective experience does not arise all of a sudden and constitute an absolutely new departure in experience. It is implicit in experience from the start, not in the sense that that which does precede it in time contained its results there already,¹ but in the sense that the Ideal of Individuality at which *all* finite forms of experience aim and partly express, necessitates that it should appear; and *this* Ideal is implied in every mode of experience, because each mode focusses the Whole at a specific point and in a specific way.

The interpretation of Absolute Experience.

What, then, does the interpretation consist in? It is clear that we cannot get "behind" Experience to explain it. That is as futile as it is impossible. The interpretation itself must fall within the scope of Experience. It is equally impossible to reduce Experience to terms of any one form, for that cannot but fail to do justice to the others, since they become thereby secondary if it is primary; and yet every form all the while stands by itself and has a life of its own with terms and activity *sui generis*. But if all forms of experience are *pro tanto* valid, have individual significance each by itself, the only interpretation that will do justice to this uniqueness of

¹ If that were so, then certainly Prof. Dewey's objection (*Logical Studies*, p. 46) to the view here advocated would hold. For the moment, however, in his eagerness to emphasise the significance of the position he is himself defending—that reflective thinking is one type of experience by itself—he has overlooked the fact that it must be continuous with the rest of experience. This, of course, does not at all assume that "Thought" was "*there*" before it "arose."

value each possesses, and yet be an interpretation of them all, is one which shows their connexion one with the other. To connect, however, implies a unity of significance in all. That unity is found in the Ideal of a completely Individual Experience, which contains them, and of which they are "realisations" or expressions. The connexion of one form with another is the same therefore as connecting them with this Absolute Individual Experience. To connect them *with* this, which they *all* imply, is to unite them *to each other*. But this Individual Experience is, from the point of view of each and all, an Ideal. Hence the connexion consists in tracing how they successively and separately embody, realise, or approximate to this Ideal. From it they may be separately distinguished, while still being moments in its own Reality. It remains as the one complete Individuality; they focus it in different ways,—ways unique when looked at *inter se*, but united in virtue of the common Ideal they all embody and aim at. This Individuality has, however, no existence apart from them; it exists in and through them. They together make up its own substance, a substance whose content is expressed in them. It, *per se*, so far as we can speak of it *per se*, is the centralising unity of all, and therefore not a mere collection of them as parts. The parts are separate *for themselves inter se*; they are *together for it and in it*. That is possible just because it is Experience by an Individuality—a Subject and not a mere substance. The connexion of them is thus from the point of view of the absolutely Individual Experience, a mere *exposition* of what it contains, of what makes up its life. From the point of view

x of the parts, therefore, the connexion consists in showing how they successively approximate to¹ the attainment of Complete Individuality, their Ideal. Being successive on the one hand, and showing the various degrees of approximation on the other, it is a gradual realisation or "development" of what Complete Individuality is and consists in. From the point of view of the Whole Unity itself, it is merely an exposition of what itself contains. Putting these two aspects together, the interpretation consists in a genetic exposition of the forms in which Absolute Individuality appears and is realised. The forms *appear* and appear as historically distinct. As such they are merely scattered and separate, appear heterogeneously, and as the focus of experience changes. They have as historical appearances no connexion but that of mere *events*. But if we look on them as realising, even in their merely successive appearance, the supreme Individuality, they have not all the same value, nor does the historical individual himself look on them as all attaining what he aims at—Complete Individuality—to the same degree. If he were, therefore, to go through them successively according to their *value* for him, it would still be the history of his experience, for he would take up each in succession in time, but it would not be of the zigzag and haphazard character which his experience, dictated by the needs of moment, alone adopts. It would be an orderly realisation of the ideal of Individuality, at which he all along strives: it would be a "genetic history"

2. ¹ It is too apt to be forgotten in looking at experience "genetically" that we cannot even trace genesis, show development *unless* we know the *end* to which the process tends, as well as the antecedents from which it *began*.

of Experience. This is another expression for what the interpretation consists in.

Every point, therefore, where experience comes to a halt, so to say, where the unity of experience is attained, where the individual experiencing "rests" and is "satisfied," is the attainment of a specific individuation, a union of elements in a whole, of universal in and through particular. The universal varies with and in the particular; and the individuation, the stability which that union secures, differs accordingly. Each is experienced, *is* individuality, but in a different way. The individuality attained in Perceptual Life is one thing, that in Reflective Activity another, in Morality another, and so on; and the processes of securing individuality in the several cases differ accordingly. In Perception it consists in bringing "sense qualities" to a focus which is called a "thing"; in the case of Reflection it consists in bringing "ideas" to a focus called "judgment" in its simplest form, and "inference" in its highest. In Morality the individuality attained is different again, and takes different methods to become established. It is not, therefore, merely in reflective thinking that we come to "rest," are "satisfied," but *wherever the unity of experience is realised, wherever individuality is attained*. We are "satisfied" merely in different ways. But because we are satisfied in each in a specifically different way, each is specifically distinct from the other; each works within a certain range of activity all its own.

There is no clashing therefore, and no "opposition" between, *e.g.*, Perception and Reflective Thinking. "Perceptual facts" are not "opposed" to "Reflection" as something "external": the world of facts as

"genetic history" of complete Individuality embraces all forms of individuation.

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X
X

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No opposi-
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modes of
experi-
ence :
"matter"
and
"form"
in experi-
ence.

"perceived" cannot therefore stand on one side and in opposition to Reflection on the other. Experience is individuated in *each* in a different way, and *each* attains its own purpose, the purpose which locates it in the totality of Experience and fixes it there. Nor does one supply "matter" to the other, as if the matter were externally "given." Matter and form in *all* cases fall *inside the individuality of the experience*, whether it be Reflection, or Perception, or any other. The matter of one, therefore, cannot be the matter of another, nor the form of one the form of another. *Each has its own matter and form*. The matter of Reflection is "ideas"; the form is the construction we impose on them in the interests of that type of individuation we call reflective experience. No doubt the content of Perception may provide the stuff for thought to work with. But *it does not work with it as perceptual fact*, but as *thought fact*. When we analyse Reflection into its elements, no doubt we can separate the matter from the form and speak of the latter as "given," and, as "given," we may *assign* it to the realm of Perception. But *to assign it is the act of thought itself, not the work of Perception*, which has a life and being of its own, just as thought has. In Perception, similarly, we may analyse it into its elements and assign the qualities to Sensation, and keep the form of unity, which Perception gives them in the "thing," to perceiving itself as such. But here again the assigning is the work of Perception. The qualities are not *given* by Sensation to Perception, for Sensation has also a life of its own. And so on through all the forms of individuality experience assumes.

Thus it is that the exposition of the Whole, the interpretation of Experience as a whole, belongs to that type of experience where Absolute Individuality is known as such. We saw that in Religion and Philosophy the point of view of the Whole is taken up and becomes an experience for the individual. Here self-conscious Spirit, as such, is present to self-conscious Spirit *quâ* finite individuality. Here the finite individual is consciously one with the Whole as such. It does so in different ways in Philosophy and in Religion. The way of detailed connectedness of the parts in the Whole, and as they are *for* the whole, is the special attitude of Philosophy. The genetic exposition we have spoken of, therefore, is the way in which Philosophy brings the forms of individuality together. It is the method or process by which Philosophy works out its special individuation: it is the "philosophical method" of realising individuality. Since Philosophy is at the point of view of the Whole as such, it is a matter of indifference whether we say that Absolute Individuality works itself out in this way, expounds its own life, or that Philosophy adopts this way of revealing the connectedness of the parts in the one Whole. The method is an "absolute" method, or is the method of Absolute Individuality. Here the content and form are one, as in other forms of individuation. We do not make a separation in the individuality of experience between what is "perceived" and the "perceiving" of it, between "thinking" and the "content" of thinking, between form and matter in "sense" or in any other type of individuality. We can draw a *distinction* inside each, as we do and must; but we do not

Philosophy
and
Religion.

Philo-
sophy.

Matter
and form
in philo-
sophy.

separate and put one on one side and the other on another. This holds similarly of Philosophy. The matter of Philosophy is Experience as a whole ; its form the way Experience as a whole is held together. And those two are inseparable in the type of individuation we call the philosophical attitude in experience. Philosophy, therefore, does not clash with other forms of Experience : it is a mode by itself.

It does not dissolve other forms into itself : nor does it determine what they are. It merely, in pursuit of attaining its specific end, connects these together. It does not create nor destroy each ; it "explains" all by connecting all. And to connect all is to show the place each occupies in the Whole, and so to interpret each in relation to the other. Further,

Its method
self-ex-
plaining.

in the course of doing so, it at once connects the several phases of experience and shows *itself* to have a place in the plan of Experience. It explains all others and *so* explains itself : it is "self-explaining." This "justifies" *itself* ; and it does so by its success in achieving its purpose. It thus avoids the objection that Philosophy requires to get "behind" experience to "explain" it, by proving that *itself* belongs to and holds good of that Whole it explains. And in doing so, it is not acting differently from what takes place in other forms. For every form does this. For example, Reflective thinking, when operating, "justifies" to itself the special individuality it (Reflection) possesses as against Perception or Sensation ; for it maintains that what it develops, "its conclusions" "*hold good*" of the world of Perception and Sense ; or, to put it in another way, Reflection is the "outcome" of "perceptual" life and the life of "sense."

But is there only one philosophy and one method? For an idealism which takes Absolute Spirit to be the Unity of Experience, and which takes finite self-conscious Spirit to be at the point of view of the Whole, there can be only one philosophy and one method of interpretation. The statement of the contrary lies with its opponents, just as the defence of it lies with those who uphold it. And either can only satisfy the other by showing that every other point of view is really included within the one adopted. Idealism does profess that this is the case.

How the process of interpretation is carried out, what is its starting-point and how it achieves its end, I have tried to state in the following chapters, in a form doubtless more summary than the magnitude of the subject really justifies. But the types of individuation, or forms of unity of subject and object, as they are called, which are here discussed, are sufficiently representative to enable us to see in outline the character of the Idealistic Construction of Experience. They are modes of individual experience with which we are everywhere familiar, and they represent individuality at different levels of its realisation.

CHAPTER II

DUALISM AND THE NEW PROBLEM

It will be convenient to lead up to the statement of the idealistic view of Knowledge, if at the start we formulate the ultimate question at issue in any interpretation of Knowledge, and show, by reference to certain historical theories preceding Hegel, how their defects arise out of the assumptions which governed their view of the problem to be solved, and how again these defects point the way to such a conception as idealism seeks to establish.

The initial difficulty of formulating the problem.

Here we are met by the difficulty involved in trying to draw an ultimate distinction *within* experience and to keep to it throughout succeeding discussion, a difficulty only lessened but not removed by the knowledge of successive failures to overcome it. Perhaps in no part of philosophy is this greater than in the formulation of the question as to the nature of knowledge. The result is seen in the diversity of treatment of the subject which we find in the history of reflection. No doubt it might be argued that there is not so much diversity in the general conclusions arrived at, and, if these are the same, the consistency of method, it might be said, is a question of ways and means, and need not greatly concern us. Each mind, we might hold, must find

its own way to truth by the avenue that seems clearest, and the main thing is that the various avenues should converge towards the same spot. But while the general rationality of experience may prevent the human mind being put to confusion in the final issue, it is still legitimate to maintain that some ways of reaching the end are safer and more direct than others. That is the justification for attempting at the outset to formulate the problem we seek to solve.

Knowledge¹ does not merely, as Kant indicated, start from experience; it is a *kind* of experience, in any sense of that term. It will be admitted, too, that its significance lies in its being an activity with a certain end in view, the end we call the attainment of truth. These are two distinct phases of its nature, as is obvious when we observe that the end may not be always attained, or that knowledge may go wrong and, as we say, be "false," while yet truth remains its necessary goal. Were the distinction between a right and a wrong way of getting to the end meaningless, knowledge might be looked on as simply a mechanical process with conscious events for its content. Now, if the relation between these two aspects is such that knowledge is most really knowledge when it attains its end, it seems clear that what above all things the interpretation of knowledge has to consider is the ideal of knowledge. Not that we can separate actual knowledge from its ideal; they can only be distinguished. But any attempt to confine the

The factors
in Know-
ledge.

¹ "Knowledge" is here used primarily in the narrower sense of, *e.g.*, reflective knowledge. As the argument proceeds we shall find reason to extend its significance to include, *e.g.*, Morality. *Vide pp. 72-73.*

question to the consideration of actual knowledge without conscious reference to the ideal of knowledge seems bound to lead to error somewhere. On the other hand, merely to consider the character of the ideal of knowledge as such, without reference to actual knowledge, will equally be one-sided in its result. The question of knowledge, in short, is one which must take account of both aspects of this form of experience. Indeed, unless both are admitted and acknowledged to stand in this intimate relation to each other, it is difficult to see how the problem as to the nature of knowledge could arise. Knowledge in finite experience is rooted in the distinction between the activity of endeavour and the reality of attainment; and beyond this, knowledge, as a form of experience, does not go. Within that, it is an experience *sui generis* and complete. That is the only antithesis which is essential to its vitality; and the existence of it is the sole condition of its continuance as a finite process.

The
problem
stated.

Now if that is its simple elementary constitution as presented in experience, what is the *ultimate* problem that we must raise regarding it, the problem which the theory or interpretation of knowledge seeks to solve? If we are not to prejudge the answer by preliminary assumptions, the problem seems capable of being stated in only one form. We have to show the way by which knowledge, in the pursuit of its own end, achieves that ideal it seeks; or, otherwise, we have to show how the ideal of knowledge determines the actual realisation of knowledge in experience. These ways of expressing the problem are in principle the same, for the ideal and the actual are both implied in knowledge. We have not in this inquiry

to state the content of ideal knowledge, *i.e.* of knowledge in its ideal form : this would give us the round of speculative science, an Encyclopædia of philosophical knowledge. Still less are we to state the content of ordinary knowledge in the different spheres in which this is exercised, for this would mean stating all the varied content of Perception, Science, etc., in each of which we have knowledge of a kind. What we have to consider is the *relation* between knowledge as actual and knowledge as ideal, the relation, namely, of how, in the life of knowledge, the one is determined by and in the other. That seems the simplest way to formulate the question as to the nature of knowledge. No assumptions beyond the fact of actual knowledge and the ideal of knowledge are thereby made to start with. We do not by anticipation hint at either the limits or the range of possible knowledge, or even the conditions of knowledge, for these in a way prejudice the answer. The question so formulated is, so to say, raised by knowledge itself. It is the knowing experience become self-conscious. This way of looking at the question, while it is to some extent familiar in recent logical discussion, is essentially the point of view adopted by Absolute Idealism.

Let us try to bring out the significance of this conception by considering for a moment the problem of knowledge as taken up and discussed by Kant. In what we have to say we shall attempt to show how the adoption by him of other assumptions led to errors, the existence and nature of which indirectly indicate the need for starting from such a principle as that above stated.

A fundamental assumption from which Kant's

Kant's
dualistic
assump-
tion.

view started and which pervades his argument all along is the cleavage between the subject "knowing," or, as he puts it sometimes, "having experience," and the being of things. This was no doubt his heritage from the Cartesian metaphysic. But it found support in his early scientific training and in his keen appreciation of the finite and tentative character of human knowledge, which contrasted sharply with the boundless world of independent fact standing over against it, and setting a limit to its activity.

Subjective
determina-
tion of the
limits of
know-
ledge.

For Kant, however, the reality of things *per se* which mark the bounds for Knowing, is so ineffectual to influence the course of knowledge that the very function of determining the positive character of the limit itself is undertaken by the subject. The limit is a boundary set to the activity of understanding by the equally subjective activity of reason. Merely to speak of things imposing a limit was not enough: if taken thus, the limit would be merely characterless and obviously inoperative in itself. A positive significance in relation to knowledge had to be given to it; and this from the very nature of the case could only come from the *subject*. Thus the limit, so far as it could be an effectual limit to knowledge, was imposed and established by that same subject which was held to be bounded in its activity by things *per se*. This exhausted its significance as far as concerned knowledge, whose activity was thus entirely self-determined, even in its very limitations.

The
function of
Faith.

But Kant had still in some way to give a substantial and independent nature to the being of things, if not by knowledge, then apart from it: other-

wise they were not merely unknown, but as good as unreal. Their reality could not be considered in terms of knowledge without a patent self-contradiction. Yet their reality must be for a consciousness in some way. Hence we require to appeal to a special function of the mind for that purpose. This function is what Kant calls Faith, which is not knowledge nor strictly reason, but still has its source in consciousness, *i.e.* in the subject. Such a function once more illustrates Kant's difficulty in finding how a conscious subject can, from the side of the subject, in any way deal with what to begin with is held to be beyond *it* altogether.

Merely, however, to assert the existence of the being of things by an unknowing act of Faith, does not carry us far in determining the actual nature they possess. Faith had to do what knowledge failed to do—to deal in a positive way with the realm of things *per se*, of which knowledge could merely state that they were beyond its province. It had to give local habitation and a name to what for reason was little better than an airy nothing. But to give assurances of any kind by Faith alone, with no reference to knowledge, can only be admitted either as an endeavour to speak intelligibly in two mutually untranslatable languages, or as an attempt to carry on the business of intelligence on a system of bare credit. And what do we find? The world of Faith gets its concrete filling from the activity of *moral will*. This at first seems a great deal, even though it takes no account of, and certainly does not seem to refer to, that realm of the being of things which *specifically* concerned knowledge of nature, and which, in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, stood over

The object
of Faith.

against it as an ultimate limit to understanding. But even this filling is of less significance than it seems, for we are assured of nothing but the *form*, *i.e.* the bare activity of will. And, moreover, even the reality of this is merely a matter of Faith.¹ It is not intellectually impossible, but it is actual solely for Faith. And why this meagre result? Simply because Faith is outside knowledge; it gives no determinate content or significant assertion on the one hand, and is incapable of giving more than a bare assurance on the other. Faith is itself characterless, a mere ungrounded act, and what it supplies must in consistency have the same indeterminate value. The mere fact that will is assigned to the sphere of reason settles once for all that its significance is intellectually for ever a mere problem; for reason is the sphere of the problems of the intellect, or, what is the same thing, the bounds of understanding. To gain any information about it is therefore logically impossible. Kant's Faith is merely a compromise between the sceptical tendency lurking in the conception of the "bounds of reason," and the necessity of doing some justice to the initial assumption regarding the reality of the being of things. This compromise could, in the nature of the case, only take the form of a mere possibility; and thus Faith gives a bare assurance. That is all it is able to accomplish for us in regard to the being of things. Hence the admitted insecurity of the argument dealing with the so-called "practical reason," an insecurity which is only saved from disaster by a thinly-drawn qualification, the problematical phrase—"as if": "man is free when he acts *as if* he were so."

¹ As Kant says, we have no guarantee that "pure duty" is ever "realised."

In fact this Faith tells as little about the being of things as knowledge, which is just *nothing* in Kant's view. The thing *per se* in the form of will has no more to do with actual concrete morality than the thing *per se* had to do with the actual process of knowledge. In both cases it is quite ineffectual, is outside "experience." The one lies away beyond knowledge and is consigned to the "ideas of reason"; the other lies away behind actual morality and is assigned to a peculiar act of Faith. The one is described as a "problem," the other is described as a "postulate." The difference is merely due to the point of view from which the same thing is looked at. In the former case we have in mind the *terminus ad quem* of an experience, in the other the *terminus a quo*; and both are identical, because all we can say of each is, on the one hand, that it is unknown, and on the other, that it is the "unconditioned condition" or "limit" of experience. The same character, which we find in the case of Freedom, is possessed by the other entities which inhabit this realm of things *per se*, and which Kant speaks of as God and Immortality. Their character is the same, and their value the same for exactly the same reasons as those just mentioned in the case of a "free" will. They belong to the sphere of Faith, which merely can assert that they are; they, too, are and remain for the sphere of Faith *postulates*, as they were *problems* for the sphere of intellect.

Faith
makes a
postulate
of
intellectual
Problems.

Thus, then, try as Kant will he never succeeds in carrying the ramparts of "things *per se*." They for ever defy assault. The attempt to do so in the discussion of the Practical Reason merely reveals the

The significance of the limit to Knowledge.

futility of the task ; for the argument in the *Critique of Practical Reason* does not take us a step further than the result arrived at in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. It merely changes the designation of the thing we have been considering. The limit is there to begin with, and the limit remains ; and little difference seems to be made to actual intelligible experience whether it is or what it is. For the whole wealth of the world's significance, what Kant calls "experience," is still in the possession of the subject in spite of it. The limit merely asserts itself—that is all. If we start with such an assumption as Kant (and indeed naïve Realism also) adopts, we are compelled to raise the problem of knowledge in only one form. We must ask, in some way or other, "how is knowledge possible" ? ; within what limits does it work ? ; what is its relation to that over against which it stands for ever opposed ? No other kind of problem regarding the ultimate nature of knowledge is possible ; and that form of the problem is predetermined simply by the initial assumption referred to. A boundary is set up at the start to the very activity of knowledge, and the real question to be considered is simply what *is* the limit, and what are the conditions which determine that limit, make it both possible and necessary. The question is certainly a legitimate one in such circumstances, and seems indeed at first sight an easy question. At any rate it seems by no means so ambitious as the attempt to give a systematic construction of the whole of Being. For we are simply directing upon the fact of knowledge in general a scientific analysis, in the same way as we do towards any other fact, e.g. space. Knowledge is here a perfectly circum-

Collected

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scribed and definable process : it is a process found in a thinking subject, and bounded on this view from first to last by a reality beyond and independent of that subject. Hence its very limited character at once attracts attention and raises scientific curiosity regarding it. There are no preliminary metaphysical difficulties to be faced and overcome. For the question does not seem to occur to Kant, as it did to Berkeley, what that "independence," that "being beyond" really means. The very statement of his question indicates complete assurance of the substantial worth of his assumption. "How are synthetic judgments *à priori* possible," implies that in his inquiry he is at once compelled to admit the separation between knowledge and reality, and yet to explain somehow in what way the perpetual reference to it from the side of ideas is legitimate. The term "possible" refers to something actual and assumed to begin with ; for possibility can only be decided or considered on a basis of actuality. The question therefore refers to what is possible *in the circumstances.* The term "*à priori*" merely accentuates the same contrast, brings out still more clearly the pointed antithesis from which he starts. While "synthetic" bears on the face of it the marks of the opposition he is trying at once to accept and justify. Kant never seeks deliberately to overcome that initial opposition. His sole question is to explain, *within the limits necessarily imposed on knowledge, the reference of ideas beyond the immediate consciousness of the knowing subject,*—an act of reference peculiar to all ideas which make up the content of knowledge, and one which falls solely within the subject knowing.

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"Spontaneity" of the subject.

Hence we see the importance laid by Kant on the fact of subjective spontaneity, or freedom. The reference is not forced on the mind *ab extra* (as Locke seemed to imply); for this would mean that reality invaded the subject bodily, which is just as illegitimate as to assert that the subject covers by the act of knowledge the gulf separating it from the being of things, and which would in any case break down the opposition assumed at the start. The act of reference must come from the free, spontaneous activity of the subject. Hence it is, again, that the whole apparatus of knowledge described by Kant belongs from beginning to end to the subject only. Reality has nothing to do with it. That remains for ever a "beyond." Whether it is taken to be a "real" "beyond," as in the *Aesthetic*, or an ideal limit or "regulative idea," as at the close of the *Analytic*, the result is exactly the same. Thus, the being of things appears at the end of Kant's inquiry still outside knowledge as it was at the beginning, not so much because his inquiry has led him to that result, but *because he has all along worked under the assumption of its being outside*; not because the analysis has put it outside, but *because its being outside has determined the analysis*. Thus for all theoretical or cognitive purposes, the being which is beyond knowledge might, as far as the apparatus of knowledge is concerned, be quite as well non-existent. It does not determine that apparatus, it does not affect the process of knowledge. It does simply one thing and one thing only, it decides *that* a limit shall be set to knowledge; but it does not decide *what* that limit is, or where it is, nor how it affects knowledge. From this comes the peculiar result of the Kantian

The work of Knowing also subjective.

reach

analysis. The being of things remains indifferent and characterless outside the subject, while all that gives worth and significance to the life of the subject is assigned to the subject in virtue of the apparatus of knowledge, which makes its "experience." That is, the subject surrenders any claim to possess the being of things by knowledge, and rewards its self-sacrifice by enriching its life with everything of significance that can be made into experience. It gives up any right to knowing things *per se*, but thereby merely gives up what it has no interest at all in wishing to grasp.

Kant, therefore, goes to the very verge of the apotheosis of knowledge, but recoils from this by reminding himself that there must be a limit. This is seen likewise in the *Critique of Judgment*, where Kant (so we may put it) considers another aspect of the realm of the being of things which falls outside the sphere of the *Critique of Practical Reason*, an aspect which also concerns that limit set to knowledge referred to in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Everything of value is, in the *Critique of Judgment*, allowed to hold good so far as experience goes. But in the last resort, *i.e.* so far as the being of things is concerned, we must again qualify our judgments by the otherwise ineffectual phrase "as if"—"nature" must be considered "as if" acting "purposively." This merely expresses in the milder form of a measure of precaution precisely what has been present throughout all Kant's interpretation of knowledge, viz., the reality of a limit to the subject's activity.

It seems strange that Kant should have laid such extraordinary stress on the reality of the being of

The
Teleo-
logical
Judgment.

The
dualism
ineffective.

things as a limit to knowledge, and yet that this very reality should have had little or no meaning of its own. If the limit it imposes on knowledge had been assumed to come from knowledge itself, its want of content might have been inevitable; for it would then have been just that beyond which there was no knowledge and on this side of which all the content of knowledge lay. But Kant began by assuming that the being of things, reality with its now substantial wealth, stands on one side and over against it the subject's activity in knowledge. We are entitled, therefore, to expect that the one side would at least have been as concrete as the other, that in short the dualism would have been permanent and effective, and not evanescent and ineffective. So slight a hold does the substance of things have on knowledge in the final form of Kant's view, that it comes to be little more than a reminder that human knowledge is at best finite. The "limit" is a tax which has to be paid for the privilege of understanding, and which being quite undetermined in character can therefore be reduced to the absolute minimum. Kant gradually reduces the substance of the reality of things till finally it becomes a mere ghostly shadow of its earlier self, a ghost which nevertheless haunts his theory with all the persistence of an ineradicable superstition, and with which at all costs he must somehow make his peace lest it imperil the security of knowledge. But the very slightest means are required to lay a disembodied ghost, for the being alone to be considered is the subject who fears it. Hence it is enough to call it a "problem," a "postulate," the "unconditioned condition" or what not, all of them apparently differing,

but with the same identical content, namely, *none at all*,—their vagueness corresponding completely to the indefiniteness of what is referred to, and the expressions themselves being all used merely to win the favour of the inhabitants of the shadow world beyond the confines of experience.

It is clear that in all this Kant is doing no more than adhering to the conditions of an assumption from which his problem started, in spite of the necessary results to which the actual course and method of the inquiry itself inevitably ought to lead him. The inquiry is prosecuted by one principle; the assumption remains external to it. Hence it merely exerts an incessant check on the natural trend of his own argument. The assumption was external from the start; for it had nothing to do with determining the specific course of the analysis. It is "regulative," not "constitutive," *i.e.* external, not immanent: and regulative and external it remains. Hence the unsatisfactoriness of the relation between the two at the end of the theory. The view of actual knowledge, which he develops, has changed the whole situation: it is inconsistent with the sharp dualism from which Kant started. But, since the theory must hold at all costs, and the assumption has also to be maintained in some form or other, the only solution is to make the antithesis as slight as possible. This is done by placing, with a kind of ironical consistency, the opposite poles of the antithesis outside of experience altogether!

Now it seems evident that since all Kant's difficulty has arisen through starting from the original assumption, the difficulty would vanish, and his essential theory remain, if the assumption with which

Inconsistency of dualism with Kant's argument.

See also page 56

note

Kant's assumption unsatisfactory.

we are to begin were either dropped altogether or fundamentally changed. And there is every reason for doing so, since the assumption is itself unessential, is merely accepted as apparently self-evident, and is not established, by his theory itself, in the form from which Kant began. In philosophy, to start from a mere presupposition is to raise a standing objection against the validity of the result; but to leave that presupposition unexplained or refuted, is in a sense the *argumentum ad absurdum* of the presupposition. Now the step taken by the immediate successors of Kant, and more especially by Hegel, was essentially this. They refused to admit Kant's assumption, and if, as with Hegel, a logical starting-point was accepted, that starting-point was one which found its explanation in the theory itself.

Other
views of
dualism :
Locke.

The
nature of
Know-
ledge.

It is important to notice that it matters little what form the initial dualism assumes, the same effect is seen in the resulting theory of knowledge which we have found in Kant's case. Locke, to refer to him in this connexion, likewise starts his epistemology from a dualistic presupposition. His analysis is more "empirical" than Kant's, his view of knowledge more mechanical. Knowledge is the result of the interplay of things with the mind or spiritual substance. The two substances act and react on each other. In that sense reality exerts a more controlling influence on the course of knowledge in Locke's argument. But the ultimate issue is again in all essential respects the same as in the case of Kant. Locke¹ is sure of the content of experience so far as consciousness is concerned, and hands over to the subject-substance as much of the

¹ In Book II. of the *Essay*.

thing-substance as he possibly can. But being restrained in so doing by the latter, he divides the content of experience between the two. And he does this in quite an arbitrary way. One part he assigns to the subject, and calls this "the secondary qualities"; the other part he assigns to the thing, and names this "primary qualities." Yet they are both *cognisable*, i.e. they both fall within the sweep of the ideal life of the *subject*. To make the original opposition still significant he must, therefore, assign something to the thing-substance which can find no part or lot in the life of the subject. But, since he has already taken up so much content, indeed *all* the content he can think of, there is nothing intelligible at all left remaining for the thing-substance. This he naïvely acknowledges; for, he says, the thing is by itself merely the "*something, we know not what*," underlying these primary qualities, an unknown entity, which does not in point of fact really enter into experience at all. In other words, the thing-substance, at the opposite pole of the antithesis from the subject-substance, is for Locke a mere *caput mortuum*. So far as actual experience goes, it is quite ineffective, a beyond with which experience has in itself no concern. Its only character is that it does not enter into the ideal world of knowledge.

This is the result arrived at, and we may say the only result possible, in Locke's analysis of knowledge in Book II. of the *Essay*. When he does face the exact nature of existence in Book IV. (since somehow he must give an account of the actual relation of knowledge to that which by assumption is opposed to knowledge), the result merely brings out the difficulty of making the relation

Secondary
and
primary
qualities.

The
nature of
existence.

between knowledge and existence at once consistent with the meaning he gives to knowledge, and with the need of preserving that existence by which knowledge is bounded from the start. There, in Book IV., we find that existence is always an *external* existence, and our cognitive relation to it is at some point necessarily contingent, *i.e.* external. Existence is in three kinds, that of the Self, God, and Things, corresponding, we note in passing, pretty closely to the content of Kant's ideas of reason.¹ Each appeals to and appears in knowledge in a different way. The one, Self, is *immediately certain* only ; it is *as such* outside knowledge, but is directly present to it *at a certain point*. In other words, it is an immediate but inexplicable and unexplained fact, not built into the structure of thinking, but simply *there*, and so is a limit to denial. *What* it is, cannot be shown, *how* it is, still less so. It adds nothing to its content ; it is simply a naked fact, known by a bare act of *certitude*. God, again, is an existence *demonstrable* by successive acts, each of which is self-evident, the starting-point being the immediately certain existence of the subject. The content of God's nature is gathered from common thought and handed over to the fact of his existence gratuitously. Because God's existence is an individual fact external to the individual mind and yet demonstrable, the demonstration of God's existence is peculiar in kind and distinct from any other demonstration. For all other demonstration deals with universal truth, which in Locke's view is abstract and therefore not *real*, because the real is

¹ That Locke should have divided the reality opposed to knowledge thus is in itself remarkable.

essentially individual. So that we have to accept the external existence of Supreme Reality after a unique process of mind has brought it to our knowledge. If this is not done the existence remains ever beyond knowledge. But when it is done we have to allow that a process of demonstration which holds of universal experience can yet give a conclusion which is essentially individual. The externality of the result arrived at is thus made evident by the very contingency of the method of achieving it. While as to the last form of existence (Things) they are only found in the special acts of sense activity, and at the points of time to which these acts refer and are operative. Outside these acts the existence of things has no significance; at most it is a "probability." In other words, the existence of things is essentially external to the knowing subject, for the knowledge of it is contingently dependent on the operation, and, moreover, the *successful* operation, of sense activity, which varies from point to point, from time to time, and from mind to mind.

Apart from the question of actual consistency between these results and those arrived at in the analysis of Book II., we can see that in effect the ultimate issue is much the same in the two books. The difference which at first sight appears to exist is due to the way in which the discussion is carried on. In Book II. Locke is dealing primarily with knowledge and its content; in Book IV. primarily with existence and its relation to knowledge. The assumption in both cases is the same, viz. the dualism of knowing-substance and thing-substance. In the former discussion, therefore, when he is

Result
of the
analysis in
Books II.
and IV.

dealing with knowledge, emphasis is laid on the kinds of ideas, on the content of knowledge, and by the analysis of them the thing-substance is dissolved as far as he can into ideas. The remainder is necessarily a mere "we know not what," and this is handed over to the thing-substance! In the latter discussion (Book IV.) the weight of his argument rests on the thing-substance (Reality, Existence). As much stress as possible is laid on it, and knowledge is brought as closely into touch with it as it can come. That is the point of the emphasis on "immediacy" in Book IV., there being a special virtue for Locke in "immediate" "certainties," because by them we *touch* consciously an external existence. Where knowledge fails, existence still remains, and hence knowledge *in its turn* now becomes contingent: its pronouncements regarding existence are no more than "*probable*." Probability, of course, implies some ground or resting-place, and that is found, in Book IV., on the *other* side of the antithesis, viz. in existence. In the former analysis in Book II., therefore, the *thing-substance* as such becomes so far emptied of meaning as to be *unknown*; in the other (Book IV.) the *thinking-substance* as such becomes so far valueless that its functions are mere *probabilities*. In the one, the thing becomes uncertain from the point of view of knowledge; in the other, knowledge becomes uncertain from the point of view of existence. Thus the issue in both cases is for all ultimate purposes the same. And the issue in both cases is inevitable, for the dualism is there to start with, and must be maintained. We can arrive at it or deal with it either by starting from the one side or the other.

If we start from one side and take *it* as primary, it necessarily follows that the other is secondary, just because it is external to start with. And its externality is just expressed in the result that the other can never be completely identified with it. The result is most clearly seen precisely when we consider the bounds of the antithesis, *i.e.* when we ask what there is beyond knowledge on the one side, and what of knowledge is left beyond existence on the other. The one gives us a thing emptied of content, the other a knowledge emptied of value.

It is very significant thus to note how closely the result of Locke's analysis resembles that of Kant. Locke and Kant. Apart from subtleties of method and penetration of inquiry, the issue in both cases is in all essential respects the same, and for the same reason. Both start from the same assumption which lies outside the process of their analysis, and yet has to be in some sense admitted into its result, because it directs the argument as an underlying presupposition. It was therefore with some good reason that Hegel described Kant's theory as another expression of Lockeanism.

It is singularly interesting to observe how the correction of Locke's argument took almost an exactly similar line to that adopted by Kant's successors. Berkeley. Berkeley's view of knowledge consists just in denying the necessity for the unknown substratum of the thing-substance, and in seeking to show how it was possible to make cognitive experience intelligible without it. That is, just as Kant's critical successors dropped the thing *per se*, so Berkeley dropped the absolutely unqualified, unknown, thing-substance. Each accepted the preceding analysis

of knowledge ; both refused to accept the dualism within which it worked ; it was an inadmissible and unnecessary assumption. In both cases, therefore, the development was in an idealistic direction. The difference between the ultimate result of the development in the two cases was due to the kind of idealism which was made possible by the implicitly individualistic or psychological view of knowledge given by Locke on the one side, and the implicitly universalistic view of knowledge established by Kant on the other. Locke's theory held of individual experience primarily, and Berkeley's idealism was in consequence Subjective Idealism ; Kant's theory emphasised universal experience primarily, and Hegel's idealism was in consequence Objective or Absolute Idealism.

Result.

Now if we seem compelled, in view of the results to which any naïve dualism of the kind just considered inevitably leads, to give up such an assumption as the starting-point of an interpretation of the nature and possibilities of knowledge, a number of important conclusions follow at once. These we may state by way of introducing the real nature of the problem to be discussed. To begin with, it will be necessary to admit a change in the conception of truth altogether. On any dualistic presupposition

I. Truth.

truth must mean some kind of "agreement" between the opposed factors, which though opposed come into some relation. This relation is generally spoken of *as a reference of ideas to a reality beyond ideas*, the reference being an act on the side of the knowing subject. Such a reference carries with it necessarily the conception of a real, external in some sense, and remaining external always. Since knowledge

consists in such a reference, it is implied that on the other side reality *sustains* the act of reference, *i.e.* accepts what is referred as warranted by its own nature and constitution. That is, reality refers back to knowledge. Knowledge thus being a double-sided reference, truth is simply an accurate reference on the one side and an accepted reference on the other. But this means that the two references concur; or, as it is said, truth is an "agreement" between knowledge (thinking) and reality. "Agreement" implies a bargain by two parties, and is ratified necessarily on both sides. But if, as we have seen in the case of Kant, the "agreement" in the long run falls inside the subject-activity alone, and is found only there as a conscious fact, the other side being essentially beyond, falling outside, then the very idea of an "agreement" must be given up; for an agreement has no meaning where only one side can act, where the other side is merely independent and remains so. Some other conception of truth, then, must be found and accepted at the very start.¹ Again, for similar reasons, "reality" in the dualistic sense cannot be spoken of as furnishing the standard of accuracy for knowledge. Reality is held to supply a check which can be put upon the process of thinking; it is what holds knowledge within certain bounds. It constrains the order of ideas in knowing. It is that to which thought "appeals" for the verification of connexions amongst ideas. It alone can secure or warrant the necessity which must characterise determinate thought-constructions. All such phrases imply the same

Reality.

¹ For a very concise and convincing argument against the "agreement" conception of truth, cp. Joachim, *On the Nature of Truth*, c. 1.

dualism referred to and the same view of truth. But if the necessity is determined by the thinking subject, as Kant shows, if its significance is found in relation to a possible experience, *i.e.* an ideal system of connected conscious elements, then the appeal to any standard beyond knowledge is meaningless; for this is both inoperative and inherently useless. Besides this, the supposition that what is for ever beyond knowledge can itself control the order of ideas in a sphere (*i.e.* the subject's-experience) outside itself, a sphere which is self-complete by hypothesis—such a supposition is in itself unintelligible. This is made still more evident when the term “reality” is found to have no one definite meaning, but to vary with the attitude of the subject thinking—to be one thing in Perception, another in Understanding, etc. The one “reality” which is to form the standard, and which is not any of these specific types of reality, is inevitably, as in the hands of Kant and Locke it became, a mere residuum; and that surely cannot control the course of the ideas of any subject.

II. Reality
and
Thought.

Connected with this view of truth is another principle which must likewise be surrendered or modified. It lies in the nature of an agreement between thought and reality, that reality, while it can make an agreement, yet has a nature of its own outside this agreement. This must always be the case so long as agreements are made, and since truth is all that knowledge achieves and aims at, and since truth consists in such agreements, endless in form and number, there must always remain a nature peculiar to reality in order to make such agreements possible. This nature, therefore, can by no process of knowledge

whatsoever be exhausted, otherwise knowledge itself would cease to exist, for then there would be nothing to make the agreements which it strives to attain. This position finds expression in the view that "reality is richer than thought," to take Lotze's statement of it ; or that knowledge is unequal to reality, to use Bradley's conception of the same position ; or that beyond the bounds of knowledge there is a sphere of "faith," to take Kant's interpretation of the same situation. All these expressions are based, in the long run, on the same principle of thoughts referring to a real somehow beyond themselves. But if reality is in any sense beyond knowledge it is of no importance where, in the history of knowledge, the separation is made. To make knowledge bear an essentially asymptotic relation to reality is in principle precisely the same as to separate knowledge and reality absolutely from the start. The only difference is that the former puts the separation far away at infinity,—“reality cannot be exhausted by thought” ; the latter plants it down at our feet,—“reality is outside knowledge.” But this is a difference which is unimportant and meaningless : unimportant, since in both cases reality is beyond us, and the question of “when” it comes to be so does not concern knowledge : meaningless, since in both cases we can never say when knowledge actually has failed ; the beyond is always a beyond in either case. The position just referred to is therefore rooted in dualism, in spite of the apparent concession of the worth of knowledge up to a certain point. For it must accept the alternative ; either knowledge does give the nature of reality, in which case the question of amount and the time it takes to exhaust

it is of no significance, since the nature of reality is explicitly known and implicitly cognisable ; or there is at the outset a fundamental cleavage between the two, in which case at no point does knowledge give reality. This view, then, must likewise be modified or given up.

III.
Limits.

If once more reality is not in any sense essentially beyond knowledge, if dualism is abandoned, the inquiry into the nature of knowledge cannot take the form of asking "what are the limits of knowledge," "under what conditions does it work," "what is the relation between thought and reality." For knowledge must in some way determine its own conditions, *i.e.* must be a self-contained experience. The limits of knowledge must mean—not what lies beyond the reach of knowledge, what lies outside knowledge when it has exhausted its utmost resources, but—within what range does a specific form of knowledge hold good? ; *how do the modes of knowledge limit one another?* ; for knowledge can be limited by nothing but knowledge. The relation of thought to reality cannot any longer mean, when does thinking stop and reality begin? ; how is the sphere of thought adjusted to a reality outside itself? The very form of such a question is due to a kind of comparison between thinking on the one side and a real on the other. But such a comparison is itself impossible without thinking, and without an identity containing the factors compared. The question, so far as it has a meaning, is really due to comparing one sphere of thinking experience with an object belonging to another. In point of fact, it is mainly due to comparing conceptual thought with the object-world of perceptual knowledge. Clearly these are separate ; but they

are only separate inside knowing-experience itself, as modes of conscious activity. The comparison, therefore, is a relation of one form of knowing-experience to another. Hence if the comparison implies that conceptual activity, as such, is cut off from all the real, and related to it in some strange way externally, then it falls into error. Conceptual thinking has an object world of its own, a real of its own—the world of conceptions; just as perception has an object of its own—the world of “things.” At no point is thinking divorced from its object, and hence to speak of an external relation between thought and reality either has no valid meaning at all, or else it means the relation of one mode of conscious experience to another.

Where, then, shall we start the problem of the interpretation of knowledge? If we drop all pre-suppositions which would condition the nature of knowledge externally, and, at the same time, if we are not to inquire into one particular kind of knowledge (*e.g.* Perception), nor into a particular sort of relation amongst forms of knowledge (*e.g.* between Perception and Conception), then we can only start from the fact of the activity of knowledge in general on the one side, and of a purpose or end arrived at by knowledge on the other. These are the simplest elements or factors in the problem as to what knowledge is and how it proceeds. Without these there would not be the experience we call knowledge at all. For knowledge does aim at something, has some purpose, because it is a human activity; and that knowledge, as a conscious experience, exists, not even the most daring scepticism can deny. But granting this and this only, then the problem of understanding

The new
Problem.

knowledge consists in finding out simply how these two factors are related. What precisely is it that knowledge actually aims at? where does it reach its goal? and how does it get to that end?¹

Other
forms and
statements
of the
Problem.

Observe the generality of the problem. Knowledge is found in many forms, but all are forms of the same attitude, and hence must, in a general inquiry into knowledge, get consideration. Too often a different view has been taken of the question regarding the nature of knowledge. Sometimes the inquiry is limited simply to the discussion of the so-called "perception of the external world." This is in the main what Berkeley, Locke, and Hume were thinking of when they raised the problem of knowledge, and we can see how their form of the question affected Kant. In a way this seems always to have been thought to be in a peculiar sense epistemology proper. At other times, again, the discussion has gathered round the analysis of the elements and relations of conceptual knowledge. Here it has been supposed that we are in a region away from Perception altogether; that we have a world by itself following its own laws and modes of procedure,—so much so that in its extreme form it is said we hardly need think of any world of perceptual reality at all. Knowledge so treated has been the subject-matter of the Logicians. Logic had to deal with this sphere primarily, because here primarily we get "reasoning."² This discussion, no doubt, was not always spoken of as epistemology, because concepts were taken

¹ To answer that question is in part the purpose of Hegel's *Phenomenology of Mind*.

² Reasoning, the highest expression of conceptual knowledge, has been in such a case taken for the whole of it.

without any necessary filling from Perception, or from any other form of knowing experience, and the question of their worth as conveying truth regarding experience could not therefore readily arise. The more "empty" they were the better for the discussion of them; and hence the form of such a discussion gradually drifts into the purely abstract and symbolical treatment of thought which we find current in so-called Formal or Symbolic Logic. Reality comes in, if at all, by applying the results of "reasoning" to any special "universe of discourse."¹ When some reference to "truth" and "experience" is introduced by way of reaction from this highly abstract and very one-sided view of thought, the discussions of Logic start from the nature of Judgment, whose meaning it is the business of Logic to develop. In judgment, it is held, reality is always implied, and hence stress is laid on the act of so-called "reference to the real" immanent in judgment. The point of agreement between this view of Logic and the other is the divorce both make between "ideas" and "reality." The point of divergence lies in the insistence, in the second case, on the worth of ideas as conveying the actual meaning of the real. But the real, for this second type of Logic, is nevertheless what lies beyond ideas so conceived. Hence we get the ambiguous position that, on the one hand, ideas refer to the real as an "immediate," the immediate of perceptual experience; and, on the other, that reality as such is, not immediacy, but the "ultimate subject" of

¹ It seems fair to say that this treatment of thought by "formal logic" is historically to a large extent responsible for the problem of the "relation of thought to reality."

all experience, what is beyond the immediate, an indefinite and indeterminate extension of it. In other words, we are immediately in touch with reality, and yet reality is mediately "constructed" by us. This view of Logic is current in the more recent developments of Logic.¹ It is clear how closely it is allied to epistemology, for it deals with the nature of concrete knowledge, knowledge, namely, as this appears in judgment. But the limits of its conception of knowledge necessarily make it rather an interpretation of science and scientific procedure than of knowledge in general.² Hence it is that the only kind of immediate referred to by ideas is the immediate of external perception, perception of things as parts of "nature,"—a limitation of the range of immediacy which is quite misleading if left unexpressed.

The new
Problem :
its char-
acter.

If, therefore, we are not to discuss simply one mode of knowledge, and if we refuse to take any one form as exclusively knowledge, it is manifest that we must widen our conception of the nature of epistemology and alter our problem. Not one, but all forms of knowledge will be considered. Wherever we can be said to know, be the object what it may, that will fall under the scope of the inquiry. But this means that the problem embraces every way of being conscious of an object. For at the very least it will be admitted that in all conscious human experience there is a somewhat present to consciousness to make that

¹ It is the view found in Lotze and Bradley, and to a less extent in Bosanquet.

² It is interesting to notice that the discussion of other forms of knowledge, e.g. Sensation, or again Morality, is handed over to different kinds of analysis. For that reason this view of Logic is not really epistemology proper. It is less so than even Mill's *Logic*, which does discuss the "Logic of the Moral Sciences."

experience possible, whether the somewhat be a spot of colour, a planet, a human soul, or the universe. But the presence of somewhat to consciousness is exactly what knowledge in its widest and most complete sense really means. It is not necessary that the two should be clearly and consciously distinguished by a given individual; this is irrelevant. If it were necessary, then much of what passes for knowledge, even in popular speech, would have to be rejected. These, then, are the lowest terms in which all knowledge can be described, and when so described *knowledge and conscious experience are, strictly speaking, co-extensive*. It is impossible to draw hard and fast lines across experience and arbitrarily say, here is "knowledge," there is "perception," that is "morality," this in "instinct," the other is "intuition," and so on. For in all these cases *one and the same fact* is found, a somewhat of which mind is conscious; and literally that is all there is to find in each case. But to be conscious of somewhat is surely knowledge. The precise relation, which merely determines the special kind of knowledge, does not alter the fundamental fact of its being knowledge. To isolate one form of such relation and speak of it as exclusively "knowledge" is unwarranted, if that which makes "knowledge" a form of experience is exactly the same as we find in other forms of experience. Thus to say that "knowledge" is exclusively confined to statements, to what can be expressed in words, is not even in agreement with current acceptations of the term, where we regard much knowledge as being immediate, and both incapable of being spoken, and unnecessary to be expressed. So when it is held that knowledge

implies a distinction of ideas from things, we are confronted with the fact that in sense-experience there is no such distinction; and yet we are "distinctly aware," *i.e.* we *know*, through Sense.

An objection.

It may be said that such a view would confound knowledge and conation. In "will," as seen in Morality, it may be held, we have surely something different from knowledge, although in "will" also there is a somewhat for consciousness. In fact, the relation of something to consciousness, we might say, tells us nothing of the *kind* of relation, whether it be one of action or observation, and cannot be named knowledge, which, it might be held, is only one form of that relation. But to that the reply seems sufficient, (1) that conation in the sense of activity is certainly present in "knowing" itself, whatever meaning we give the term; yet this does not alter our view that it is knowledge: and (2) in conation (*e.g.* in the case of Morality) there is surely knowledge even in the narrowest sense; for we are conscious of objects.

(1) The psychological analysis not an "explanation."

The truth is that in two ways such an objection to the idealistic interpretation is mistaken. The objection is raised from the side of psychology only, where we have in view simply the processes of individual mind taken subjectively, and deal with the elements or factors which compose the immediate experiences of a subject, and the distinctive attitudes it can take up in its varied experience. From this point of view certainly knowledge and conation must be distinguished. They are generically different phases of conscious life. But the psychological point of view is confessedly limited in various ways, in this way amongst others that it deals solely with the

conscious individual life, as a finite unit, and does not transcend the immediate conditions of that life. Now even the individual in his actual experience is not to be fully understood merely from his subjective side. We cannot by resolving his individual experience into its ultimate elements and conditions thereby state the full meaning and content of that life itself. By resolving a tree into its chemical and physical constituents and conditions we could not describe the configuration, the actions, and reactions which make up its concrete life-history, make up the full meaning of the tree as it is in itself, and in relation to others. Hence, for this reason alone, an objection to a more full and concrete interpretation of the individual's experience cannot be legitimate if based on an expressly one-sided and abstract position. The real individual who lives and moves throughout his experience has not simply a subjective side but an objective as well, and at the same time. But if this be so, then it is not simply one of the elements of conscious life which is operative now at one stage of that experience, and another at another. The self as a unit operates with all its "ultimate elements" *at once*, and must do so just because they are its ultimate elements. Thus in concrete life we find that actual knowing implies conation in the psychological sense, actual conation implies knowing in the psychological sense. Since these are in concrete experience indissoluble, it is irrelevant to speak of an interpretation of concrete experience identifying the two. They are themselves identified and must be so treated. Hence we may psychologically look at, *e.g.*, Perception, either as a manifestation of the conative activity

of a subject or as presentation ; but in concrete experience it is both at once. And the only general expression for that experience is to say that there is in Perception a somewhat for a consciousness, or there is consciousness of something. This general form of awareness characterises all possible modes of the life-history of the concrete individual, from the Perception of a tree to the realisation of a Moral Order, or the Life of Religion. Now *to be aware of anything* is, in the widest as well as in the narrowest sense, to *know*. Hence the experience of the individual, which just consists in all the forms of being aware of something, is to be regarded as consisting in modes of knowing. The object or the somewhat may vary according to the plane of experience ; but there must always be an object and a subject to make it an object, and for which the object is. Whether we use the term "experience" or the term "know" is thus indifferent.

Reason
for the
objection.

What makes the term "know" seem insufficient is the fact that in knowing we have in general the object primarily in view, and not the subject who knows. The scientist, *e.g.*, does not think about himself at all in knowing ; he is absorbed in his object, and tries indeed, as he says, to eliminate the subjective factor altogether. He, *quâ* scientist, occupies a trans-subjective or "impersonal" attitude, what has been called the point of view of "universal experience." In other forms of activity, however, this attitude is not deliberately taken up ; the subjective factor consciously remains a determining element in the experience. This is seen, *e.g.*, in Perceiving, or again in Morality and Religion. Hence the reluctance to admit that a term which is

generally appropriated for a mode where the subject is consciously suppressed, should be applied also to cases where it is consciously emphasised. But it is our whole contention—a legitimate contention—that in Science, no less than in every mode of experience, the subject is operative and cannot be eliminated,¹ and that what we have in Science is merely one special form of the experience of mind. And thus the “scientific mood” stands, *quâ* experience, on the same footing as all other modes.

The other reason in defence of this more general use of the term knowledge, is that conscious awareness is wider than both knowledge and conation in the narrow psychological sense. It is wider because it contains both as moments or factors. It is conscious awareness of content so conceived that we are dealing with, because this is the consciousness operating throughout experience. Hence it is inaccurate to assert that we are ignoring one of those factors by using an expression which necessarily must contain them both.

(2) Psychological knowing and willing imply a wider conscious principle.

We have to take, then, all the forms of awareness, of consciousness of something, which make up what we call our experience. No one is taken to the exclusion of the other; all modes of experience must find a place in it. The question is, What does the interpretation of knowledge so considered mean? how is the significance of knowledge so understood to be arrived at? If we ask this question about any one mode, the answer is to be found in the actual procedure of the form of knowledge

Meaning of the new Problem.

¹ This, indeed, is very evident even to the scientist himself. The existence of the “personal equation” in Science, the possibility of error in observation and calculation and assumption, the doubt or, again, the satisfaction and confidence in the final result—all testify unmistakably to the subjective factor.

itself. Thus, in the case of "perceiving," when we seek to find out the nature or meaning of Perception, we seek to state the "truth" about perceptual experience. This means that when Perception attains its highest expression, its essential end, we have its real nature. Its truth does not lie outside it, nor in its constituent conditions (psychological, physiological, etc.). It is a mode of knowledge, and its truth is the end which constrains or controls the process of perceiving. It is this end which imparts to Perception the necessity which characterises it as a mode of knowing, for it is to this it must proceed in order to *be* Perception. Its truth in that sense lies within its very process and determines it. So of any other mode of knowledge. And this is the way by which we are to find out the real meaning of *all* the modes in which knowledge appears, and which make up the mind's experience. Instead of taking one mode, we are here to take all the modes together. These are simply diverse forms in which that fundamental relation of awareness of a somewhat, which constitutes having experience, appears. The mind, we may put it, in experience, when looked at as a whole, is aware of a somewhat in general, a continuum of objectivity, which gets differentiated into specific objects, or "somewhats," according to the kind or plane of experience, Perception, Science, Morality, etc.¹ To interpret this general relation as such is exactly the same problem in principle as to interpret the meaning of any specific mode of knowing. And just

¹ Or, again, we may state the same position by saying that to the one continuum of objectivity the one continuum of mind gets differentiated into a variety of specifically distinct conscious attitudes.

as in the latter case we find the solution in determining the ideal or end aimed at, which controls the relation between mind and its particular object, so we find the interpretation of the *whole* process by showing what is the ideal aimed at and implied in *all* the forms of knowledge, and how and where that ideal is realised. There is only one such ideal, for it is the consciousness of one and the same individual in which there is experience. And it must be operative throughout all the forms of its experience. The question as to *how* is precisely the question as to the method of carrying out this interpretation.

Here, then, is the significance of the new interpretation of knowledge. What gives necessity to knowledge is not, as dualism holds, some external constraining force exerted by a so-called world beyond the mind, a world of things, which controls the order of our subjective ideas. The necessity is to be found only in what is inherent in the very essence of knowledge itself. But that is just the end or ideal at which knowledge aims, and which it expresses by its process. The meaning, in other words, is to be looked for in what is immanent in knowledge, not what is transcendent. Necessity there must be, and necessity is a controlling force. It implies a contrast between what is and what must be, between a fact and a law, a part and a whole, a datum and an ideal. That is all it means in the last resort. The controlling force in consciousness can only be a conscious Ideal.

Necessity
lies in the
Ideal or
End.

CHAPTER III

TRUTH AND EXPERIENCE

The Ideal: **THE** whole stress of the interpretation here rests on its meaning. the character of this Ideal. An ideal is, in any sense, within the limits to which it applies, the completest unity in the greatest diversity. Thus an "ideal" of scientific interpretation in the case, say, of any mechanical system, is one in which we have a principle regulating or controlling all the elements, and combinations of these, which make up the constituent parts of that system. So of a moral or artistic "ideal" in given relevant cases. In regard to consciousness of objects, the ideal will also be that in which we have the deepest unity with the richest diversity. The diversity here lies in the two elements distinguished, viz. consciousness and a somewhat or objects. The unity is just the presence of the one in and to the other. The object is not external, nor is it internal ;
* for these terms imply a connotation quite alien to
* the character of knowledge, and are in fact the
* creation of experience itself. Nor is the unity one
* of interaction, for here again we have a mechanical,
and to that extent an external relationship. The
unity is one in which consciousness only exists in
* and through the object, and the object only in and

III UNITY OF SUBJECT AND OBJECT 81

for consciousness. So much is this the case that we can, and do in actual life, consider one side as if it were the whole unity. This is what we find, on the one hand, *e.g.*, in scientific inquiry, in generalisation, or even classification, when it is said "we must eliminate the subject altogether, the object alone is what we have to keep in mind." On the other hand, when, *e.g.*, in mathematical analysis, we are said to carry on the process merely "in our minds" and then "apply" the result to so-called objective facts, such as motion, here again one side stands for the whole experience. The reason for such apparently contrary views is just the completeness of the identity of subject and object in knowledge. The distinction of subject and object is experience broken up into its diversity; the active relation of the two, however it appears, is experience in its unity, withdrawn to its identity. But neither the diversity nor the unity has any significance without the other.

The ideal, then, for this consciousness aware of an object is to be found at that level or mode of experience where mind as subject has its self as a whole consciously before it, not implied, but actually expressed. Or, put otherwise, it is the form where the object is the mind itself; it is that identity which does not merely make its diversity "*possible*," but is its expressed content. And this is the ideal, because this has been implied all along. It is not an absolutely new mode of experience. It is the mode which appears when that is attained explicitly which was always present implicitly; for, as we saw just now, subject only is in its object. It finds itself there; while the

Form of
the Ideal.

object *is* only through a subject. We have, therefore, merely to get those two sides absolutely transparent to each other, completely fused as a conscious fact, and we have the ideal for all forms of conscious experience.

Content
of the
Ideal.

Now it is clear that such an ideal will be unable to stop short of a complete mind and a complete object. It will not be found in the consciousness of a special object, a particular object, such as we have in the consciousness, say, of a "thing" or the world of "society." These are partial; there always remains something outside any one of them; for they always remain outside, *i.e.* different from, one another. They are, looked at in one way, merely modifications or specific modes of the one complete objective continuum which faces consciousness as a whole.¹ Mind in its unity as a whole is aware of objectivity as a whole; "things," "events," "persons," etc., are just elements in this continuum, to each of which mind takes up a specifically different attitude. Thus the mind's unity as such is not, in the long run, satisfied by anything short of the whole, the reason being that only then is its unity completely found or expressed. But if its unity is completely found in the whole, there is no distinction between itself and the whole. The whole is its unity; its self is there in its fulness. If the self only finds itself in its object, it finds its completest self, its full unity, in the completest object. Or, the ideal is found when the self is consciously the objective totality, of which the specific objects of detailed experience are but parts or elements. In

¹ Looked at in another way they are specific attitudes of the one continuous unity of the subject of all experience.

this ideal mind answers to mind consciously and completely. This means, to use the familiar phrase, that mind is satisfied when its object is the Absolute, and that Absolute is mind. The ideal of experience is the complete and conscious unity of the subject with a conscious Absolute.

The importance of such an ideal lies not so much in its being a definite mode of experience. It is that. But it is the condition which makes real any mode of knowledge whatsoever. It is the logical ground of the awareness of anything, even of the lowest form of awareness. Experience in all its forms starts with the distinction of consciousness from objectivity. That distinction *is from the first implicitly a distinction of mind from itself*, and therefore finds its completion in becoming conscious that it is so. But explicitly it appears to begin with as a contrast between mind and objects in general. How that contrast comes about is a question for that study which deals with the growth and evolution of the life of mind.¹ There it is shown that mind begins in somatic and soul life with its various qualities. We then have merely a relation of soul to environment, the soul being one item in the complex whole of "nature." Only with the dawn of consciousness does mind begin to be actualised, for only then does it become aware of its distinction from the whole. Only at this stage can it have "experience," can there *be* "experience" at all.

Experience proper, therefore, begins at that level of the mind's life where consciousness starts, for experience means conscious relation to something; and with the rise of consciousness comes an

¹ This is in part the business of Psychology, whether rational or empirical.

object of which mind is conscious, that from which mind is distinguished. Ultimately, of course, what consciousness is aware of is the whole of objectivity, which stretches from the immediate present or focus of consciousness without break to the totality of objective content. In a sense this whole is there *to start with*, for soul becomes mind by distinction from the whole with which it was formerly (in soul life) fused. But the whole is at first explicitly just an immediate whole, that whole nearest to soul life—the life of sense. Hence, as we shall see, the first stage of experience is *sense-experience*.¹ But the whole is for the most part *implicit* in the first stage of experience. Being implicit it forces experience to develop; and that creates the “course” of experience. The first form of an object being “external,” inadequate, shot through with diversity, a development of experience is demanded to get that unity it really wants, and which was there from the start of consciousness. Experience, it may be said, is the great venture of the Spirit to try to accomplish by its own history, and at its own level, what is done for soul by the “course of nature.” It is the Spirit’s voyage of discovery to find its own meaning; the falling of the world in sunder to be fused by the white heat of thought and spiritual toil for freedom. Freedom is the goal of the life-history of experience; it is there we have at the higher level of the sphere of Spirit what we had at the level of soul life. For the distinction referred to has arisen within finite mind; and its having arisen is just the proof of its finitude. To establish finite consciousness and create such a

¹ Cp. Adamson, *Lectures*, vol. i. p. 290 ff.

distinction mean the same thing. But that by which it arose is that in which it finds its completion and satisfaction; for it is the unity out of which came the diverse elements, conscious subject and an object. Hence the ideal is not merely the goal towards which the modes of knowledge point, but the very principle which makes them what they are for finite consciousness. It is that which makes them essential modes, and which makes them modes at all, *i.e.* forms of experience, of a unity of the diverse elements, subject and object. Thus to show that the modes of knowledge have their complete realisation in this ideal is both to prove that Absolute Mind is that in which the nature of knowledge is satisfied, and also that which makes all modes of knowledge at once possible and valid. It is the ground as well as the goal of all truth whatsoever.

We see at once in all this the character of the change which has come over Kant's problem.

To begin with Kant considered knowledge to be an affair between an individual mind and an individual object. Now this, of course, is in a sense true, but only in a very limited sense. The mind is consciously aware for the most part of one object in every act of knowledge, and hence the conceptions etc., which it employs, appear, so to say, one at a time, and as occasion demands. But to regard this as the whole truth is to confound the psychological process of knowing, with the content of truth with which knowledge is concerned. For it confuses the act of attention, or the series of such acts, by which, certainly, knowledge is carried on, with the content on which mind is engaged. These acts are no doubt discrete, but the consciousness of objects is continuous and

unbroken. The object engaging our mind at a particular time is isolated, for selection involves isolation, and attention implies selection. But just because a content is selected, all the other content of objectivity is implied, to some extent even consciously, in every act of knowledge. Take, for example, the knowledge of the sounds filling an auditorium. We are thinking of, *knowing*, the words which comprise these sounds, but we are also aware of the size, colours, etc., of the room, and our place in it and so on. The mind, in fact, is never literally aware merely of what is at the focus of attention, nor does knowledge consist *simply* in such discrete separate acts. The mind is a centre of varied relations to a whole of objectivity, for this alone completes its purpose, and only in this as a whole can it rest satisfied. Hence what we have to consider in knowledge is not a single relation of a mind to a single object, but of mind in its unity to the total objectivity in which alone are its purpose and nature completed. When this is taken account of, we shall not take truth to be realised in specifically different acts each complete in itself; nor shall we divorce the finite mind from the complete whole in which it finds satisfaction. For only in and through the whole is it truly itself. From the point of view of the complete interpretation of mind's knowledge, therefore, the nature of the whole is logically prior to that of the part, because it makes each phase of knowledge a moment of the complete truth at which knowledge in all its various forms aims. It is not, of course, necessary that we should begin the interpretation by stating in its entirety what this ideal contains.

For a reason we shall see presently that is not essential. Nor is it possible to do so; it would mean beginning the interpretation by giving it in its entirety at the start. But we can and must proceed in the light of that ideal.

From this again it will be seen what meaning must be attached to the idea of necessity in knowledge, an idea which played such a large part in determining Kant's theory. For Kant necessity, if it was to be found at all, had to be essentially *à priori*, because the material of the objective world was somehow beyond coherent knowledge, and for that reason was contingent as regards it. Thus the conceptions of "necessary knowledge" and "possible experience" were in Kant's theory strictly complementary conceptions. Necessity could only exist in what was logically prior to experience; and because experience was logically posterior, it was, from the point of view of self-consciousness, dependent, and *per se* therefore contingent. This position is merely another illustration of the dualism with which Kant worked. Had "empirical contingency" referred to the validity of a generalisation, *e.g.* in science, no doubt the necessity would have been concrete; it would have been embedded in experience, even though the necessity would then have been merely relative. But Kant's necessity has no part nor lot in experience at all: it is unconditioned necessity he refers to. This, however, can only hold good of the pure conditions of experience. It is not concrete in any sense; it is purely abstract and formal. The necessity holds only of the sphere determined by the *à priori* grounds of experience. But what does necessity in this case mean? Necessity in its very

"Necessity" in Kant's view.

?

x
x
x

x

x

x

?

principle implies a relation between parts in a whole. Nothing in particular can be necessary in itself. Necessity holds between one thing and something else. The relation may be expressed hypothetically or otherwise, but a relation it must be. Now for Kant the relation here in question is one between the unity of the self and the idea of a possible experience. Conceptions constitutive of experience are the functions by which the manifold is built into this unity. Their necessity lies in their being the only way of securing the single unity of the self when dealing with the varied detail of sense. A "category" is that by which the manifold can be part of the experience of a single self. Hence since this is done by specifically different functions (according to the kind of object), each is necessary in exactly the same sense. And each is necessary as it stands; for on Kant's view, as we saw, objects are known by separate acts. Observe what that necessity amounts to. It is strictly relative to a possibility, viz. a possible experience. That possibility is purely abstract, as abstract as the pure self for which it is a possibility. It does not *of itself* constitute the specific character of the conceptions or universals which give necessity, any more than the pure ego. Their special nature has therefore to be determined in other ways. In point of fact it is determined quite fortuitously, either by the suggestion of sense-facts, which give the hint, so to say, what conception, *i.e.* what specific necessity, is required in a given case; or the conception is obtained by a gratuitous appeal to the structure of traditional thought or logical doctrine which, as

Kant himself confessed, he drew upon when arranging the list of his categories. The necessity, in short, so far as of significance for the interpretation of the nature of knowledge, is purely and simply of a formal character, which tells nothing whatsoever as to the concrete necessity which is alone of value in actual knowledge. When it becomes definite we have to get its nature elsewhere. This is the inevitable result of Kant's dualistic assumption, where at the very best necessity must be of a point by point character, each special case of necessity being determined without conscious reference to the single unity constituting the principle of necessity in every case.¹

Now on the above view the necessity in knowledge lies also in a relation ; it is a relation between the ideal aimed by all knowledge, and a given mode of knowledge. It is the constraining influence of the ideal which compels acceptance of the validity of a given act or form of knowledge. It is not a compelling force exerted externally on the course of the mind's thoughts by a reality beyond knowledge ; nor again a controlling abstraction like that of the unity of a possible experience. The necessity must lie in the heart of knowledge itself ; and knowledge can only be controlled by an inward principle when that principle is implicit in the very nature of knowledge. The necessity determining knowledge must then be immanent, not

Necessity
is concrete
and arises
from the
ideal.

¹ Similarly in Kant's view of morality. Every duty is absolutely necessary, and necessary to the same degree, because the necessity lies in formal agreement with law in general. But when duties become concrete, their matter comes from experience, which relatively to the law is contingent. The necessity of each law therefore stands by itself : there is no determination of laws from a central unity.

transcendent in any sense; and that is found in the contrast between what is potential and what is actual, between what is a whole and what is a part. Thus, *e.g.* in Perception, what compels us to admit validity in an act of perceptual knowledge, such as "there is a tree," is the implicit presence in that act of the essential unity of mind and its object. The degree to which that is realised varies in Perception,—a fact seen, on the one hand, in the vagaries and illusions of Perception, and, on the other, in the incapacity of perceptual knowledge, as a whole, to tell the complete truth. But such necessity as it does have comes from the one principle just stated. And the same is true of the necessity inherent in scientific knowledge, or again in a moral judgment. Every form has necessity, in short, for the reason that in each the ultimate unity of mind with its objective world is both asserted and implied.

Necessity
varies in
form.

This, again, indicates that necessity does not require to mean exactly the same thing in all forms of knowledge, as Kant seemed to imply. We shall find this more particularly when we consider the method. Meantime, it is sufficient to observe here that variation in the form of necessity lies in the nature of the case. For if the principle at the root of necessity is the unity of the whole self with the object of which the self is aware, the very diversity of the forms in which the life of the self appears just means that there are different degrees in which that unity is explicitly secured, or that it is implicit to a greater extent in certain forms than in others. That must be so, because they could not be different forms on any other condition. Their

having necessity at all lies in their nature as modes of knowledge, and their being different implies a difference in their necessity. This can be confirmed by an appeal to everyday experience, though of course such an appeal is not final for a systematic interpretation of experience. Thus, for example, we are familiar with the appeal men make from "principles" or "conceptions of thought" to "actual facts" belonging to Perception, an appeal which is made in different ways according to the interest at stake. At one time men will say, "let us give up ideas and theories, and let us see what the facts say": meaning thereby that conceptual knowledge, generalisation, etc., is looked at as either confusing or contradictory, while the "facts" are steady and manifest to the normal operation of Perception. This appeal is made in spite of the transparent and admitted truth that Perception is, of all mental processes, perpetually open to error and liable to illusion—as is indirectly indicated in the precautions taken for eliminating sources of error in observation. At another time we find that just as readily men will, in other circumstances of mental life, appeal from "facts" to "conceptions," in those cases especially where particular facts seem to make against a long-accepted principle, or even a largely verified hypothesis. Here, it is held, the facts will later on be shown to fall under the principle, although they seem at present not intelligible by it. Such an appeal may be stated in the strongest form; "if your facts do not agree with the conception, so much the worse for your facts." In this case a different and a lower certainty, or cognitive necessity, is attached to perceptual fact than to conceptual principle, and that in

spite of the accepted truth that conceptions easily lead us astray because of their mere universality.¹ In this opposition, then, between perceptual fact and conceptual principle, however that opposition be expressed, we have an illustration of a difference admitted in ordinary life between one kind of cognitive necessity and another. And this difference is not merely one in kind but in worth for our experience. Some forms of experience are said to be more necessary to us than others, *e.g.* moral, or, it may be, religious experience. By this we mean, not so much that we can less easily exist without them, that their absence would impoverish life, but that they realise more fully the nature of our experience ; or, to use our terms, they have a deeper unity of the diverse elements, subject and object.

It is impossible, therefore, to discuss the question of the necessity of judgments, as if necessity means the same thing throughout the whole range of experience. Yet this seems certainly to have been assumed, *e.g.*, by Kant and Hume in their interpretation of knowledge.

Nature of
Truth on
this view.

Once again we see that the new conception of the problem of knowledge involves our giving a definite meaning to what the very idea of knowledge implies—Truth. Ordinarily understood, truth, as Kant puts it, means the agreement between thought and its object, held by dualism to be separate. Kant's own theory gave a curious turn to that conception. If the object is the unity of the matter of experience with the conception of understanding, the latter containing the function and rule of synthesis which the

Kant's
view.

¹ This second relation between facts and conceptions is not limited to "scientific" experience. It is the peculiar note of morality and religion.

unity of the object implies, it is clear that the object is not more exclusively matter than form or conception. But if thought in any sense "makes the object," "legislates for nature," what comes of the meaning of truth as just defined? Thought cannot "agree" with its object, if thought is itself a determining condition of the nature of the object, for the very word "agree" implies that the object is something with an independence of its own.¹

The meaning Kant attaches to truth will hold only when we deal conceptually with what we may call perceptual knowledge,—*i.e.* where, as in the case of science in the narrowest sense of the term, a sharp distinction is implied between sense perception on the one hand, and judgment and inference on the other. It concerns relations amongst ideas, not "matters of fact," and deals with the connexion between these two factors in the constitution of an intelligible experience. It does not refer to any other relation between mind and its object than that in which the object is looked upon as something "given" from without, and the mind is regarded as dealing with it by certain generalising processes peculiar to itself,—as we say "thinking about" the object. It excludes, therefore, from the range of truth the sphere, *e.g.*, of Moral Experience, or again that of Art, and applies essentially to the harmonious relation between mind and its object in the sphere of "science." In these other spheres specifically different expressions are used. Thus, on this view, it would probably be held that in the relation in Art, harmony of feeling was satisfied, in Morality harmony of will. To speak of forms of

Its narrow
range of
applica-
tion.

¹ The object, of course, is not, in Kant's sense, the "matter" of experience.

the moral life as more or less "true," would, on Kant's view, be probably considered a misapplication of terms.

Truth is
"Agreement"; its
mistake.

The fundamental principle at work in this conception of truth is no doubt the unity of mind and its object. Where this is complete we are said to have, in intellectual experience, "truth." But a moment's reflection shows that this narrower meaning is at once inaccurate in its application of that principle, and too restricted in its range. For it takes truth to be in reality a relation between *two different forms in which the subject and its object are connected*. The subject belongs to one form of experience, the object to another. It holds truth to be a relation between, say, the perceived object, and reflection about *that* object. But it is transparent that in Perception itself we have a specific relation between subject and object, for Perception is a mode of experience: and in reflection likewise we have another specific relation between subject and object for the same reason. And the object is no more the same in each case than the attitude of the subject is the same. *Both object and subject are different in the two cases*. Object and subject are correlative to each other, and an alteration in the one *ipso facto* means a change in the other. Thus the object of Perception is *not the same as* the object for Reflection; and it is no more possible to perceive an object and then *think about that same object as it is in Perception*, than it is to see a law of nature by opening our eyes. "The laws of the planets," as an astronomer once remarked, "are not written on the sky."

Relativity
of subject
and object.

Hence, the view which supposes that our reflec-

tion is "true," because its result "agrees with" sense-fact, makes a twofold mistake. In the first place, it seeks to identify the object of Reflection with that of Perception, and thus implicitly neglects to note that each has a distinct object of its own. In the second place, it separates the process of reflection from its own object, takes that process to be something by itself, and looks upon it as dealing with an object which is external to itself, whereas this object really belongs to another sphere of experience altogether. It is true that Reflection and Perception are distinct in our experience: hence the attempt to unify them, which gives rise to the view of truth we are criticising. But it is not true that the elements or factors into which each can be resolved can be so cut loose and separated as to replace one another indifferently, or be transposed from one sphere to another.

The error
twofold.

On the other hand the view of truth we are opposing is too limited in its range, even if it could be accepted as it stands. If the harmonious relation of mind and its object is the fundamental principle in that conception of truth, then why should not the conception apply wherever we have such a relation? We can see at once that we must so apply it. For not merely is it not possible, except arbitrarily, to limit it to one form of that relation, but the complete harmony or agreement (as we choose to call it) cannot be attained at all unless when mind is taken in its completeness and related to the object world in its entirety. For what is meant by "mind" in such a statement? If a particular form of mind (*e.g.* in Perception or Morality), then clearly mind will never be fully satisfied, fully harmonised

This view
of Truth
too
limited.

merely by one such phase of its activity, simply because no particular form can exhaustively realise its nature, satisfy its supreme end. Truth would therefore be unattainable at all if that were meant. But if we mean, as we must, mind in its entirety, mind in its complete unity, then it is impossible to stop short of applying the conception to each and every way in which mind is related to its object. The mind is one, and only attains complete consciousness of unity in its relation to the whole of its content, and every relation in which it stands to an object, every part of its experience is merely a partial expression of its completed realisation, a partial form of its "truth." This is saying no more than that truth must be the whole, and cannot be confined to any special form or phase of experience—as the narrow view of truth above given proposes to do.

The
idealistic
view.

Now this change in the conception of truth is an essential characteristic of the above view of experience, and follows directly from the nature of its principle. We are no longer to take one form of experience as furnishing truth, and determine the truth of others by means of it. Each has a truth of its own; all are "truths" for mind as a whole. The Moral Life, or, again, Religion has its own truth, which differs from every other, but has a value all its own which cannot be affected by another phase of experience. Their claim to be true just lies in their claim to *be* at all. And they claim to exist, simply because mind seeks in each a phase of its complete realisation. Science is not the only means of presenting truth; it only presents a special form of truth. It is not the only form of knowledge, in the widest sense,

for Morality *is* also a form of conscious relation of subject and object.

Such a question, again, as the "possibility of attaining truth," which is sometimes raised, ceases to have importance from its very indefiniteness. If it implies a doubt regarding all truth, it is at once meaningless and self-contradictory. It is meaningless to raise a sceptical question regarding the possibility of truth in general, for that question being intelligent implies at least the possibility of a true answer. Again, the very idea of "possibility" implies a standard by which to test something assumed for the moment to be problematical. In that sense the question is self-contradictory. If, however, it means a particular form of truth may not be possible, we have to ask, in order to make the question definite, which form is referred to by the question. The form of the question seems to imply that there is a single standard for all truth. But such a standard must either be purely formal, or, if it has content, must be a special form of truth taken as the standard for all other forms. A purely formal standard is valueless, for truth is essentially concrete, being the innermost nature of the life of mind. We cannot separate form from content, unity between mind and object, which is the general form, from the actual phase of mind and the actual object between which the unity holds. While if we take one particular form of truth as a standard, this will certainly be arbitrary unless it be the whole.

It is just such a limitation of the meaning of truth which gives rise, *e.g.*, to Kant's conception of the range of valid knowledge, or again to the position taken up by Descartes at the very outset of his

"Possibility of truth."

1.

11.

111

Kant on limitation of truth.

philosophical inquiry. If, as Kant held, truth is only possible when we have sense-experience, then we have restricted the content of truth to begin with, and the whole argument to establish the limits of knowledge and the impossibility of knowing things in themselves apart from sense, is devised to sustain, and is merely a consistent development of, the initial limitation of the range of truth. Alter the conception, and the whole construction of Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* has to be revised. The very problem of "the conditions of the possibility of true knowledge" is seen at once to be futile, because it sets up one form of truth as final and yet seeks to examine the conditions of its truth by *another form* of knowledge, viz. a scientific or philosophical criticism. It is inherently impossible to understand or examine any knowledge except by knowledge itself. Such a problem makes a pretence of restricting truth to one sphere, but is all the while, by its very examination of that sphere, asserting the equal validity of another kind of knowledge, viz. criticism of knowledge. This gives an air of artificiality to the whole argument. At the very best it is no more than an analysis of the conditions of our knowledge of the external world, of truth regarding the world of Perception, not an analysis of knowledge as a whole. The *Critique* is, like Locke's *Essay* or Berkeley's *Principles*, a chapter on the philosophy of perceptual experience. Beyond this the results are fruitless. It is transparent, for example, that, if we restrict knowledge to perceptual experience, we are bound to fall into inconsistency if we try to go beyond it; for to try to go beyond it, and yet not be able to go beyond it, is precisely the whole of

the inconsistency in question. The ingenuities of the Dialectic in the *Critique of Pure Reason* are merely illustrations on certain fundamental points of this single inconsistency. So, again, no one in his senses ever supposed that by Perception we could know the truth about what, by its very nature, is assumed to be outside the range of Perception, viz. a thing in itself. As perceived, it is necessarily a thing *for us*, and what it is outside that condition, *i.e. for itself or "in itself,"* is obviously beyond the power of Perception to say.

But for Kant's prejudice in favour of one form of truth, he would have been led to try to justify the very attempt to gain, by other forms of knowledge, certainty regarding what lay beyond perceptions. And this would have involved a change not merely in his view of truth, but in his very conception of a criticism of knowledge.

Now if truth cannot be taken in any one-sided way, we are bound to reject all attempts to limit its range to one form, or to judge its worth by making one special kind absolute. And when we do so, there is nothing left but to accept every form of relation between mind and its object as giving, *pro tanto*, a certain mode of truth. Any realisation of the life of mind is at once experience and truth; it contains subject and object, and is a form in which the unity of mind with its object is revealed. Such a unity is what we mean by truth. This view means that the worth of no phase of experience shall be sacrificed to the claims of another, and that each will be acknowledged as contributing its own amount to the sum-total of truth. Hence, *e.g.*, from this point of view, Religion, or Science, or Morality cannot and need

Kinds and
degrees of
"unity"
and
"truth."

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not surrender their truth in the interest of one another; for each simply presents a different truth for mind, and enriches its life thereby. To set up Science to judge Religion is just as futile as to examine the moral life with our five senses. The mind attains a different satisfaction through each and all of its forms, and, as forms of experience, they cannot disagree, because the kind of realisation in each case is different. To take one either as standard for all the others, or as the only valid form, is deliberately to impoverish the meaning of the mind's life—a result which the biographies of specialists in all departments of activity, Art, Science, or Religion, amply testify in a painfully concrete manner.

The only difficulty, then, which faces this interpretation of what truth means, is, how is truth to be distinguished from error or illusion in such a view? Or, to put it more formally, by what process shall we criticise and connect these various truths so as to show an inherent necessity running through them all? This raises the question of the method of explaining knowledge. With this we shall deal presently.¹

“Experience” in
Kant’s
theory.

It is evident, after the foregoing, that we shall also have to reconstrue the ordinary use of the term “experience” in philosophy, if the new problem is to be understood properly, and its position justified. To Kant the problem of knowledge was the analysis of the conditions of what he called a “possible experience.” In whatever way the term be understood, it implies quite a distinctive conception of the relation of mind to its experience. The self or ego is looked upon as a self-complete and self-closed abstract entity, over against, and in that sense external to,

¹ *Vide* Chap. IV.

which, experience is placed, and with which somehow it gets connected. We may say that it is the aim of Kant's theory to give the conditions of such connexion. Experience in this way is confessedly something contingent, so far as the self (or the self functioning through understanding) is concerned. And this Kant states in so many words. It is impossible, indeed, to give any meaning to such a term unless by taking something to be actual. For a "possible" has only significance by relation to something definitely secured and fixed. But such a conception must in that case be essentially abstract and empty for two reasons. We cannot, in the first place, divorce the concrete self from its actual experience; yet to give meaning to that conception we must do so, for a "possible" experience implies a self without experience, *i.e.* a purely indeterminate abstract ego, an ego that is not yet realised, an ego implicitly. Possible experience, when applied not to a particular content but to the whole, is correlative to and distinguished from an abstract self, a self that is to be. On the other hand, an experience which is only possible is itself indeterminate, and in that sense empty of content. Such a conception cannot in itself be effective in determining actual knowledge as distinct from problematical assertion. Yet it is only in reference to such a conception that "a priority," which has its source in the mind apart from such experience, gets its value and significance for experience. It is easy to see from this how the *à priori* conceptions of which Kant speaks come to be "empty" in themselves. Their emptiness is simply due to their being functions of an empty self, an abstract ego, that ego which is

assumed to be *per se* divorced from experience, and is a bare potentiality. They are merely different phases of that indeterminate functioning entity.¹

Experi-
ence is
concrete.

Now it seems obvious that the only experience we have to deal with is actual concrete experience, and that this is not the experience of an abstract ego, but of a living ego in a perpetual state of activity, an ego ceaselessly realising itself. If we take the standpoint of actual life we shall refuse to make any separation between an ego and its realisation, between a mind and its "environment" of experience. For the self is never the mere possibility of having experience as a whole; it always is a definite form or mode of experience. And it is no more possible to separate experience and self than the members from the organism: the members are the organism in its diversity, the organism is its members in their unity. The term "possible" only has a meaning on the basis of actual experience. We can, therefore, never get to the point of view from which all experience is a mere possibility, not because this is beyond our capacity, but because it is self-contradictory. The term "possible experience" cannot be used as a regulative condition by reference to which certain abstract functions in our minds are to get a value. The functions (or notions as Kant calls them) are not there in any sense until there is experience; they *are* only in experience. It is just as true that experience makes them possible as that they make experience possible. Rather, there is no mere possibility in either case: experience is actual in them, they are actual in experience. "Possible

¹ One would have supposed that at least the diversity of their functions would imply a certain amount of content in the ego to constitute their difference.

experience" thus can only mean what may fall inside the range of the life of mind as it is actually constituted, something that may come about on the basis of the actual. It can only apply to an implicit but not yet explicit stage of experience, and can never apply to experience as a whole. Experience as a whole cannot be contingent, since within experience both contingency and necessity fall, and experience itself provides the ground of distinction between the two. Experience is through and through actual, and actual by its bare existence. All the distinctions drawn within experience are the result of analysing its content and are merely elements of its nature. For that reason there is no going beyond experience, and no standard or point of reference external to it, to serve as a ground for determining it.

This would be self-evident but for the ambiguity of the term itself. It is this ambiguity which created Kant's position. For him that was primarily an objective judgment of experience, in which we have necessary unity of the elements of the sensible or perceptual world. It is not always easy to say whether it was the unity or the perceptual content which was most emphasised in the term experience; in any case both were essential to his conception of the term. But this compelled him to adopt the paradox that there were large tracts of conscious life which yet fell outside experience. These were, *e.g.*, on the one side, what he called judgments of perception, and on the other, the whole field of absolute or pure morality. There could be no reason for excluding these from the scope of the term except one, viz. that a particular and limited meaning had been attached to experience. In

Judgment
of experi-
ence.

Selected
experi-
ence.

different systems of philosophy, and in common life also, one form of experience is often taken as the standard and type of all experience whatsoever. It is of no importance which form we take so far as the ultimate issue is concerned. For in every case we shall find that much of conscious activity and conscious life is held to fall outside experience, simply because it does not fall inside the limited interpretation we have put on experience at the start. The mode of experience fixed upon is not always the same. Sometimes, *e.g.*, in crude empiricism, sensuous experience, pure and simple, is looked upon as experience in the strict sense, and whatever cannot be expressed in terms of sense is rejected as either probable or illusion. At another time scientific law or mechanical order is the type, and everything else valued accordingly. Or, again, the moral order or the religious life may be taken as the primary reality, and the rest of experience becomes a show or mere appearance, even in certain cases an illusion. Any of the chief types of experience may be taken as fundamental and alone real, from mere sensuousness up to mere religiousness. Which type is adopted depends on the kind of mind or spiritual individuality, and varies not merely from individual to individual but from race to race. All agree simply in their rejection of every other mode of experience in preference to the one regarded as primary. Such a procedure, what we may call the human selection of the real in experience, is thus not confined to philosophical systems, but characterises the whole history of the life of humanity. It may be looked on as the outgrowth of the universal fact,

which is at the same time the universal necessity, of that selective interest which governs all finite individual experience. But whereas this is merely a difference of emphasis in ordinary life, it becomes a metaphysical principle when the phase selected is exaggerated into the norm for reality as a whole.

There seems only one way of escape from the inconsistency which must arise when one phase of ^{Universal} experience is adopted as ultimate. We must take experience in its most comprehensive meaning as the starting-point from which to proceed in our constructive analysis of what it contains. We must start, in other words, from the whole of experience as such. This is the only principle from which to proceed to work. It is necessary to do so if the part is to be properly interpreted, for any phase can only be regarded as a specific phase by looking at it apart from a whole; the particular form is the result of analysis of the whole, however that analysis may be brought about. And it is possible to do so, if we have a sufficiently comprehensive conception of what the unity of experience is; for a whole is a unity. Every experience is actual and concrete, and the whole is the absolutely concrete. The unity, ^{The whole of experience:} therefore, cannot be an abstract unity, it must ^{what.} contain that diversity which gives concreteness and individuality. The principle of unity can thus be neither an abstract ideal end, nor an abstract indeterminate basis, but an active ground of differentiation. Now we take experience as a whole when we look upon the subject-mind, in which alone experience exists, as the centre to which all forms of experience refer and round which they gather.

The wholeness of experience is just the completed expression for the unity of the subject-mind which pervades it and owns it. The ground of unity is thus what we call mind or self-conscious Spirit. Experience in its concreteness is a manifestation in time and space; it is embodied, and covers the whole life of conscious activity wheresoever found. But this is precisely human history. The experience of mind is the appearance of mind in time, is its history, its realised existence. The actual mind at work in experience is individual mind. Hence on the one side to analyse and systematise experience as a whole means to interpret and connect the historical manifestations of human individuality. On the other side, it is to disclose the nature of an individual mind taken as the *type* of all forms in which individuality may appear in human history, it is to trace the ways in which a *generalised* or typical individual mind would show its activity. It must be general, because all human experience is what we are considering; and it must be individual, because experience is only concrete in individual minds. In a sense, of course, all human experience is every one's experience: but it is equally clear that all experience is not explicitly so. Much remains implicit even for the richest mind, though all is in principle possible for the poorest. Human experience is the expression of one self-consciousness, but its full expression requires the entire activity of combined human effort and struggle. Humanity is in that sense a unity, and the individual whom we consider in dealing with experience as a whole must therefore be a representative, typical, or generalised individual mind. Now it is just this comprehensive

scope which is here given to the meaning of the term experience; and the actual starting-point for discussion is the concrete experience of a typical individual mind as it historically exists in the life of humanity.

It is clear from this that the "appeal to experience," which every philosophy professes to make, and which all knowledge professes to claim, whether for verification of conclusions or correction of the process of reflection upon its meaning, has quite a different significance on this view from, *e.g.*, that of Kant. The experience appealed to in Kant's case must necessarily have a perceptual character and content. This determines the range of possibility. This can only be appealed to by what is accepted as in some way apart from it, outside it. Conceptions as such are examples of such entities outside Perception. Yet these have a nature of their own, a nature not found in perceptual experience alone. This Kant himself acknowledges explicitly when dealing with Morality, where he states a specific condition which can give these conceptions a value, *viz.* self-consistency. This gives thought as such a necessity distinct from the necessity which concerns perceptual experience. This twofold test of worth which Kant employs, and is forced to adopt, illustrates the impossibility of taking one phase of the content of mind as alone valid, and indicates the limited character of experience in Kant's view. The very meaning of an "appeal" to experience implies the existence of something apart from it, but yet in some way connected with it. In short, the appeal must be made from one part to another part, or from one part to the whole as such. The former is impossible if one part is taken

"Appeal
to" experi-
ence.

to be peculiarly experience; the latter is impossible if the part is treated as external to the whole. The only meaning that can be attached to the phrase "appeal to experience" is that one element finds somehow a place in the ordered connectedness of the whole. What that place is depends on the nature of the element. The appeal is different in each case, for one form of experience differs from another. Thus what would be a test of experience in the case of Morality would not be adequate in the case of Sense-life or in the case of Scientific Knowledge. The whole question, therefore, turns on the essential nature of experience, and of the way in which its parts are to be connected.

Experi-
ence :
what.

Experience always implies a relation between two distinct elements: the one is that for which something is, and the other the something which is presented. These are the so-called subject and object. Sometimes the term experience, in ordinary use, designates this relation *along with* its factors, as when we say "such an event was an experience": sometimes it means the relation *per se*, as when we speak of ourselves "having an experience", or "experiencing something": sometimes again the objective aspect is emphasised, sometimes the subjective. But in every case there is implied or expressed a duality of elements within the continuity of their relation.¹

This will be found to hold when the term is applied derivatively to inanimate things or, again, to living beings in general. Primarily the term refers to conscious life where there is a conscious distinction

¹ Cp. "The proper unit of our experience from first to last is the total content of any moment of consciousness."—Adamson, *Lectures*, vol. i. p. 292.

of the object factor from the subject factor. Here experience is the interrelation of a subject with what is consciously present to it—its object. Object implies a subject just as subject implies object. The relation between the two, again, is not external, as if the one could *be* without the other. The being of the one simply implies, because it refers to, the other; subject exists through relation to object and *vice versa*.

What the nature of the relation between the two is, cannot be answered apart from experience. For this implies that we must find a more ultimate term than experience to furnish the answer. If this cannot be given without a contradiction in terms, then the answer to the question must be furnished by experience itself. It can only be given when experience as a whole is developed. What the relation is, means either of two things: (1) how did it arise, (2) how is it determined, or what does it aim at? These are the only ultimate questions about experience. One is answered by genetic psychology;¹ the other is found by tracing the forms through which experience passes. The nature of the relation will differ with the sphere of experience we are considering. In some cases it seems a kind of interaction, *e.g.* in the life of Sense: in other cases the emphasis seems to rest with the subject, *e.g.* in the Moral Life: in others again with the object, as in the case of scientific knowledge, when, as we say, the nature of the object 'determines the current of our ideas.'

The only question we can properly ask regarding these ultimate factors in experience is what specifically

The
question
regarding
experi-
ence.

Subject
and
object.

¹ On the genesis of the distinction, cp. Adamson, *Lectures*, vol. i. part v. c. 1.

distinguishes subject from object. The answer to that can be best found if we take a typical and characteristic form in which the terms subject and object are found. This is found when mind is contrasted with nature. Nature is that which is over against, presented to, mind. Mind is "subject," nature is "object." This is the point of view taken up by all science and ordinary life. The distinguishing feature of subject is here self-determination, self-sufficiency, or generally reference to self as one and single. That is subject which can be conscious of self as such, which can consciously refer to self. Object here is that which is referred to self, that whose completeness lies in something beyond the sphere of its own reality. It is that which in consciousness is *for* something else. A subject is that which in consciousness is for itself. In other words, in conscious experience a subject is inherently self-referrent and self-dependent, an object as such essentially points to and is dependent on something else.¹ And wherever we have subject and object constituting experience these will be found to be their essential characteristics.

Subject and object being the elements in the unity of experience, subject is that which is for itself through the object; in being conscious of the object it is conscious of self by referring that object to itself. The object is that which is for the subject in virtue of the activity of the subject; it has no being except for a subject. This is the conception

¹ Hence the general character of "objectivity" in experience is "outness," "extendedness," *i.e.* reference of content to what is external to its immediate existence. This seems a consequence of the above distinction, not the source of it. Cp. Adamson, *loc. cit.*; also Fichte, *Bestimmung des Menschen*, Book II.

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of the factors of experience with which we start and with which we work. Here we are concerned merely to interpret what this implies.

We can see that this conception of experience must identify experience and knowledge, in the general sense of awareness of objects. It is clear from what has been said that there is no restriction whatsoever in the content of experience; wherever we have a conscious subject aware of an object, there we have experience. Everything that can be an object enters an experience. And it is equally clear that the range of the objective world is limited only by the self-reference of the subject. Whatever it can refer to itself is *ipso facto* an object. But if mere self-reference is all that is required to constitute subjectivity, it can distinguish itself from everything and anything, even from itself. Hence every element and aspect of experience can be made an object for a consciousness, even what we may call experience as a whole. This last, in fact, is actually the case when the mind raises the philosophical question as to the meaning of experience as such; it thereby makes the whole as such its object. Now in all these possible attitudes in which subject is related to object, their fundamental characteristic seems certainly cognitive. There seems no reason why consciousness of objects should not be described as knowledge; or that all possible modes of such consciousness should not be called experience. But it must be noted that here knowledge means neither more nor less than consciousness of something, whatever that something be. We are well aware of the difference between reflective, observational, or perceptual knowledge when we use the

Know-
ledge and
experi-
ence.

term knowledge as equivalent to experience in general. Scientific knowledge, for example, is merely a specific way in which consciousness can be aware of an object; but this does not restrict knowledge specially to Science. It does not involve a confusion between psychologically distinct processes, *e.g.* those of cognition and willing. These processes are in any case only abstractly separable; the mind always acts as a unity in all.¹ The essential point is that wherever we have experience, consciousness must be aware of something. The way in which it is aware of course differs, and this makes the difference in the experience. But there must be awareness of something; and to be conscious of something is, in its universal acceptation, knowing something. All this, in point of fact, follows from the difference already noted between the above view of experience and Kant's.

Summary.

Such, then, is how we are to determine the significance of the various stages of experience in the light of and by the aid of self-consciousness as the fundamental principle. The various forms have all a worth, and each contains a truth. None is able to exhaust the full meaning of self-consciousness. Hence the only alternative is to regard them all as necessary modes of its life; and the only method of arrangement is that of an order according to degree of realisation of the one principle in all. In this way we can justify the rejection of all one-sidedness in experience; and meet the difficulty, in the way of any monistic view of knowledge, as to how truth and falsehood are to be interpreted. This difficulty is overcome in the case of dualism

¹ *Vide* p. 108, note.

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by setting up one form of truth as final, *e.g.* that of perceptual experience, or of conceptual connexion, and then determining every other expression of knowledge by reference to this as a test. The denial of dualism, and this interpretation of experience are thus closely related.

It is to be noted, in conclusion, that we are not concerned here with any such analysis of the machinery of knowledge as is given by Kant or Locke. There is one and the same question asked at each stage: how does a given form of knowledge hold together and relate the ultimate factors determining and constituting all knowledge, all experience?; how is unity amid the diversity of subject and object sustained? We have, *e.g.*, in dealing with Perception or Morality to bring out the "truth" of Perception, the "truth" of Moral Experience. We reduce the various forms of experience to their universal constituents, and determine how each realises its unity in them. When this is done, we have all the knowledge of the nature of a given mode of knowledge which a theory of experience can demand.

The real question.

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I

CHAPTER IV

PLAN AND STAGES OF THE ARGUMENT

The mode
of inter-
pretation.

How then is experience so conceived to be interpreted? We cannot ask, as we have said, what are the conditions of the possibility of experience. There can, in the long run, be no way of finding how experience is possible except by entering the field of experience itself. The experience which is to be is continuous with that which is. What we must do, then, is to take experience as it is in its totality, and to find controlling it such a necessity as an absolute explanation requires. We must try to bring into connected inner coherence the variety of experience given as historically discrete. We can neither rise above experience nor go below it, if we would explain it as a whole. We must, therefore, find the connexion *within* experience itself.

Experi-
ence
"self-ex-
plaining."

This does not mean that ordinary experience is self-explaining, in the sense that we need not think about it at all. Ordinary experience is precisely without "explanation" at all. Its rationality is not self-evident; it merely *is*. It can be rational as well as a conscious fact only if this be made manifest by the long way of reflective comprehension. When it is commonly said "experience explains itself," what is meant is that experience is

the direct and immediate content of a conscious life, and beyond this we cannot and need not go. That is of course true; but it is not an explanation. It is merely an assertion that we never go beyond experience, which is to say no more than that experience is experience. An explanation requires a special effort to fulfil a special end, an end lying beyond the range of desire and outside the interest of many conscious lives. The statement, however, may be said to be true in the sense that experience contains within its scope, and will furnish, the explanation which has to be given. The explanation merely brings out the necessity inherent within experience, throughout all its phases. Therein, too, lies the truth of the statement that "experience must verify explanation," that "philosophy must start from and in its result agree with experience." Such a statement is self-evident if the explanation given by philosophy is one which shows how experience connects its various phases by a law at work in the very nature of experience; if, in other words, the explanation has to show that the necessity of reason, which philosophy seeks, is the reason of the necessity which experience itself implicitly contains.

That, then, is the only kind of attitude we can take up to experience if we would explain it completely. To answer the question thus will solve the very problem which Kant and Locke raised about the nature of knowledge as restricted to the narrow range of Perception or Science. For the warrant for the certainty and necessity in such knowledge is given if we *show how scientific and perceptual activity are necessary forms of the experience of con-*

Necessity
in know-
ledge.

scious mind. The question regarding their necessary validity arises simply because they *are* different functions of mind, which can be distinguished, and which act separately. Their very isolation creates the problem of their value for experience: what do they contribute to the whole if they are a part? what is their necessity if they are separate and to that extent externally related? Now ultimate necessity lies with the whole. Experience in its entirety is in the long run the only principle of necessity; "necessity of thought" is in the long run identical with "necessity of fact." Hence to fit each function into its place in experience is to *give it the necessity belonging to it.* And that is precisely the way we have to answer the problems of Hume and Kant. There can be no problem as to how we are to satisfy thought regarding necessity in Science, or in perceptual experience, because thought so taken is itself knowledge, and knowledge is not something on one side and the criticism of it something on the other. *Both* are knowledge, and criticism of knowledge is essentially self-criticism. Nor again is "knowledge" on one side and "mere perception" on the other. *Both* are knowledge, and both in any case are experience. Criticism of the necessity in perceptual experience is therefore again self-criticism of experience.

To
connect is
to explain.

Hence the statement of the connectedness of experience is at once the satisfaction of rationality and the expression of necessity in the content of experience. We cannot get outside it. Our interpretation is itself a phase of our experience, which experience itself must connect with other phases or forms. Experience must contain our explanation of

it just as much as our explanation construes experience. That is the only way our explanation can be true; and such an explanation must in the nature of the case be true *because it shows our explanation to be a necessary moment of experience itself*. This means, in a word, that experience is self-explaining if we can find a way of connecting its diverse moments which will fit every aspect of it into its place in the whole. Such a method of explanation must lie in experience itself, be inherent in the very life of it. It will not be simply objective, though it will be so in the sense that the content of experience is controlled by the method independent of merely individual selection and subjective caprice. That is, it will be objective in the sense of completely universal, holding of each phase and at each stage, comprehending the whole in its sweep. It will, again, not be merely subjective, though it will be subjective in the sense that the subject mind is involved all along and must find that the connexion established completely satisfies its consciousness of unity. But that will free the connexion from the contingency of individual caprice, mere private interest and demand. In other words, it will be subjective and universal at the same time, which means it will be universal mind or mind as universal whose unity will be expressed. The connexion has to be both objective and subjective. It will be an "absolute" connexion. The method of explanation will have to be an "absolute" method. This is essential, since experience *itself* is *both* subjective and objective at once, and since beyond experience there is nothing. Experience is relative to nothing outside itself, and since it is the absolutely real, the

method of explanation must be absolutely final ; the connexion is to lie in the very nature of experience. This is all that is meant by a method being "absolute." It does not mean that the thinker himself has given the final truth, but merely that there is no other way by which complete explanation can be attained, however successfully or unsuccessfully any individual thinker works with it. And indeed this claim is justifiable and its truth self-evident. For clearly a method of explanation, which is not bound up with the contingency of individual caprice or the contingency of external objective fact, must be the *ne plus ultra* of explanation. It is experience "explaining" itself ; and that surely is absolute explanation. The only doubt which remains is the doubt about any given attempt to express it, whether it has been in any system, or can be in general, successfully carried out.

How it
actually
proceeds
to work.

Now the way by which we may proceed to give such an explanation is shortly this. Experience is, we saw, realised at once in individual minds and yet in no given individual mind completely. It takes all the diversity of finite mind to experience all that can fall within man's experience. With man's experience as a whole we are alone concerned, for this is the only experience historically realised. The Divine Mind is a conscious experience for man, and hence the discussion of it falls within man's province. We could not think of it unless it fell inside our experience in some way. The religious aspect of experience is where most obviously and generally finite experience specifically and deliberately realises the life of Absolute Spirit ; and hence the Divine

Mind as such comes up for definite consideration when the religious experience of finite mind is discussed. Whatever the real nature of such experience, it is none the less finite experience with which we are dealing. The same is true of the experience called Philosophy. It may tell us all we really know of Absolute Spirit, but it falls inside individual experience like everything else, and must be considered as a phase of it. Even, therefore, though it should turn out that in certain moods in experience we consciously seek to overcome finitude as such, they are still moods of finite experience in the first instance, and take their place amongst others.¹ To find, then, all that the experience of finite mind contains we must deal at once with individuals, and with the whole of man's experience as historically revealed. We may look on human experience as the experience of a comprehensive individual, an individual who can or may live through all finite experience. If we take as the subject mind of finite experience what we have called a typical individual mind, we will do justice at once to the totality of human experience in all its diversity, and the individual form in which all finite experience is realised.

Taking then such an individual as the centre of experience, we can look on the explanation of experience in two distinct ways. We may try to show how the one individual mind assumes the various forms in which experience appears. We may explain experience as a series of forms which the

¹ The distinction of finite mind from finite mind is no doubt a fixed, and that between finite and absolute mind a vanishing distinction, but in both cases finiteness has a positive significance.

individual mind adopts in the process of realising itself in experience: or we may regard experience as the content which fills or can fill the life of the individual mind. In the one case we look upon experience from the point of view of concrete individual mind: in the other from the point of view of a universal mind. In the former experience is the expression or manifestation of the essence of individual mind, and is realised by its self-conscious activity; in the other experience is the content so expressed, the completed result. These two ways are possible because experience has a subjective and an objective aspect, it is at once subjective and objective. And since they are inseparable, the two ways of dealing with experience are merely aspects of the same process.

Unity of
subject
and
object
essential.

We must not think of subject and object as two things separate and external from one another. This gives us dualism pure and simple. They are different aspects of a single identity. The object world is experience all in its diversity, the subject world is experience focussed in its unity. The real distinction, therefore, is not between two things subject and object, but between experience in its diversity, and experience in its unity. The former is objectivity pure and simple, the latter is subjectivity pure and simple. Because of the distinction between finite individuality and universal experience, the distinction between experience as objective and individual mind may assume the form of a contrast between a particular self, over against which stands the totality of experience; and the one seems outside the other, external to it. But the whole life of an individual mind is the perpetual

refutation of this opposition; it is an incessant assertion of the identity between a finite individuality and complete experience. The finite individual mind has a relation to the content of human experience as a whole—the content of universal mind—exactly similar to that between the momentary focus of a given individual's attention and the whole range of his presentational content. As the latter are continuous and inseparable so are the former.

Because of the contrast between an individual mind and its completely explicit experience, the relation between the two is necessarily one that is realised historically. The individual mind is not all at once the whole of experience as found in the life of humanity. It expresses experience in consciously distinct forms or stages, which are modes of its own complete life. Experience is realised in moments which are consciously successive to one another. From the point of view of the individual mind experience is a variety of historical appearances, it is a series of phenomena in the process of an individual life. To trace these stages and connect these appearances by constant reference to the ideal form which, as we said, they all imply, is to give a connected account of the phenomena of the life of individual mind. It is what we may call a Phenomenology of Mind.

The question to be answered is, how in the individual's life is a given special subject-object relation constituted so as to make a specific experience? On the one hand, how does the subject-mind specifically function in reference to a specific object-content of its experience? On the other, how does a determinate object-content constitute part of the life-history of

The
problem
involves
history.

The
question to
be solved.

an individual mind. The inquiry is carried out by means of a constant implicit and explicit reference to the ideal of experience. Hence to answer this question is at once to state the truth a given experience contains or aims at, and to determine the plane or level of experience it occupies. It is precisely the same question that is put from one end of experience to another, and precisely the same method of answering the question must be adopted. The fact that it is of the same mind that each question is asked ensures that the way of answering it will merely vary with what the experience is, and establishes a continuous connexion between all the forms in which the mind appears.

We have to take account of both subject and object at once, for the one changes with the other. The one is relative to the other, because both constitute what we mean by the individual's experience. And because we are dealing with the individual mind, the specific experience will imply a specific attitude of the mind in that experience. Subject activity and conscious content involve each other. Thus we can read the meaning of experience in the life-history of a typical or generalised individual soul. Completely carried out, then, we have here the answer to the question as to the nature of experience.¹

¹ When we drop the reference to the individual's experience and cease to regard the content of experience as phases of the life-history of the individual mind, experience falls into its component constituents, each separate and self-contained. What are stages from the point of view of an individual's experience are distinct areas of reality when taken by themselves. What are fragments of a single experience are wholes when we eliminate, or treat as a kind of constant and invariable co-efficient, the individual whose experience they together constitute. They can therefore be dealt with by themselves as

When we take knowledge or experience, as we shall call it, in the sense adopted by Hegel, it is at first sight difficult to see where and how to begin the interpretation of it. All ordinary methods of procedure fail us ; because these in general start by assuming one phase of experience as ultimate or primary. To explain experience in such cases consists in finding how other aspects of conscious life are related to the one we fix upon, whether by way of derivation from it or reference to it as the source of validity. In our case no such assumptions are made, and the task of interpretation is correspondingly greater. When we look at conscious experience historically, or phenomenologically, and seek to show its inner coherence, we might in a sense begin anywhere, with any of the forms in which experience appears. Since, as we have seen, the same kind of question is asked at all parts of experience, the analysis could be carried out from any point. But clearly this would not tend to produce the coherent connexion amongst all parts which is required. For this purpose we must know both how to proceed and where to begin. Now while an absolute beginning cannot in the nature of

separate areas of reality, each with diverse content of its own, which can be rationally connected. Since individual mind must necessarily appear historically, this way of interpreting experience must differ from that of a Phenomenology, but only to the extent of making no reference to the modes of the life of individual mind. Now experience has a varied content : religious life, art, morality, what we call nature, organic and inorganic, science with all its various conceptions, etc. All these, then, can be handled from this point of view. All may be shown to be rationally constituted, resolvable into terms of reason. The various scientific constructions of these different parts of experience make up the entire range of the world of universal reason ; and these appear as Philosophy of Law, Religion, Art, Logic, etc. The method of procedure will be here determined by the nature of reason itself, a nature which is of the essence of the self-consciousness.

the case be merely assumed, we must assume that which makes any beginning possible, viz. the end which is to be attained. This determines not merely *that* there is a beginning but *what* the beginning must be. To that extent our interpretation of experience rests on an assumption. But this is inevitable. For we have to establish a certain result, namely, a connected experience, and we cannot put this down, so to say, all at once. It has to be realised by a process, and that process must have a beginning and a conscious determining purpose from first to last. Our assumption is no more than such a determining purpose. From this the beginning is derived, and by this the connexion is established. It is not as such *given* by experience; for this falls into discrete moments or modes. The absence of connexion is precisely what calls for a philosophy of experience.

Assump-
tions in
philo-
sophy.

No doubt what we may call the "mood" of philosophy is given in experience; it is a phase of its life. But the way philosophy is to accomplish its task is not given; it has to be found and brought to light. Since it is not there to begin with, it must be assumed till it is established. And therein lies the peculiarity of the above assumption. It does not remain an assumption; the working out of the connexion aimed at by philosophy removes from the assumption the characteristic of contingency and arbitrariness which would cast an initial doubt on its validity, and thus gives what was assumed the attribute of necessity. To establish an assumption is to destroy its nature as an assumption; it is to "prove" it. In other words, the assumption is only such at the outset of the argument, not at the end. The

argument itself makes the assumption a truth, or "proves" it. This is what is meant when it is said philosophy must do without any presuppositions, if it is to be accepted. Not that we cannot use assumptions in any sense; but all assumptions must be established by philosophy itself, and so cease to be simply assumptions. They are merely required by the conditions of philosophical procedure. Their content finds its own place in the same system which they determine. When the system is completed, therefore, it contains no presuppositions.

In this way we can get over an initial difficulty which seems to be avoided, but in reality is not avoided, by those who take as ultimate a certain mode of experience, *e.g.* Sense-experience, and then proceed to explain all other phases of experience by reducing or referring them to that one form. Their procedure is ostensibly simple, and they can begin with that type of reality which they regard as ultimate. This is the plan adopted by Sensationism, or by Empiricism generally. Its success is merely apparent, however, because it fails in the nature of the case to prove that this type of experience is itself ultimately valid; or, again, it fails to show how other modes of experience derive all their content from this one type without already in some way implying their content in that type. This objection has been repeatedly pointed out in the history of philosophy, and is the substance of the objections made against Empiricism by an idealistic critic like Green. Other ways of beginning.

The plan proposed, while thus apparently more difficult than that of other methods of interpretation, really accomplishes, provided it can be carried out, all

Philo-
sophical
proof.

that is required by complete philosophical theory, a theory which establishes its own necessity and presupposes nothing. But it is clear that it rests on a peculiar view of the nature of "proof." Proof, in general, usually assumes at some stage in its process a provisional character whether it be in its premises, or in its results, or in its conditions. And, indeed, proof without conditions seems a contradiction in terms, since it is a means of relating incompletely intelligible parts of a whole to one another. On the above view, proof, to be complete or absolute, must be without conditions or qualifications; for there is nothing to condition its worth or absoluteness; it deals with the whole as a whole. The actual "proof" that the method is true consists in showing that its assumption appears as the final outcome of the experience which is to be connected: that is, the truth of the method of proof just lies in successfully explaining experience by it. The success is seen not simply in the step-by-step connexion, but in showing that all experience leads finally to this end. It is a form of the "transcendental proof" used by Kant, but without his reservations, and without the acceptance of the idea of a "possible" or contingent experience. It is the transcendental proof not as a regulative method for establishing necessity, but as a concrete organising principle.

The end is
the ideal.

We ask then what is the end which determines the beginning and the manner of interpretation? We saw that the meaning of experience lay in the essential unity of subject and object, its component and mutually related elements. And we saw that the ideal of such experience lay in the consciously

complete identity of the two elements. This ideal is, then, the *end* at which it aims and from which the interpretation must start.

Experience will be best realised, if there are to be different forms of its expression, when that unity is most explicit, when the subject and object are explicitly aspects of the same conscious unity. For then the subject will consciously be identical with its object, its object will be its very self. In this case, the object is self and aware of the subject, subject is self and aware of object; or subject and object are each self-conscious. But this is only possible when the object is the self of the subject which has experience, and where this self-consciousness is absolutely all inclusive. It will be found in absolute self-consciousness, in that form of experience which we call the life of Absolute Mind.

It is clear that this is the final reach of the activity of experience: it is the ideal of a completed experience. For there is no opposition here which is not overcome; there is no relation between subject and object (which is the essence of all opposition in experience) which is not at the same time a conscious or explicit identity between them. Identity, to be complete, must be identity of content and not abstract or formal identity. Hence the consciously complete identity of subject and object must be found when the subject has for object its entire self, or when we have absolute consciousness of self. But this means no more than, and no less than, that this form of experience is spiritual life pure and simple. It is the life of Spirit as such, complete and self-contained. Conscious spiritual

experience is therefore the ideal of all finite experience.

The
ideal is
an experi-
ence.

Now we must note that this is not merely an end to which experience *points*, but one which is both itself real, and underlies the life of experience at all its stages. Thus the absolute conscious unity of subject and object is implicit in the lowest form of, say, Sense-experience, and is explicit as a specific form of experience in, *e.g.*, Religion. The unity is in most cases of experience only implicit: but what *is* implicit is this completely conscious identity. The unity of subject and object must be there, otherwise there is no experience: subject and object would then fall apart and be sundered by the whole diameter of being. But the unity itself as a conscious unity only comes fully to light in certain forms of experience (*viz.* Religion and Philosophy). This completely expressed identity, then, is the *controlling* or *constitutive* unity throughout all experience.

It is not
a formal
ideal.

The only alternative to admitting this is to regard the final goal of experience as a "mere ideal" at which the individual life *aims*, but never reaches, *i.e.* it remains always a mere "point of view." This puts it outside the range of actual life; it never is a reality, but a possibility, not a fact but a problem, not a certainty but a "postulate." As such it can have no constitutive or determining force on our actual experience. Experience would then have to be interpreted by a principle which never transcends the immediate opposition of subject and object, never reaches the inner nature of that unity in which they subsist. This unity would in that case either be simply acknowledged, and called a

"mystery" ;¹ or else it would be denied altogether ;²—and then we have thorough-going dualism, which means in the long run scepticism regarding ultimate things.

The conception of the reality of that unity as an actual form of experience, and of its function in determining all forms of experience, is thus precisely the extreme antithesis of both mysticism and scepticism. It is the deliberate adoption of the idea of a complete experience as the principle for illuminating all other forms of experience. It starts from the actuality of a complete self-conscious unity, and from that seeks to determine how every other form of conscious unity is constituted, and how all are connected through their common implication of this highest form. For these two steps are connected together. To show how every form of experience is constituted by this idea of a completely conscious unity, is also to show how they are related to each other, because they are all forms of experience, and therefore different realisations of the one complete unity dominating all experience.

Now this is not a startling principle to adopt. It really means no more than that we are in earnest with the principle that self-consciousness is the key to the meaning of experience, a principle laid down by Kant, and indeed found in different ways, as Hegel tried to show, throughout the history of philosophy. Consciousness of self is a relation

The
ideal is
concrete.

Import
of this
principle.

¹ The position of "Deism."

² The position of "Agnosticism." It is curious to find dualism at the basis of these abstract and opposite positions. They are indeed closely allied in other ways. It is easy to pass from the abstract assertion *that* the Unity is, to the equally abstract assertion that we do not know *what* it is.

of an object to a subject. It is therefore an experience. And because the unity of its two sides is made explicit by their content being the same, we have there the very idea of all experience fully and consciously expressed, viz. the *unity of subject and object*. To adopt it as a ground of explanation does not involve, therefore, as is done in so many other cases, taking an external arbitrary principle of some kind, fitting experience into it, and then, in virtue of the coherence or symmetry thereby secured, calling it "intelligible." The point is that experience in any and all its forms implies this principle. Hence to interpret experience by the idea of consciousness of self is to interpret experience by itself, by what experience really is when fully expressed.

It does not matter whether this complete experience is spoken of as the ideal experience of "finite" mind or as "absolute" mind. It is finite experience absolutised, finite experience completed. Whatever more this may mean, and does mean, that is enough to begin with as an end from which and by which to look at all finite modes of experience. We have, in short, simply to deal with completed self-consciousness as such, as an explicit identity of subject and object. In what form of experience the attainment of this is found, and what that form contains—this is itself part of the inquiry.

Misunder-
standings.

Again, it must not be supposed because the ideal of experience is actually realised in the religious life or in philosophical consciousness, that, relatively to this, other forms are to be so interpreted and understood as if they were incomplete expressions of the philosophical or religious experience.

That would commit the error against which the idealistic interpretation is a protest, the error, namely, of regarding one type of experience as essentially real and the other's "appearances" of it—as if one form were in strictness the only form, the others being unsuccessful attempts to express it, and, because unsuccessful, erroneous, and therefore to be merely superseded altogether. This is the mistake made by those who lay exclusive emphasis on Religion or on Philosophy. It is the fallacy of enthusiasm, fanaticism, and over-concentration of any kind. It is as false as the attempt made by Empiricism and Sensationalism to reduce all experience whatsoever to mere manipulation of the elements of sense-experience; and is false for the same general reason. If we take Religion to be the only real experience, because fully satisfying the notion of experience, then we proceed to divide experience into "reality" and "mere appearance"; and thereby fall back on a distinction which brings in again precisely the dualism we want to get over, and do get successfully over in the religious life. Such a division of experience makes the religious unity *itself* merely *abstract*, a bare unity; and this may very easily suggest to a mind absorbed in *other* modes of experience, *e.g.* the scientific, that very possibly this bare unity may *itself* be "appearance" or even illusion—a development very often found in reactions from mysticism.¹ If, again, Philosophy is taken as the only valid experience in the same one-sided way, we may come to look on Science, Perception,

¹ Mr. Bradley's conception of Reality and Appearance arises out of such an over-emphasis as that described, and is in part open to the objection indicated.

Morality, etc., as merely incomplete revelations of a meaning completely realised in Philosophy. We tend to look on them as imperfect attempts to express the real nature of experience as a whole, or different "points of view," as it is sometimes put, from which we look at "reality." This is more often done in the case of Religion, which is at times spoken of as merely figurative or symbolic philosophy. But it is sometimes carried to other forms of experience as well.¹

Every
form of
experience
is positive
and true
in its
degree.

Such results are only possible through laying exclusive emphasis on the negative significance of the relation of complete experience to the other forms. It overlooks the fact that all forms of experience are real and actual just because they are experience, because expressing a relation between subject and object, no matter what the relation be. Each therefore is essentially and fundamentally *positive* in character. This indeed is recognised by ordinary thought, or "common sense," where, while one form of experience may be allowed to check or limit another, yet all are given their place. The question of the *worth* of any particular form of experience itself *assumes* its positive reality, and only arises because of that positive or "real" nature. Moreover, the question, as to the *value* of a given form, only arises in certain cases and for certain purposes, which for the most part are of a practical kind. In practical life the question as to the worth of *all* and *every* form of experience in its entirety, really *never* arises. It is only when we make the

¹ This is seen, *e.g.*, in Mr. Mackenzie's view of the forms of experience as so many different "constructions" of experience, perceptual, moral, æsthetic, etc. See *Outlines of Metaphysics*.

connexion amongst all parts of experience our special problem, viz. in Philosophy, that we attempt to show in a thorough-going manner the relation between its various forms. And it is then only that the danger occurs of pressing too far the negative effect of comparing higher and lower forms.¹ It is then, in short, that we are apt to desert the positive ground on which all experience really rests, and from which the philosophical problem itself arises.

All forms, then, are *at once positive and negative*, and must be so regarded. All are necessary, because subject and object must take up all forms of relation to each other in order to exhaust the possibilities of experience. In working with the conception of complete experience we can see more clearly the sort of question we have to ask and answer regarding each form. That is all it does for us. We cannot deduce the various forms from it, because Philosophy is reconstruction not creation. Rather we deduce *it* from *them* by a long process. And the question it asks is:—What in the light of complete self-consciousness does the unity of subject and object in a given form amount to? how is the identity they imply expressed and constituted in each case? By asking this of every form we shall ultimately show how all finite experience is determined.

We use, then, the idea of complete experience to show in what, in the given forms of experience, the relation of subject to object consists. By showing this in the case of all forms we shall at once explain the meaning of every experience, the meaning of all

¹ This danger is seen in Mr. Bradley's analysis.

relations of subject to object, and we shall thereby establish the principle from which we set out, that complete self-consciousness is the ideal of all experience. This will show that experience, because essentially self-conscious, is self-explaining, for the principle in use all through is itself revealed by experience. The form of experience in which this ideal of experience is found is what we call Philosophy or completed knowledge. Hence the whole argument is merely a persistent and consistent application of the essential principle of Philosophy, viz. complete experience, to explain all experience philosophically. This may seem a circle or a transparent commonplace, whichever way we please to look at it. It is enough to remark that it is at least a legitimate position to take up, and in a sense is so obvious as to need no comment at all. It is saying no more than that for philosophy to do its own business it must justify itself to itself completely, it must be self-determining from first to last.

This, then, being the end and principle from which and by which to work, the first step is to find out where to begin, and what are the main stages through which the argument must pass. This is easily stated. We have, as we have said, subject and object as the antithetic elements in the concrete reality of conscious experience, and the key to its entire meaning lies in the complete explicit unity of the two, the subject conscious of itself in its object. Now the individual subject may be aware of an object as purely and simply other than, *opposed to*, itself, have not even a feeling of implicit unity with it. It may, again, be aware of *self* as *other than* but implicitly one with the subject-mind conscious

The
stages.

of it. And, finally, it may have overcome all sense of otherness in its object, and be fully and explicitly aware of itself in the object of which it is conscious. More simply, perhaps, we may say that in the first stage the individual is conscious of objects which are *prima facie* quite alien to and outside the subject ; in the second, of the self, but as something which is ostensibly different from, and over against the subject conscious of it ; in the third, of the self as transparently identical with the subject.

CHAPTER V

THE INTERPRETATION OF SENSE-EXPERIENCE : AND OF PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE

Nature
and mean-
ing of
sense-ex-
perience.

THE first stage is found in the simplest and, for consciousness, the most primitive form of experience—consciousness of objects of the world of Sense. It is here, as has been recently argued,¹ that the conscious relation of self and not-self first dawns. That is the fundamental or simplest form of experience, the simplest form of objectivity on the one hand and of subjectivity on the other. It is here that objectivity is what is named “external.”² The object at this stage is simply the not-self in general, and the form of experience in which we find it specifically is what we call Sense-experience, consciousness of objects of Sense. The analysis of Sense-experience will bear this out.

Illustra-
tion of
sense as
not-self.

Indirectly this epistemological conception is confirmed by the familiar everyday fact of the strangeness, the unpredictability, the elusiveness of the world of sense, which in different ways affect the attitudes of individuals towards it. Thus to the religious mind it may give rise to the feeling of the

¹ By Adamson, *Lectures*, vol. i. part v. c. 1.

² Objectivity as “external” is just the space-character of this content of experience.

nothingness of the sense-world, its very variety being an indication of its inadequacy to reveal the ultimate One to which that type of mind clings. Or it may seem the veil of an inner reality, *i.e.* its mystery and strangeness are transferred to a permanent reality which merely shines through the infinite detail of its pattern, and, because it is a mere veil, it sinks to the level of a means which loses its own terrors as such, and may be ultimately destroyed, burnt up, or, as it is put, "rolled together like a scroll." Its elusiveness, again, is for the ordinary mind the source of all the suggestiveness of sense, of its symbolical character, of those "obstinate questionings of sense and outward things," of "blank misgivings of a creature moving about in worlds not realised." So, too, its unpredictability is the source, *e.g.*, of the perpetual reserve which guards all our judgments concerning sense-experience other than what we have lived through, and even concerning that also—a reserve which pursues empirical knowledge to its utmost limit of accuracy. It is the source, further, at once of the contingency found by science, and of its incessant and *necessarily* endless attempt to remove it. All these together make the self-conscious individual feel himself so detached from the world of sense as to be able to withdraw from it altogether into his own inner life, and even to doubt its very existence.¹

This act of withdrawal has appeared at different times throughout the history of philosophy, more particularly, however, in modern philosophy, from

Philosophical forms of this attitude towards

¹ As is done by the higher "mysticism"—an abstract but supreme form of the world self-consciousness.

of sense.

the time of Descartes' doubt regarding the world of sense-objects. It is seen in the perpetually recurring problem as to the "existence," or at least as to the *nature* of the existence, of the so-called "external world"—the problem sometimes described as the nature of "external perception." To the ordinary concrete mind, and to the scientific consciousness, as well as to absolute idealism, this may indeed appear a very singular problem to raise. And when it is looked at as the *only* problem of philosophy (as it is, *e.g.*, by Berkeley), it may well be considered inherently inadequate as an expression of the whole problem of philosophy, and essentially incapable of solution under the conditions in which it is raised. This is partly proved by the result of Berkeley's own analysis. But it is just as evident when we look at the amount of experience which it leaves out of account, and which cannot be ignored by philosophy. Thus the nature of Moral Experience, or the Moral World, does not fall inside such a problem; and yet it has to be introduced even in the solution which is offered. We see this in Descartes' appeal to the *moral* goodness of God as a guarantee for the belief in the existence of external things, and in the way moral ideas are used by Berkeley throughout his argument. This, again, comes out in a striking manner in Hume, who was, for historical reasons, concerned primarily with this narrow conception of the problem of philosophy. For him, there seems no doubt at all about the reality of moral distinctions and the moral life in general; for him, any one who treats *them* sceptically is looked upon as insincere from the start. This merely proves indirectly that the external world is

not the only object of experience, and cannot therefore, as his sceptical analysis of perception seemed to suggest, exhaust the whole problem of philosophy. For surely the moral life is a reality just as much as so-called external things. The same remark holds good in regard to scientific realities, realities of the scientific consciousness, say, in the case of mathematics, or, again, as regards the reality of the religious consciousness. These cannot be affected by the analysis of the meaning of the "external world." The application of the same methods of analysis to these kinds of reality as to the problem of the external world, reveals, by the very inadequacy of the result attained, the futility of confining the question to this one problem. For the relation of the object to the subject is different in these cases, and does not appeal to us in the same way. Thus it never seems to occur to any mind, still less to the ordinary or the scientific mind, to doubt the existence of the Moral Order, or Social Life. No one, for instance, doubts the existence of his friend, or his family; at least if doubts occur, he finds it better to keep his doubts to himself! The reason is that these simply *do not belong to the world of sense alone*, or to the world of perception, and hence they cannot and do not take up the same relation of externality or "otherness" to his self, as is possible in the case of the world of the things of "sense." They are a different kind of object, and while they may and do appear in sensuous form, Sense, as we are well aware, does not exhaust their meaning and reality. So much so that even death, or the negation of their sense reality, is taken to be no absolute or necessary barrier to their

continued reality. Hence it is that the appeal to, or consciousness of, deeper realities, *i.e.* realities entering more into the inmost life of the subject, than we find to be the case with external things, often provides the arresting point to thoroughgoing mental uncertainty regarding reality in general, not merely in the ordinary life-history of individual minds, but in actual philosophical systems—as we find, *e.g.*, in Hume, or again, in a different way, in Kant. Such higher or “inward” realities are deliberately or unconsciously used to turn the flank of a sceptical attack on knowledge even in regard to the external world.

The significance of philosophical doubt¹ regarding sense-experience.

But that the doubt can arise at all regarding the external world of things of sense, shows conclusively how thorough and complete the opposition can be and is between mind and objects at the simplest or lowest level of experience. The extremeness of the opposition is there always, and merely comes to light in an extravagant or excessive form when men doubt either philosophically or otherwise the existence of external things altogether. Strictly carried out, such a doubt is bound to lead either negatively to pure Scepticism, or positively to pure Solipsism, which, inside the limits within which it keeps, cannot really be answered,—a characteristic which led Voltaire to remark that Solipsism was madness, but beyond the reach of argument or refutation.

We start, then, with this opposition of subject and object in its unqualified and extreme form, and we ask how is experience in such a case constituted. What is the nature of that essential unity which so relates these opposite elements as to form a concrete

experience? We put this same question when we ask what is the "truth" of this experience, truth here meaning the nature of the specific identity which unites subject and object.

The opposition here considered appears in different ways. Mere Sense-experience is its simplest and most obvious form. But we find the same kind of opposition in other phases of experience. When we speak of "perceiving" an object, we draw a firm line between our perceiving and the object perceived. We say, *e.g.*, the object is *out there*, whether *we* perceive it or not, or even whether anybody perceives it or not. The object-world as perceived is sharply separated from the subject-mind experiencing it in and through Perception. This is the position of common sense, and to some extent of the scientific mind; so much so that the sphere of independent "fact" for science and common sense lies generally in the objects of Perception. "Facts" are taken to be precisely what instruct and mould the mind, and so are independent of, "external to," the subject, whose business it is merely to accept what he "finds," or "what his senses teach him." So separate are the objects, that our mind is held to refer to them by a process of its own which may err; but, it is held, the "facts" never can. Hence, since we can refer truly or falsely to this world, our experience of it takes the form of specific kinds of judgments, Judgments of Perception. All our perceptual knowledge takes this form. Our ideas here "*refer to*" this object-world which we perceive, but which is "apart from" our minds. Yet in spite of this independence, it is also maintained that the world we perceive seems to depend on, or,

Forms of
first stage.

(1) Sensa-
tion.

(2) Per-
ception.

at least, be qualified by, the nature of the subject perceiving. For the variety of *our* avenues of Perception suggests the possibility of *others* in differently constituted perceiving subjects; while the variation of the actual content of the perceivable world according to the position in time or space, the condition of the organism, etc., of the perceiving subject, leads to the recognition of a certain amount of *dependence* of the content of objects perceived upon the subject.

Consequences of this contrast in the case of Perception.

This contrast between the apparently self-evident opposition or separation of subject and object in Perception on the one hand, and their undeniable reciprocal dependence on the other, leads the reflective philosophical mind, in the long run, to raise the question (above mentioned) regarding the meaning of an independent world of Perception. It leads also to the historic distinction between "primary sense-qualities" and "secondary sense-qualities," the ground of distinction being the accidental or the necessary character of the relation of subject to object in the case of any given quality, according as the quality is primary or secondary. If it is accidental, the quality perceived is primary, the subject "makes no difference" to the object; if it is necessary, the quality is derivative or secondary, the subject is essential to determine the quality. It leads again to the distinction between the "that" and the "what" in judgments of Perception, the "what" referring to the content of the judgment, the "that" to the existence of the object to which "ideas," the media of judgment, are taken to "refer." Here the separation is limited to the "thatness" of the perceived object, the "whatness" can belong, or

does belong, to the sphere of ideas. The "that" is always immediate, the "what" mediate; and since the "that" is beyond ideas, it is beyond judgment and so beyond knowledge.¹ From this again arises what is called the separation of "reality" and "thought," a separation implying a dualistic view of knowledge.

But yet another form of sharp separation between subject and object is to be found, one which, to some extent, has still to do with the world as experienced in sensation, and as perceived. Both common sense and in part the scientific mind are accustomed to speak of the world we know as one of "appearance"; and what appears in it and through it is some active force or power at work behind the screen or veil revealed to Sense and Perception. This "world of appearance" may be ordered by "laws." These laws are not found in Perception. They are construed apart from it;² but, because unseen, they are referred to an "invisible" "non-sensuous" world. They are ways in which the non-sensuous world produces order in the sensuous world. Similarly, we may refer the varied motions or processes of the sensuous world to hidden "forces" of which these motions are the expression. The "expression" is before consciousness when perceiving; it *appears*: the "force" is *beyond* what appears.

These distinctions are found in the attitude of science, and are certainly seen at work in common thought. Here an abrupt opposition is

¹ Hence the "representative" theory of "external perception," where ideas "intervene" between the subject and the "that" (the existence) of the object.

² *i.e.* They are determined in the first instance negatively as regards Perception: they are "not seen," intangible, etc.

(3) Appearance and the Super-sensible World.

established between the subject-mind on the one hand, and a non-sensuous object-world on the other. The sensible manifestations, as such, of this world create no opposition for the subject to overcome.¹ The opposition is maintained between object and subject *by means of* them. Since it does not fall inside sensible experience, it is now set up between a non-sensuous object in a *super-sensible* world and the subject. When this is done the opposed factors (subject and object) are now seemingly further apart than ever;² for we have all the wealth of sensible experience between them, separating them from each other and from ultimate union. All sensible experience may be said even to be dependent on the subject and its activity; and if so, it is then held to be "phenomenal" of a world *beyond* the range of Sensation and Perception proper. The sensible world is epiphenomenal, as regards, and in contrast with, a noumenal non-sensuous reality, into which the subject "cannot penetrate." This may be expressed in the form which Goethe puts into the mouth of the physicist, "No creature's mind can pierce within dark nature's inner secret." Here it is held we only know what "appears," never what "ultimately exists"; that remains in permanent opposition and externality to the subject. Or it may find a philosophical expression, as, *e.g.*, in the case of Kant, where the actual life of experience consists in objects being determined and unified by functions of the subject on the one side working upon the matter of sense on the other, the whole lying

¹ They are held to be directly present to it, whether as its *own* ideas or otherwise.

² *i.e.* further apart than they were at the level of, *e.g.*, Perception.

between two non-experienced, *i.e.* non-perceivable noumenal realities, the pure ego-subject and the mere thing *per se*. These last are sundered by the whole diameter of being, and neither known nor united at any point. They are simply opposed, so much so that even to say anything regarding them is to endanger the sacred silence which guards their being from the invasion of knowledge.

This separation of subject and object by means of a distinction between phenomena and noumena, sensible and super-sensible, is an acknowledgment at once of their necessary connexion in actual experience, and yet of their being still opposed and external to each other. It pushes the factors in opposition (subject and object) beyond the bounds of all sensible experience, as if at all costs it would refuse to surrender the assertion of their separation. The distinction, which first of all holds of and constitutes *sensible* experience, becomes now a distinction *between* a sensible and a *super-sensible* world. If this opposition is not to be absolutely maintained in the case of Perception, as above described, then it must at any rate hold good of what is beyond perceptual experience. Yet, since the two worlds (sensible and super-sensible) must still somehow be thought of as continuous, experience being a unity, the difficulty which arises from setting up something beyond sensible experience, opposed to the subject of experience, has to be got over. This is done in some cases by saying that sensible experience is *phenomenal of* a noumenal world, that objects perceived are "appearances" of an *unknown reality*.¹

This is the
extreme
of external
opposi-
tion.

¹ All this is clearly the result of an attempt to justify at a higher level of

These three are fundamentally the same type of opposition.

These three ways of taking the relation between subject and object must be considered together.¹

experience, through a process of reflection, the same kind of separation of subject and object which we find in the case of sense-experience and perception. We would see that it is so if we considered how they are specifically constituted. We should then also discover how ultimately the separation has to be and is overcome altogether. Science, we find, for example, sometimes falls back on some monistic principle, or, again, on a quasi-religious intuition into the ultimate nature of things, *i.e.* into what lies "beyond" in the super-sensible. Other forms of experience, again, assert, and work in ordinary life by the assumption of, an essential identity between the two elements, an identity which may find expression in the so-called rationality of the world as a whole whose nature the subject shows. In short, actual experience and reflection upon experience, in the long run, are forced to abandon the attempt to keep the two factors of experience absolutely apart and external; and to put their separation in a super-sensible world is seen to be, what it is in reality, a mere refuge in the unknown for maintaining the necessity of an inherently false position.

If they are really separate, why these elaborate devices to establish what, to begin with, should be obvious: if they are not separate, our aim should rather be to show that they are distinctions inside a unity. The distinction between real and phenomenal, sensible and super-sensible, are merely made to keep the two as far apart as possible. The very failure to make the result coherent, as in the case of Kant, is evidently an indication that the business of reflection is also to bring them together and show their place in a single identity—a result which, in fact, is accomplished by carrying experience to a higher level. This will appear in the sequel.

¹ They may, indeed, in a sense be looked at as three different ways of trying to secure the same result—to maintain the conscious distinction between subject and object as a separation of opposite elements in spite of their unity, a unity which must and does assert itself somehow in experience in *each case*, and which analysis of that experience shows to be there all the while. First, there is the sensation and the sense-quality, the sense-response on one side and the sense-stimulus on the other. But the reciprocal variation of the two and the essential continuity between them breaks down their independence and asserts their unity as a conscious fact. The opposition failing there, it next takes the form of a separation of the *unity* of sense-qualities and the *function* of uniting them, of thing and perceiving, percept and perception. But here, again, the mutual interdependence of the two sides, the dependence of the character and existence of the "thing" on the selective reaction of the acts of perceiving, and of the function of perceiving on the permanence of the percept, fuses the separated elements into the continuity of a single unified experience. The opposition now seems to have failed utterly: sense-experience and perceptual experience do not exist by opposition of subject and object so much as by their indissoluble unity. Yet the opposition dies hard, and will not be given up. To make a last stand it is taken out of mere sense-experience altogether, and is set up as an opposition *between* what is sense and what is *not* sensuous—between a "sensible" and "super-sensible" world. Here the separation, the "externality"

Their fundamental characteristic is, that in them subject and object are held separate from each other. The special feature in each case is what we may call the relation to "sensibility" in some form or other. It lies in Sense-experience proper, it is present in Perception, it is essential to the distinction between a Phenomenal and Super-sensible world. There is a direct connexion between the external relation of subject and object on the one hand and this implication of the element of sense. For sensibility consists essentially in the external relation of parts to each other indefinitely. The parts in sense-experience are outside each other: "this" is "here," "that" is "there"; the "now" is a unit marked off from a "then." Sensibility is not something which makes these distinctions and relations *possible*; it just *is* this relating of parts externally to each other. Hence to look upon experience as at all sensuous, bound up with sense, *means* simply that we look on subject and object (the final factors

of subject and object, becomes almost a kind of unconscious irony of experience itself. For what it sets up as utterly opposed and "*external*" to another as a *fact* of experience,—an opposition defying the unity of them in experience,—has been *itself* created by that *very unity* itself and in its own interests. And this comes out when we see that the sensible world, which is the typical form of external opposition, of one thing being "*outside*" another, is *itself* put *as a whole outside* what is *not* sensible, what is *super-sensible*. This at once stultifies the very meaning of external opposition, external separation. For what is "super-sensible" cannot be "external" to what is "sensible," if *sense alone* contains "externality"; and *sense as a whole* cannot be "external" to what is not-sensible, for the same reason. Either, therefore, the super-sensible falls *within* what is sensible, or else the relation between them is *not* that of "externality." The first is impossible, and naturally enough, therefore, we find that the relation of "externality" is transmuted altogether, and becomes one between what "appears" and what "abides," between "phenomenal" and "noumenal," and the world of sense becomes an *expression* of (not external to) the super-sensible. And thus the original professed separation fails utterly and disappears altogether into the unity of a single self-conscious experience. The following argument brings this out.

in experience) as outside each other ; and conversely, when subject and object are opposed externally experience is necessarily sensuous. Experience *quâ* sensible is the specific and concrete way in which external opposition is felt and spoken of in ordinary life.

Sense-ex-
perience
proper.

What we have to do is to show how they are held together in an individual mind so as to form a concrete single experience. This means showing the unity which relates them, the identity which holds them within itself as differences. In the case of mere Sensation or mere Sense-experience this is comparatively easy. The general quality of all sense-experience is the simple immediate existence of a conscious content. It is not a "reference" of our ideas *to* sense ; for there is at this level of mind-life no distinction between ideas and other "things." Conscious content simply *is*. Take as example the sense of colour *quâ* sense, and eliminate all reference to distinct ideas of intensities in colour, names of colours, etc., all of which imply comparison and developed thought. The colour simply fills our sense of sight: it is just the general sense of sight modified in a specific way at a specific point. No man is conscious, in *sense*-experience, of a distinction between the mere filling of his eyes with light, and some idea of light in his mind which is referred to a luminous area, any more than he is conscious of a distinction at all between his open eye and light. To open his eye means exactly seeing. A colour is for sense-experience no more than a modification of this general luminous area. So of any other form of mere sense-experience. This quality of merely *being*, without further dis-

tinctions, we express by such terms as "here," "now," "then," "there," "this," "that," etc. These terms are primarily used to convey to ourselves and others precisely this immediate presence of a sense content, the mere consciousness of a sense quality.

They do not all have the same specific connotation. "This" is not the same as "here," and "now" is different from both. But these are merely variations of the same *kind* of conscious life.¹

Now whether expressed or unexpressed these are the only ways in which *mere* Sense-experience appears. Take from an object of nature, *e.g.* a tree, all the complex notions which make up its full meaning for science and developed knowledge, substance, activity, life, laws, etc., and what we have left ultimately is merely a sense-experience of a this-here-and-now. The "this" is, say, green here and now.² And, again, because any given "this" is opposed to another "that," which too may come to be looked on as a "this," Sense-experience as a whole breaks up into a multitude of parts all outside of, and side-by-side with, each other. All can be equally named in exactly the same way, as "this," "that," "here," etc. The parts of Sense-experience simply fall outside each other, have no inner coherence, and imply no active construction. Hence it is that in such experience subject and object are looked on by developed self-conscious life as furthest apart. How then does a "this" experience, an experience

Sense-
experience
is side-by-
sideness.

¹ *i.e.* parts of the same objective continuum of sense—the parts being side-by-side, external. "This," "that," etc., *express* externality in different ways and degrees.

² It is because sense-experience seems thus "found," not made, "picked up," not constructed by developed intelligence, that to higher thought it appears so "external," that the object we are conscious of, the this, seems "outside" us.

consisting of "thises," "heres," "nows," etc., have a unity at all, a concrete identity of diverse elements?

The
"this" is
universal.

In the first place, let us observe that the term "this," "that," etc., can apply to an indefinite number of parts of Sense-experience. Sense seems at first to be merely particular, a "this" seems complete in its isolation, and falls outside the subject, which is merely another particular alongside it, "this" ego, "this" subject. But just because each is looked at as a "this," a particular "this" cannot be a mere term for particularity. It applies to all cases of Sense-experience, and hence is universal. That is inevitable, because merely to isolate particulars is to give all the same character, namely, isolation, and hence the character of isolatedness is itself universal, embracing all cases of itself. For that reason "this" does not express and cannot express merely particularity at all, it is in some way universal. Particular "thises" are thus not absolutely external to each other, they are manifestations of and in a universal, and so imply each other. A "this" contains in itself implicitly a "not this," and both fall inside the universal of thisness in general.

The
"this"
is an
immediate
con-
tinuum.

But that may seem merely an argument based on the use of words, on the fact that "this," like every word, has always at least a potentially universal application. It implies, however, a deeper truth. The immediate of sense-consciousness is a totality, a continuum, compassing in its sweep all the parts into which it may become differentiated by interest or attention or otherwise. The total immediate is alone the "this-now," and the various "thises" or "nows" are merely selected out of it. They each *mean* the totality, because otherwise they would

not themselves *be*, since it alone *is* the immediate. Thus if "now" does not mean the total "now," it makes *the rest* of the "now," and hence *relatively itself*, a "then." Hence a "this," while seemingly a discrete particular, is really an attempt to concentrate into a single point, into a "this-here," the totality of the immediate which alone *is* "this-here." The attempt is no doubt justified, because every part of the immediate of sense is alike *quâ* immediate, and hence the same term will apply to any part of it. This is practically all that is required for the direct purposes of the ordinary life of every day, where these terms are perpetually recurring. The context of fact, and the common understanding of men, save them from the confusion which analysis can detect. But none the less the attempt is unsuccessful and the position untenable. No particular "this" can express fully the total immediate, and it alone is what is present to consciousness. The latter is *always* present, but the former is inadequate to it. We may try to avoid this conclusion by saying we mean "*a* this": analysis shows at once that this is mere redundancy. From this failure arises the view often put forward that language cannot express the mere particular "this" at all. That, however, is not due to the inadequacy of language to deal with actual experience, but because of the absence of *any* experience to which language in such a case could really refer. "This," for Sense, always *means* what is universal, namely, the total immediate of sense-experience; and hence language, which must be universal, is quite equal to what "this" means, but must necessarily be unequal to what "this" may *pretend* to express but can never mean.

We never mean this isolated, discrete, dissociated particular of Sense, because that is inherently without significance of any kind to any mind. "This," "now," etc., thus stands for what is universal.

This is
generic.

There is a further reason, too. Any "this" includes in itself a multiplicity of "thises"; "now" contains a plurality of "nows." This is seen in familiar ways. We say "now it is day"; but this "now" includes hours, which again are "nows." "Here is a table." "Here" includes spaces, points, etc., which again are "heres," and so on. But a "now" which contains plurality within itself as its own is a universal. Similarly of "this" and the other terms.

Sense is a
unity of
difference.

We see, then, that the real nature of sense-consciousness lies in a universal which contains the parts of sense-life as differences. That universal is just the *continuity of the process which makes up the life-history of immediate sense-experience*. This may, by selective interest or otherwise, appear in distinct phases or parts. But each as readily becomes its opposite, and this fluent interchangeableness constitutes the identity between them. The incessant change of sense-life is due to its being a mere variation of the same simple form of existence, is due in fact to the interchangeableness of its content; a "this" can equally well become a "that," a "now" a "then," and so on. This incessant change of similar elements is all that sense-life consists in. Hence its variability, its endlessly fleeting character, its instability, its inadequacy to satisfy the desire for a stable ideal, or constant organising universal. Hence, so far from being the ultimate touchstone of reality, as some have held, it is just what is perpetually slipping from our grasp. Its being is

change, its life the death of its moments. As for constituting a support, which some have tried to make it, against sceptical attack, it is bound to prove the best weapon scepticism can use. The incessant change, which constitutes its life as a universal, makes it impossible for a "this" or "that" to maintain a substantial permanent reality external to the subject. A "this" or "that" has no reality of its own at all; its nature falls into the universal process of change.

On the subjective side, again, Sense-experience is likewise dissolved into the series of units of feeling, Sensations, which make up the discrete parts of the one changing continuum of Sense-life. The "this" is the objective side, the "feeling" the subjective side of the one experience. Being immediate the one to the other, it is only by reflection that the distinction is drawn between a subjective and an objective side. In the experience itself it is indifferent whether we say "this-feeling" or "feeling-this." We see in this way why it is impossible to state whether "sensations" are "objective" or "subjective." What we have in Sense-experience is simply a universal process consisting in the mere awareness of an immediate content, continuous as change, discrete as moments of it.¹ This makes up the whole relation, at this stage of experience, between subject and object. They themselves *exist* by finding their being simply in this process. Universality as a continuum of changing elements is thus the condition of the possibility of Sense-experience.

Subjective
element
of Sense.

¹ Hence, as a consequence, we see that the individuality or, again, the uniqueness of a subject-ego can never be established (as some have maintained) by appealing to mere Sense-experience, for this shows uniqueness to have no place in sense-life at all.

Univer-
sality
here, how
found.

But, it must be noted, the universality here is not a distinct entity for sense-consciousness. It is a continuum of change. Hence the universality is never ascribed, in Sense-experience *itself*, to the ego whose nature is just to be universal. *Universality as such* is only presented at a level above sense, and is known primarily by thinking *about* Sense. Sense is merely awareness of "this." The way universality does appear in Sense is in that *feeling of certainty* which accompanies each "this" of Sense-experience as it comes and as it appears, a feeling which characterises all Sense-experience in exactly the same way. When consciousness does become explicitly aware of the universal, the way is opened to a further and more developed form of this stage of conscious life—Perception.

Percep-
tion.

The examination of Perception reveals in the same way that the object perceived has not as such absolute independence, that its very nature is to dissolve into a unity containing it and the subject to which it stands related. In Perception subject and object seem to stand opposed. But such an external relation as appears there cannot be sustained if the object itself can be shown to dissolve into a more comprehensive totality, or universal, within which also the subject-life falls. This is what analysis of the object and of the process of Perception brings out. The main points in the analysis can be shortly stated.

Perception
deals with
the Uni-
versal of
Sense.

In pure Sense-experience the essential reality was the universal; what was directly conscious at a given moment was a certain "this." The universal *as such* is the real centre of interest in Perception. Hence the meaning of the term; it is "seeing

through" or "thoroughly" into the heart of sense-content, getting hold of its stable unity and universal nature in spite of the appearing diversity and the incessantly changing features of Sense. Thus we distinguish in common life between "seeing" and "perceiving." Both are knowing in the widest sense, both are experience in any sense. The difference is in the way the universal operates. The conscious presence of a universal in Perception is, again, the ground of the common view that *perceived* facts, or facts of Perception, are the basis of Science, and so the basis of inference (which is a process of knowledge dealing solely with universal relations). It is for the same reason that much of Perception can in time be inferred or guessed at, without going through the actual process of Perception, as, *e.g.*, in the observation of a series of objects. To this, indeed, perhaps may also be traced the doubtful doctrine that Perception is a kind of "unconscious inference."

The universal of Sense, then, is the primary factor in Perception. It is double-sided, subjective and objective at once. That lies in the very nature of the case; Perception is an experience. But it is exactly the same universal in both cases, the universal constituting the experience, giving it unity. The subjective side, perceiving, is simply the process of the universal, the universal as actively operating. The objective side, the percept, is the same universal taken simply as a totality, static and fixed in conscious experience. At first no doubt the latter seems the more fundamental in perceptual experience. As it is said, we cannot alter "facts" perceived by the way we perceive them; the process of Perception, that is to say, neither produces

The
twofold
character
of the
Universal.

nor alters the object perceived. On this view the object is taken to be the essential reality ; it *is*, "whether perceived or not." But that is really due to the greater prominence in the experience of Perception of the permanent controlling unity, not to any ultimate difference in the content of Perception between the objective and the subjective side. On the contrary, the fact that the process does not alter the object is just due to the presence of the same universal in both. Indeed we acknowledge, even in common speech, that perceiving and perceived qualities are, in certain cases at least, mutually dependent, such cases being, *e.g.*, the so-called "secondary qualities." But the important point is that while we may assert the object to be fundamental and the *process* of perceiving to be dependent on it, yet examination will show that the process of perceiving an object just consists in taking the aspects of the object separately and relating them so as to form the unity of the object. The object does not exist outside the process, waiting, so to say, till the process is correctly done, whereupon it will become known as the single object for Perception. The object itself *just comes to be in and through the process which takes place in perceiving*. In other words, the *process* of Perception (the subjective side) is itself the object in course of fitting its component elements together. The object as such is the process completed, the elements united. There is no separation between the being of the object and the perceiving of it—a position which Berkeley sought to establish by another route. For idealism this is literal truth, and the exposition of this identity, first in the case of the universal we call the object

perceived, then in the case of the universal we call the process of perceiving, is all that constitutes the analysis of the nature of perceptual experience.

The peculiarity of perceptual experience therefore lies not in its dealing with "particulars," while other forms of knowledge, *e.g.* science, deal obviously with conceptions or universals. That is a common view, which analysis indirectly refutes. The peculiarity lies just in the *kind* of universal which operates in Perception, in the way in which the universal connects the special elements composing it. The mere opposition of subject to object in Perception is not the antecedent condition of perceptual experience, which must be presupposed before Perception can arise.¹ This would make Perception the result of bringing together two alien and mutually excluding substances. Dualism on this view would be the necessary basis on which this type of experience would rest; and the relation between them, which constitutes Perception, might well be thought of as purely mechanical and causal.

Perception
does not
deal with
particu-
lars.

The latter is no doubt a common interpretation of it. Its classical expression is found in Locke, and it is characteristic of the so-called empirical school generally. Perception on this view arises through the subject being "impressed" or acted upon by the object, the subject merely working up these "impressions" or "sensations," as they are sometimes called, by certain "laws" peculiar to itself. The singular result of this position is, that the dualism assumed as the ground of Perception is held to pervade all

Perception
and
Dualism.

¹ The opposition is due to the *way* in which the universal we are here dealing with appears. It is a sense-universal, and Sense-experience *is* side-by-sideness of parts in the whole continuum.

knowledge, even the highest, because "all knowledge starts from Perception." Conceptual Science is explained as due to "abstracting" or "generalising" from perceived fact, *i.e.* by eliminating certain aspects or elements found in Perception. Perception is held to be the most direct form of contact between subject and object, the most concrete way of relating these "substances." Hence the further we go from it, the more we must drop in our progress, the more we must eliminate, and therefore the *less* accurately do we present the facts arising from Perception. Hence it is inevitable that conceptual knowledge should be looked on as less valuable, less true, should be taken as merely "abstract," a mere "construction," or whatever other terms are used to convey the idea that to be further from Perception is to be less near the "real." Conceptions as such become "copies," or after-results, due to "mental" activity; or at best they merely "correspond" to the "reality" revealed in Perception. They form when arranged a world by themselves, parallel with, and in a way "reproducing," but never realising the actual course of things found by Perception. "Reality" then becomes "richer than thought"; the "truth" is found in the life of perceptual experience. When this distrust of the value of conception asserts itself strongly, we have a recoil towards empiricism in the crudest of forms. This result is seen in the history of post-idealistic philosophy since Kant, where the explanation of knowledge has been sought simply in a clearer analysis of the nature and conditions of perceptual life. When carried to its logical issue, this tendency means either the frank abandonment of the

philosophical point of view and ideal altogether, or the strange attempt to find the meaning of things through experimental psycho-physics and physiology.

But subject and object must not and need not be at all thought of in this way to explain Perception. It would be truer to say that *perceptual experience by its very nature puts the object "external to" the subject, rather than that the externality of subject to object gives rise to Perception.* At any rate, perceptual experience and the externality of subject to object are simply different expressions for the same thing. For subject and object to be opposed as unities just means that they appear in the form of Perception. The contrast between subject and object in Perception is simply a particular case of the relation between the two, a relation which is present in experience in general. Hence we must proceed to explain Perception from precisely the opposite point of view from that of dualism. It is not this externality of subject to object which is to be assumed at the start, but the unity of subject and object. The *prima facie* externality has itself to be explained as *a distinction inside an identity*, a distinction drawn, in the long run, by the self-conscious activity at the basis of all experience. At the level of Perception *as such* (i.e. as distinct from reflective interpretation of it by philosophy), the identity between the two sides is not expressly known.¹ Because their unity is not explicit, the elements remain in it, and are accepted, as merely opposed and mutually exclusive. Hence the

Perception
does not
imply
Dualism.

¹ At the most, as, e.g., Kant confesses at the end of his analysis of perception, the identity is merely believed in.

characteristic of perceptual experience. Analysis, therefore, has to bring out this identity by showing that the different elements imply it. To do this is to explain Perception.¹

Import-
ance of
this view
of Percep-
tion.

Now since it is in the sphere of Perception that we come across the so-called "external world," that we meet the opposition usually set up between "mind" and "nature" in its crudest form (in the form, that is to say, of one substance external to and acting upon another substance), this analysis of Perception is of crucial importance for the whole view of experience. If it is correct, it is difficult to reject the interpretation to be given of the nature of Scientific activity, of the life of Morality and Religion, of the unity of Spirit and Nature, the refutation of Kant's dualism, and of his conception of the finiteness and the contradictions into which human reason necessarily falls. For these are all developments of the same position, and follow, one may say, almost inevitably on the admission of this view of Perception.

Know-
ledge
breaks
down all
opposi-
tions.

It follows also from the same interpretation that there can be no absolute *impasse* in the way of knowledge. For if, where the contrast between subject and object seems greatest, viz. Perception, the object is still constituted by the same universals controlling

¹ Thus the view, here stated, simply takes in a concrete form Kant's principle of self-consciousness as its starting-point, and shows Perception to be one way in which it operates in experience. In this sense it is nearer the truth of that principle than the position of Fichte, who did not show that the distinction of subject and object in Perception is *immanently* involved in the idea of self-consciousness, but endeavoured to show how the one *produced* the other and put it externally beyond itself by an initial act of spontaneity. So conceived the externality for ever remains, and is a perpetual "other" to self-consciousness, never completely reconciled; or if reconciled, the externalising process becomes a mere fiction from which the ego never escapes, but which is illusory none the less.

the subject, then knowledge can never be brought face to face with any kind of thing-in-itself beyond its power to grasp. The contradictions of experience will always be resolvable by the power which created them, and will not be attributed either to the pretentiousness of finite mind (as Kant held), or to the fallibility of human reason, but will be accepted as part of the nature of experience. The systematic justification of this view is the sum and substance of Hegel's interpretation of experience.

In dealing with Perception, then, we first analyse the object into its constituent characteristics. ^{Object of Perception.} It is the universal of sensibility, the sense-universal. What, as mere Sense-experience, was taken to be a series of discrete "thises," must now be viewed as elements in the universal. They are ways in which it appears, and hence are themselves a plurality of sense elements. These are what we call "qualities" of Sense.¹ They are together in the universal which is the focus of perceptual experience. This focal unity is what we call a "thing." A "thing" is just the unity of the object in Perception. The "thing" is the universal of Perception when that universal *is viewed as a complete whole*. The "qualities" are the phases or aspects of this universal. They are as such universal, universals of sense; and, being so, they, like all sensuous experience, fall apart from each other and from the central unity. Taking the plurality of *qualities* which together make up the variety of the object perceived, they are, because at once together and falling apart

¹ Thus what in Sense-experience is a "this-feeling," a mere variation of the continuum of immediate experience, becomes in Perception a fixed quality (on the object-side) and a determinate qualification (on the subject-side).

from each other, held to be merely *associated* in an object. Thus colour, sound, and taste may all be qualities of the same perceived object, but there is no inherent connexion of a quality "white" with a quality "sweet" and a quality of "crisp-hardness," *e.g.*, in the case of sugar. The one quality is not to be attributed to the other: they are merely there *together* at the same time and yet apart as qualities. Taking the qualities as a whole, there is nothing more in the object than these qualities, except the fact of their being associated together. This indeed was Berkeley's unanswerable criticism of Locke. Looking, again, at the *unity* of the object in its distinction from the plurality of the qualities, the same apartness characterises the relation of the qualities to the unity. They are said merely to "belong to" or be "properties" of the object. "Belonging to" and "being properties of" essentially imply that in some way the qualities have an external relation to the object. They are "attached to it," or, again, are said to "inhere" in it, both of which terms indicate that the "it" is something or other apart from them. This is seen in a concrete way in ordinary experience, where it is admitted that a quality may pass away altogether, or give place to another quality similar or different in nature, and yet the unity of the object still remain.

The unity
excludes
as well as
includes.

The object in Perception, then, is a universal, a "thing" which breaks up into a plurality of universals, sense-qualities, existing side by side. These qualities are the positive content of the object. If they were absolutely indifferent to each other, existing merely side by side, it would be difficult to give any meaning

to the unity of the object at all. A "thing" would simply be yellow, and *also* sweet, and *also* round; nothing more. It would be not a unity but a conglomerate. But this alone cannot constitute a "thing." To be a unity it must *exclude* as well as *include*. And what a "thing" excludes is *other* "things." To do so is to be "one thing," a concrete unity and not a plurality of elements side by side. This exclusion gives it stability and prevents it being a mere flux as in pure Sense-experience. The permanence in the midst of, and in spite of, the flux of sense is the peculiar mark of a "thing" as such, as distinct from a quality; it constitutes the thinghood of the "thing." But it is a stability in the sphere of Sense; its content is Sense. Hence to *be* "one thing" means being external to another; each is a unit and shuts out or excludes another from itself. There is no thought here of a law or force controlling the unity and making it permanent. Such ideas come later. For Perception the unity is simply *a* focus of qualities excluding other foci of other qualities. Hence their unity, their stability, is a "here," a "now," a "*this*," or "*that*," "*thing*," etc. But since its unity *consists* simply of sense-qualities, it falls in its *entirety* as well as in its qualities into the current of change. Hence the "disappearance" of "things" lies in their very nature as "things," and their varying degree of stability depends on the kind of qualities possessed. Thus the unity of a "thing" is not something independent of the qualities, nor something outside Perception. For Perception, the unity just lies in the universal, the "thing," excluding other "things," and being one amongst others; the way

it specifically does so is simply by those special qualities it is said to "possess." In perceptual experience, therefore, the universal, which is the centre of this experience, breaks up into a variety of sensuous universals (qualities) which lie apart from each other and mark off that universal itself, which is the "thing," from other "things." To include qualities is thus to exclude other "things"; and to do both at once is to be this or that "thing," is to be a single or *one* "thing."

The limits
of Perception.

Thus the nature of a perceived "thing" from first to last is resolvable into elementary universals belonging to the sphere of sensibility. There is no more, so far as Perception goes, than just this specification of a universal of Sense into sensuous universals. If we ask for more, or if we are led to go further, it must be because we are going beyond Perception proper. At the level of Perception there *is nothing* more to be given or required. That we must go further will be seen presently. But the point to notice is that Perception as such does not and cannot contain more than what has been stated. If mind cannot be satisfied with that, we thereby confess simply that our mind cannot be exhausted by perceptual experience, not that Perception as such contains more than Perception supplies in the above analysis. Perception as such creates no difficulties it cannot solve; it is *a higher phase of the life of mind that forces* perceptual experience into contradictions which it (Perception) cannot overcome. This higher phase of mind must do so just because it is higher. And as the difficulties are raised by this higher sphere, they must be solved by this higher sphere, and *not*

by Perception. They can be solved by mind, because mind has raised them; and hence mind is never defeated in pursuing its own purpose of realising a complete unity. No doubt this higher sphere beyond Perception seems to be demanded by Perception. We show (as we shall see presently) that the very nature of a "thing" is to be at once a self-contained unity and also a dependent unity. And when we do this, Perception seems to call for a further effort of mind to get over the difficulties inherent in its own nature. But, in point of fact, what has brought Perception to this pass is another level of mind which is immediately above Perception; and hence the solution of those difficulties is to be found at that higher level also.

Stated in this way the position is sharply distinguished from that of Kant or again of Locke and Berkeley. Kant, taking a dualistic view of the conditions of Perception, held the view that "behind" the thing perceived there was implied for Perception a thing *per se* not perceived, a hidden core or focus of reality not resolvable into sense qualities which we can know. He did not, like Locke, speak of this unity as a law of the thing, and thereby bring it within the range of knowledge. It was simply a "beyond," something "outside" knowledge, which no power of mind can get at. Clearly, if Perception and Understanding are heterogeneous forms of mind, anything which remains always unrevealed by Perception, and which yet is not supposed to have been placed in Perception by Understanding, must for ever be an unintelligible surd for human knowledge. Such a surd is the thing apart from its qualities. On the above view, however, such an

Kant's
view of
Percep-
tion.

idea is the creation of Understanding, the higher power of mind above Perception. *For Perception* there cannot possibly be a thing *per se*, because Perception reveals solely universals of sense, and there is nothing more to be found in perceptual experience. The "thing-in-itself" is due to the determination of perceptual experience by a higher level of the mind's experience, the level, as we shall see, of Understanding. Hence the thing-in-itself cannot be an ultimate surd for knowledge, since it is to *start with* merely the result of the mind taking up a point of view in regard to Perception which is beyond the reach of Perception itself. Certainly Perception cannot perceive a "thing-in-itself," in the sense of Kant. But, then, *it does not exist* for Perception at all. Hence if it is beyond Perception, *it is not necessarily beyond knowledge at another level*. The mistake of Kant consisted in condemning human knowledge for not being able to grasp at one level of experience (Perception) a content whose very existence is only found at a higher (Thought). And this in the long run was due to his making Perception and Understanding heterogeneous, which again was the result of his dualism.

Berkeley.

Berkeley, again, truer to the nature of Perception, finds nothing but sense-universals, or "ideas of sense," as he calls them, in the world of things, and denies the existence of any unknown somewhat so far as concerns Perception. True also to the externality characteristic of sense qualities and perceived universals (or things), he seeks to establish a purely contingent or "occasional" relation between them. They become in his hands "signs" of the presence of one another, the anticipation of one

after the other being the creation of the experience of perceptual life itself. But while *intending* to limit all knowledge in the first instance to perceptual experience, he unconsciously goes beyond this by introducing the conception of an orderliness into experience, which he does not really derive from Perception as such, but from the further nature of mind. In other words, order is introduced by the deeper nature of mind, *i.e.* by self-conscious reason, into the flow of sense-life. This order has its source ultimately, or *a priori*, in the divine-mind, and derivatively, or *a posteriori*, in man's individual mind. But it is, for Berkeley, an order of a sensuous material; and hence for him is again of a *contingent* kind. Thus causation, *e.g.*, becomes the external relation of a sign to a thing signified. Hence, while both regard Knowledge as essentially perceptual in character, Berkeley falls into an opposite error from Kant. Kant set a limit to knowledge because Perception implied an element not given or found by Perception itself. Berkeley set a limit to knowledge *although* it did *not* imply any unperceived element. The limit in Kant's case is really due to the nature and conditions of Understanding, which is the source of necessity in experience and yet is apart from Perception. The limit in Berkeley's case is determined by the fact that because perceptual experience does not carry us beyond what is perceived, the connexions of experience must at best be contingent. Hence in Kant's case the limit is characterised by a term belonging to the region of Perception, it is a "thing-in-itself"; in Berkeley's case it lies outside Perception, and is called a "notion."

Hegel's
correction.

The above interpretation avoids both these positions, first by looking upon Perception and Understanding as *both* forms of experience at different levels but *continuous* with each other ; and, secondly, by regarding the limitations, difficulties, and contradictions of the one sphere as due to, and hence to be solved by, mind at a higher sphere of conscious activity.

The
subject in
Percep-
tion.

Perceiv-
ing.

The resolution of the elements of the object of perception into separate conscious parts, and the conscious relation of these to each other, constitutes just what we mean by "perceiving." Perceiving is the subjective side of the same universal which constitutes the object in perceptual experience. The process of perceiving does not consist in an inner activity which goes on of itself, and when completed all at once refers to an object which throughout that activity was external to it. *The process of perceiving contains the object all along.* The development, or activity, of the process is just the object *coming to consciousness*, entering experience. The completion of the process is simply the realisation of what Perception means. There is no "act of reference" to the object which takes place all of a sudden : it is *there from first to last in the process of coming to know the object in Perception.* No doubt there is a finality about the completed relation of subject to the object, *i.e.* about that stage in the process where we have all the certainty Perception can give ; and no doubt that feeling of finality is not found in the earlier stages. But that is in the nature of the case. As a process with a definite goal (*viz.* the attainment of that kind of unity of subject and object which Perception achieves) it must be less secure

and definite in the stages preceding the end. But this does not mean that the course of our ideas in the earlier stages is generically different from the final result. It does not mean that *before* we have that final certainty, which Perception gives, the process is "psychical" or psychological, and that *when* we have it, the process suddenly becomes "cognitive" or logical. It is *both subjective and objective all along*; for it is experience from first to last. The subjective aspect of Perception just lies in the process of being conscious of the elements comprising the unity of the object, *i.e.* of becoming gradually aware of the diversity implied or contained in the universal belonging to Perception. This involves at once analysis and synthesis, and in this perceiving essentially consists.

To trace, then, the process of perceiving is merely to repeat the moments contained in the object of Perception, and to express the nature and result of Perception from the point of view of the subjective side of the experience.

We can see these characteristics of the process of Perception exemplified more especially when we are perceiving new objects, or when distinguishing a sensuous area into perceptual units, or, again, when identifying an obscurely presented whole, say the objects in a misty landscape. Here we can be distinctly aware of separating and combining elements, selecting, rejecting, unifying, and breaking up until a point is reached when, as we say, we are certain of "perceiving" such and such an object, after which the process ceases. In such cases we are all the while *inside* the subject-object relation. The difference between the process

The process of Perception.

and the conclusion is one between a complete and an incomplete realisation of the nature of the relation. The former is described as the subjective side specifically, the latter is the objective side, but the difference is not a separation. The objective aspect is involved *all along* in the subjective process, and conversely. When we separate them sharply, as we can do for practical purposes, and as is done absolutely by a dualistic view of perceptual knowledge, we can put perceiving on one side and the thing with its qualities on the other. But each really involves the other, each is merely a phase of the same unity, the experience we call Perception.

Its elements.

Hence, then, to trace the steps in the process of perceiving is merely to relate from another point of view the factors involved in the nature of the object, the "thing" perceived. In both cases we have a plurality of elements at once apart and indifferent to each other, and yet forming a unity. The elements on the subjective side are the various ways of apprehending by the different sense functions, "hearing," "seeing," etc., which are distinct and yet fall within the one activity of the subject. Thus seeing, hearing, and touching may be all elements in the experience of perceiving a given "thing." They are specifically different, and yet side by side in the life of the subject, and in that sense are a unity. Their togetherness just makes up the unity of the act of perceiving. Each again is subdivided into equal diverse elements or forms; seeing "black" being different from seeing "white," and so on. In all respects, therefore, we have the same kind of diversity in unity in the process of perceiving (the act of Perception) and the product perceived, the

"thing." In analysing the epistemological meaning of "things," and in stating the nature of perceiving, we are reaching the same experience merely from different points of view. Or, to put it more emphatically, the "thing" just *is* the content of the act of perceiving; the *process* of perceiving *realises itself* in the consciousness of a "thing." In a "thing" the universal consists in a unity of various qualities lying side by side: they simply *are together*. But this "being together" is also and in the same sense a form of the activity of perceiving. "Togetherness" appears within the subject in the form of specifically discrete functions of sense-apprehension, seeing, hearing, tasting, etc., each qualitatively apart and unique in its operation, and merely existing together as the activity of the one subject. The unity of the "thing" perceived is thus as truly a specific expression of the activity of perceiving as a determinate character of the objective world. For the kind of unity is the same on both sides. Its being a unity is not *given* to the self. That is the error of the dualistic view of Perception. Nor is it simply and solely *made* by the self; that is the error of Subjective Idealism. The unity is the subject itself realised in a specific form; when realised we have the objective unity of the "thing" in experience. What is fundamental is the subject-object relation constituting the experience. The unity of that experience on the side of the subject appears as the perceiving of a "thing": the unity of the experience in another aspect is the percept, or "thing." Thus the relation between subject and object in Perception is not a bringing together of static entities each fixed and complete.

The experience is a continuous process containing different moments or factors; it is a unity in and through difference. When completed the differences stand apart as distinct phases of the one unity, because, on the one hand, the process is a process of Sense-experience, *i.e.* side-by-sideness, and, on the other, the differences are here universal, and therefore maintain a fixity impossible at the level of Sense as such. Thus the stability of the opposition of subject and object in Perception is the *product* of this single process, not the ground of it.

Diffi-
culties.

If, then, the two sides are thus to be identified, how are we to account for the apparent separation, at least practically formed and ordinarily accepted, between perceiving and the thing perceived. The stones or trees, it may be said, are transparently separated from the mind of the individual percipient. They are there, it is held, whether any one perceives them or not; they are independent, if anything can be. Is this independence illusory? How is it to be explained? In reply to this it has to be pointed out (1) that if we accept sense-life as a continuum, then clearly differentiation, relation, unification, etc., must operate before we can get even specific objects like trees or stones. These must be separated out of the generic whole of the "this-here-now" of Sense before they get the individuation of "things." Such separation surely goes to constitute them what they are, and such separation is the result of experience, the experience, namely, we call Perception. (2) If the above analysis of sense-experience is correct, we cannot regard sense-life as having any independence of the subject. A sense-experience which implies

no subject of such experience seems meaningless. But if this be true, and if Perception is a further development of the very nature, and not simply *on the basis* of, sense-life, the essential unity of subject and object in the experience must be carried forward and found in Perception as well. To deny this is to deny the meaning of the development of the one out of the other. (3) The real question is not as to the abstract unity of subject and object, but as to the *kind* of unity holding between them at the different stages. No doubt the unity of percipient and "thing" is not the same as that holding between feeling and a mere Sense element. The relation is different because the experience is different. That lies in the very nature of the case. Development there would otherwise be none. But difference in the expression of the unity is something very far removed from the *absence* of any unity at all, which separation of subject from "thing" implies. (4) We must distinguish sharply between the object in Perception, between the unity of percipient and "thing" in an individual's concrete perceptual experience, and what holds good for consciousness in general. The trees and stones in Mecca are certainly not bound up with the perceptual life of a specific individual in Scotland in the way they are connected with an individual in Arabia. They are matter of inference to the former, and of direct Perception to the latter. That is, they belong to a *non-perceptual* experience in the case of the former, and to Perception *only* in the case of the latter. In the former the object belongs to what we may call general or *conceptual* experience, the experience of a *conceiving* subject : in the latter the object exists for a *perceiving* subject, a

subject *quâ* perceiving. Hence it is mere confusion to speak of the object for general experience and the subject in perceptual experience in the same breath, as if subjects and objects could be cut loose and transposed as we please. Subject and object are *always* relative to one another and to the experience which they constitute. It is out of this confusion that the idea of a separation between things and the subject arises. We are using object in one reference and subject in another. (5) It is also to be pointed out that it is the *thing-character* of the object world we are considering, *i.e.* the content of *Perception* only. Thus, for example, a tree or even a stone is not *simply* a "thing," any more than a human being is a mere "thing." They have the thing-character *in so far as they appear in that form of experience we call Perception*. But we cannot exhaust a tree by perceptual experience, still less a human being. A tree, *e.g.*, has "life," as we say, it is governed by "laws." Neither of these categories belong to Perception; we cannot *perceive* "life" or "law." These imply a further development of mind and experience; they imply what, as we shall see, we call Understanding and Reason. Hence it is utterly misleading and erroneous to assert a separation between perceiving and its object, when the grounds of that separation imply elements of which in the very nature of the case Perception can take no cognisance. We must keep within the universe of discourse of Perception itself, and then ask whether the nature of perceptual-experience is such that there is or can be a *separation* between its object and its subject. When we do so we shall find, as indicated above, that the fixity of the opposition of subject and

object in Perception is the result of universalising moments of the continuous process of sense-elements. The sense-content, as we saw before, consists essentially of units side by side; when universal, that content gets permanence of character, and this fixes the side-by-sideness into a stable opposition of content. Therein lies the difference between Sensation as such and Perception as such. The opposite elements, however, are none the less moments of the one continuous process in which the life of this experience consists; and they arise out of that process. That is the only kind of opposition which exists at the level of Perception as such.¹

The justification for this somewhat lengthy analysis of Perception is that Perception presents a crucial problem for any interpretation of experience such as is here given. It is by appeal to perceptual experience that dualism for the most part finds justification; while Perception seems at first to be a serious obstacle in the way of any thorough-going idealism.

¹ The kind and degree of opposition varies with the content of the perceptual experience. Hence the distinction between primary and secondary qualities on the one hand, and the varying degree of "thinghood" in perceived objects on the other.

CHAPTER VI

UNDERSTANDING AND THE WORLD OF NOUMENA AND PHENOMENA

The need
of a higher
stage of ex-
perience.

THE next question is, how is the content of experience involved in the Perception of things to be brought into a unity which will completely satisfy consciousness? It is plain that at the level of Perception this satisfaction is not attained. In point of fact nothing is so common as the confession of defeat in attempting to penetrate completely the life of things. This refers to the experience we have through Perception. The limited range of Perception, the transitoriness of qualities, the alteration of their arrangement, the disappearance of things themselves—all these in everyday life prevent permanent satisfaction with this level of experience.

A thing
exists by
external
relation.

But the very principle of perceptual experience makes this inevitable. For it lies in the nature of qualities and things that they have their peculiar character through external relation. A "thing" only is by reference to other "things." Its unity is for Perception a unity by exclusion. It is, as we may put it, obtained by selecting a certain area of sense fact, leaving the rest aside, and looking on the part selected as a fixed and determinate object. Its determinate unity just lies in its shutting out the remainder of

sense with which all the while it is *continuous*. This character also affects the internal unity of the "thing." For that, as we saw, lies in the *qualities* excluding one another and in being simply together, side by side. That whose nature lies in exclusion is *itself* excluded. But complete reciprocal exclusion means *dissolution*. Hence the passing away of "things." So, again, of the qualities. They are universals, no doubt, but universals of Sense. But what is of Sense carries its opposite in its very nature: a "this" is not for ever a "this." It is no sooner "this" than it becomes a "that." A universal of Sense, therefore, in spite of its fixity, carries within it the instability of its own origin. One quality passes and gives way to another literally and completely. The colour of a "thing" gives place to another colour without any internal unity between them: they simply are there. And, finally, the result is the same if we take a "thing" *with* its qualities. Here we have an object which contains opposite elements simply existing together within it, but not coherently *connected*. They are and remain apart from each other. The object is looked at as *this* object in virtue of a certain quality, its "property"; the distinctiveness of it as one object lies in that property. The object is a universal because of its plurality of properties existing side by side; it is "this" and also "that," and "this" in spite of "that."

Now all this implies that the nature of a "thing" is not self-contained. Its nature carries with it a perpetual reference to what is outside it, other than it. It could not have *this* quality unless by contrast with other "thises," other qualities. It could not be the meeting-place of qualities unless by reference

And is
therefore
not self-
complete.

to other spheres from which itself is distinguished. Externality, in short, is of the essence of a thing, and that means that it is not self-contained.

Arbitrariness of Perception.

No doubt these two aspects mentioned seem to make a "thing" a substantial reality with an independent being of its own. But the very fact that in Perception itself either side indifferently is regarded as its reality shows the inherent instability of a "thing." We find that sometimes Perception takes one quality or more to be the essential being of the "thing," as when primary qualities are taken to be more fundamental than secondary; while sometimes its real being is placed in the combination of certain qualities, the others being indifferent, as when a drop of water is regarded as a "thing," even it may be the same "thing," whether it be coloured or clear, rounded or flattened, etc. This ambiguity the perceptual consciousness may try to overcome by drawing a distinction between "essential" and "accidental" characteristics of "things"; or, again, by saying that the "thing" is "independent" in certain respects, though relative to others in other respects. But these are easily seen to be subterfuges. For a distinction between essential and non-essential characteristics in the case of what owns qualities in a merely external way, the qualities being for Perception merely side by side, is clearly quite arbitrary. While, again, to assert the independence or inherent self-identity of things, and yet qualify it by adding "so far as it is this or that," is obviously an assertion and a denial in the same breath.

The level of Perception therefore cannot satisfy the mind's desire for completely coherent unity. The constituent factors in the "thing," its unity and

its diverse elements, are and remain antagonistic to each other in the very being of "things." They are "associated," but disparate: they include by excluding, they are one merely by being many. They both fall inside the "thing"; but for Perception they stand opposed and unreconciled. Hence to meet the demand which the mind makes on its experience, a further stage of experience must be introduced. This step is made possible because both opposed factors fall within the totality of the "thing's" nature. In this way they are seen to be parts of a whole. The step is made necessary, because the experience of mind cannot be exhausted so long as the sense of opposition remains within it; that opposition must be removed. What we want is a whole which will not be fettered or conditioned in this purely external way characteristic of the "thing." In other words, the universal we want must not be one which is maintained simply through relation to others; it must be self-determined, coherent within itself. To obtain this in experience, since it cannot be had from Perception, we pass to another attitude of mind. That attitude is what we call *Understanding*. Understanding is thus the next level of experience required to realise what is left unsatisfied by Perception.

A further
stage
necessary.

Before indicating what this form of mind contains, and how experience at this stage works, let us notice in passing the peculiar significance of this step. Stated shortly, it implies neither more nor less than that the mind of man is on the one hand not to be defeated in its demand for a completely coherent experience, or, what is the same thing, complete consciousness of self in experience, and on the other

Meaning
of the step.

hand is not to be put off by subterfuges or partial reconciliations, no matter how ingenious. Be the object and the subject as far removed to all appearance as they may, be the antithesis between the factors in any mode of experience as great as possible, this view of knowledge maintains as a working assumption, which the course of the interpretation of knowledge is to justify to be correct, that a satisfying unity can and must be attained by the mind operative in experience. Hence, on this view, the transparently incomplete sense of unity arrived at by Perception is not the occasion for confessing the bankruptcy of knowledge in regard to the so-called external world; nor is it sufficient merely to supplement and guard its limited form of truth by qualifying expressions or patch-work apologies. The former is the attitude often assumed by a thorough-going Dualism, the latter is adopted by so-called common-sense Realism. Thus, those who regard Perception as the sole avenue to knowledge of a world, from which to begin with the mind is separated by the whole diameter of being, and which gets into contact with mind through the agency of our "external senses," find that the opposition between the two poles assumed at the start remains at the end of the process of Perception. The world remains external, and Perception fails to convey to the mind its "real" nature. The admission of this takes the form of drawing a distinction between what the world may be "in itself," what things are "in themselves," and what they are "for" perceiving minds. Regarding the former we are said to know nothing; regarding the latter we are held to have a working certainty, a certainty, however, always

Two
views.

The
position of
Dualism.

threatened and liable to be overthrown by the unknown reality behind the veil of sense-experience. Knowledge beyond perceptual experience is impossible, however much we may desire or demand it. In spite of, perhaps because of, this confession, the question cannot but be perpetually raised:—what, then, *are* the things when *not* perceived? what qualities have they? do they have even qualities at all when the percipient is removed temporarily or permanently? And the question remains as persistently without an answer. This qualified agnosticism very easily passes into absolute agnosticism or even pure scepticism. For the transition from the question, “what *are* the things apart from the qualities I perceive”? to the question, “are the qualities I perceive really properties of things at all”? is too simple to be neglected by the awakened reflection of the critic of knowledge. When this step is taken, we can stop at nothing short of the paralysis of all knowledge of the external world, and total scepticism is the result. Such, indeed, is the point of view deliberately adopted by a mind which is frankly prepared to accept despair rather than cherish delusion.¹ The way out of these difficulties consists in accepting the inherent incompleteness of the process of perceptual experience as a form of knowledge; in asserting, further, that the consciousness of that incompleteness implies the presence in experience of another form of knowledge which can extend and complete our knowledge of the world of “things”; and as a consequence in denying the dualism assumed by the view just stated.

¹ I have in mind here the epistemological position of a critic like Huxley on the famous controversy regarding protoplasm.

And of
"Common-
sense"
Realism.

On the other hand, the mere ingenuity, or ingenuousness, of the "good sense" of "ordinary understanding," which professes "to take things as they are" and not to go further, is not sufficient to secure the end we seek to attain. For this, while admitting the insufficiency of Perception, yet at the same time seeks to make the result seem completely satisfactory by merely distinguishing between what is an "essential" aspect of a "thing" and what is "unessential"; *i.e.* it merely qualifies one of its contradictory elements by reference to another. In this way it never feels the need of transcending the knowledge of "things" given in Perception, and never seeks to bring the contradictory elements into coherent connexion. It considers any attempt to do so as an endeavour to transcend what it calls "experience," meaning by this perceptual experience; and sees in the attempt merely the sophistical manipulation of abstractions. Such procedure, indeed, it may even identify with philosophy itself, which is said to deal merely with "bare" thoughts, "pure abstractions." This is to a large extent the view of "common sense," and of much reflection on the nature of "science."

These
views
unsatis-
factory.

But this is evidently a confession of want of thoroughness in the application of the idea of knowledge. It implies that such terms as essential and unessential, universal and particular, are not to be taken too seriously, and do not raise any problems that require a further solution. It means that the belief in the coherence of knowledge need not be applied to conceptions, but must be restricted to what can be attained by Perception, no matter what that involves. And it is clearly inconsistent. For such ideas as essential and unessential are

considered necessary to Perception, and yet they *do not themselves belong at all to the level of perceptual knowledge as such*. Perception does not perceive essentials and non-essentials: it perceives a "thing" and its qualities. Such ideas are thus treated as external to perceptual experience and yet as necessary. But if they are necessary they surely demand further systematic interpretation; while if they are external they may be considered irrelevant for Perception as such. Then, again, the sheer sophistry of proceeding in this way is manifest when we note that in point of fact it is quite indifferent and arbitrary which aspect is held to be essential and which not. Everything depends on how in a special case things are regarded. This must be so. For the terms essential and unessential, so far as concerns the content of Perception, are held to be *interchangeable*. All the same, what is unessential is still looked at as necessary. But to hold anything to be unessential and yet necessary is inherently contradictory.

There is only one course left if we are to apply the idea of knowledge, of coherent unity, systematically. These factors necessarily operative in Perception must be made consistent with the unity ^{The way} they imply. This is the more necessary since the ^{out.} very elements are themselves the life of Perception. They make Perception as such what it is: the flux of "things" has its ground just in the fact that what is essential may be in another aspect the reverse, what is universal may become particular. Their significance in this respect is ignored altogether by Dualism and Realism: and hence they are treated as being more or less external to "things," and

calling for no further treatment on their own account. To secure such treatment the point of view of mere Perception must be left behind, and a higher aspect of experience appealed to. This implies that Perception is not self-complete, as it is assumed to be, and it implies that the sphere to which Perception points has a nature and content of its own demanding separate consideration and development. This is precisely what is done in passing to Understanding as that mode of experience to which we are carried in order to reconcile the opposite elements of Perception.

Under-
standing :
in its
subjective
side.

What kind of experience this is, and how it proceeds, are determined first by the elements which Perception leaves unreconciled ; and second by the demand for coherent unity on the part of self-consciousness, a demand which controls the whole course of experience. The first, we might say, prescribes the content, the second prescribes the form, of this next stage of experience. We may put the result here attained in the following way. We saw that the unity present in Perception was universal, because within it all the discrete elements in the perceptual world lay together. The question now is simply how does this universal hold these different elements together, or in what way does it show itself a concrete universal ? It is not something external to the factors present in the nature of "things" : this would merely restate the contradiction we are seeking to remove. Nor is it merely an abstract designation for what is common to them. It is identified with them, the medium in which their relation takes effect. They are related to each other ; "things" and "qualities" mutually imply

and refer to each other, in virtue of some identity. Their differences are the ways in which it appears; its unity is the ground of their interrelatedness. They get their stability from it. It is resolved into them. They are dissolved into it. The independence of "things" with their "qualities," which makes them indifferent to each other, collapses into the unity of the medium in which they subsist and by which they affect each other. The unfolding of this identity is just the realisation of independent "things" and "qualities." Now, says Hegel, the process hereby involved is what we call active "Force" (Kraft). In Force we have an identity containing all that appears as its "expression," and a diversity of elements different from and independent of each other and yet manifestations of the one fundamental identity. It is just such an idea, therefore, which can unite in itself the two aspects which characterise "things"—mutual independence of elements, and a unity which insists on being the sphere of such independence. For Force, by its very nature, must *express* itself without reserve. Force resolves itself into diverse elements, what we call its "manifestations," which differ in time, place, and relation. The unity of Force in that sense lies in its holding the plurality of manifestations into which it is resolved: the diversity *is* that unity made explicit, "expressed." This, then, is how the world of things appears at the level of experience immediately above Perception, and which is demanded by the incoherence of Perception: for a world of "things" and "qualities" we have substituted a world of "forces" and their "expression."

On its
objective
side:
Force.

Let us not misunderstand the result. This

Meaning
of this
position.

does not mean that the individual human mind in dealing with perceptual reality makes use of, or manufactures the notion of Force in order to reduce to unity the different factors, which Perception leaves side by side and without connexion. Such a view is ruled out from the start; for it rests on a dualistic basis, altogether alien, as we have seen, to the idealistic conception of knowledge. The mind does not first of all find itself in difficulties with regard to the qualities inherent in "things,"—*e.g.* the colours, sounds, etc., belonging to a perceived object—and then, because unable by Perception to reduce all this diversity to unity, proceed to "create" out of the resources of its own consciousness the idea of Force, and employ it to reduce discord to harmony. This is meaningless, unless to begin with we assume that mind is confronted with an objective world altogether alien to itself, and with which it endeavours to reconcile itself as well as possible. Such a view of the process is that taken by Empiricism, or again by Pragmatism. The idea of Force certainly appears later in experience than the content of Perception, and certainly brings that content into some deeper unity than Perception can supply. But this aspect of the case concerns the history and psychical process of the individual, and does not affect the place and worth of such an idea in experience. For the view here adopted, Force is not an idea "*employed*" by, and so external to, conscious mind, any more than "thing" or "colour" can be looked at in this way. Force indicates a certain *level of experience to which the mind has come in dealing with its content*. The idea is revealed in man's experience, it may be with all degrees of clearness

and precision. As a way in which mind operates, it appears in the half-conscious or unconscious attitude of the untutored mind which believes in and sees a hidden source of power and activity behind the changing life of sensuous things, as well as in the definite reflection on the forms of things which we find in the cultivated intellect. The lowest level in which it appears is no doubt the source of what we call crude anthropomorphism and animism, while the highest may appear as the beginnings of scientific reflection in the history of man.¹ But the same attitude is operative throughout. The difference between highest and lowest lies simply in the elimination of contingent and chance detail, and in obtaining the abiding unity.²

The world as "perceived" gives place, then, to a world "understood"; a world of "qualities" and "things" becomes a world of "forces" and their "manifestations." Force simply stands for the *objective* aspect, while Understanding is the *subjective* side of experience at the level above Perception; just as in the latter perceiving was the subjective side and "things" the objective. To "understand" is only possible in experience if and where the objective world is looked on as the expression of Force. The consciousness of Force is literally the content of experience within that stage. The sphere of Perception and "things" is not *outside* and *opposed to* the sphere of Understanding and Force. The sphere of Perception as such has itself *given*

Subjective and objective implied in the same experience makes it unique.

¹ Cp. Ward's view of cause, force, etc., as anthropomorphic, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 237 ff.

² Thus in pure science, such a unity is without "human" qualities of any kind: it has merely quantitative characteristics. Hence the contrast between the idea of scientific energy and that of primitive animism.

place to that of Understanding, has passed away into it, and hence cannot be opposed to it. *When we are understanding we are no longer perceiving at all*: we have left perceiving behind and are at a higher level of experience. Hence there is no sense, on such a view, in asserting that in Understanding we "apply" the idea of Force to perceptual "facts." The idea of Force *already implies* the content of Perception, and what we do in Understanding is to develop what *that idea itself* contains, carry it, so to say, its whole length, exhaust its value for experience. And by doing so we come to find in turn *its* limitations, and hence pass to a higher stage of unity still. But we do not take Perception, so to say, in one hand, and Understanding in another, and try to reduce the difficulties of the one to the shape prescribed by the other. The process is a *development*, where each stage contains already the preceding, and is not to be fitted into or connected with it mechanically.

Kant.

And herein, again, lies the difference between this view and Kant's. For Kant, and indeed many others, Perception and Understanding are generically different agents of a mind which, as a detached and complete entity by itself, uses its machinery now in one way and now another. But since it is all the while one mind, the two must somehow be brought together;¹ and if, after that, there is still some gap, or again some residuum, discoverable, another attempt must be made to get a completer unity,—which is the so-called unity of "reason." Why the mind can or should act in these different ways, and how a mechanical unity of any kind can satisfy self-consciousness, is not clear. But,

¹ Hence the machinery of "schematism" and "categories."

for Kant, it is enough that both Perception and Understanding seem to deal with the same objective world, the world of "nature" "outside" the mind. The one gives so much of the content of that world; the other does something quite different to bring its content within the range of experience. Perception, so to say, picks it up in fragments and brings those fragments to be connected by Understanding. The latter takes them up without alteration and puts them together by relations all its own, and alien to Perception.

Hegel's correction is twofold in character. He first rejects the departmental conception of the organisation of conscious life, which implies that all departments co-exist and co-operate in the mind; and for this conception he substitutes that of the mind having different levels of experience in *each* of which it is *realised*, and in each of which it is in a certain degree complete because it is experience. What has to be expressed and exhausted is, *not* the object-world as a *res completa*, but *experience* as a *unity* of subject and object. In the second place, he gives up the view that experience at any stage is composed of mere particulars requiring a special organ or function to deal with and collect them together before coherence can begin. Instead of this he maintains that there is universality *at every stage*: that there is never matter without form, difference without identity. Hence there is no need for one type of experience to "provide matter" for another: each has its own form and matter peculiar to it, its own universals and content. From these two positions it follows that Perception and Understanding are not to be brought together because they

Hegel's
view.

are external to one another. They are different attempts on the part of conscious experience to attain the *same purpose*, namely, to satisfy the one supreme end of self-consciousness. The one does not *supply* what the other *lacks*. The *one simply does more completely what both accomplish in different degrees*.

Truth of
this view.

Now reflection will let us see that there is profound truth in this interpretation of the nature of Understanding. For to "understand" an object assumes that the mind does not merely *see directly* the universal (as in the case of *Per*-ception) but penetrates to its inner *meaning*, and reveals the inner principle *connecting* its elements.¹ It implies that the object is known as falling in its entirety inside a single conscious unity, which when resolved into its different constituents just is the full content of the object. We cannot profess to understand unless both these aspects of the situation are consciously present to us. To seek to understand means either to grasp the unity holding together the differences of which we are aware, or it means showing how this unity breaks up and expresses itself in these various differences. Any case of scientific or popular "understanding" of an object will illustrate this. The very effort and claim to "understand," therefore, implies the presence of this principle ; or, to put it otherwise, the existence of such a principle in experience takes the form of "understanding." Now Force is just the objective way this effort appears when Understanding works : it is the principle on which it proceeds. How it shows itself in detail we shall indicate presently. Such a conception taken as it stands no doubt is

¹ The etymology of our word brings this out : as it does also in German. Cp. also the Greek *διάνοια*.

abstract. That is in the nature of the case, because here we are dealing with Understanding in general, simply as a mode of experience. But the whole course of Understanding as it "deals with" the various elements or spheres of objectivity, *e.g.* trees, rocks, and clouds, is the detailed application of one and the same attitude which proceeds by one and the same principle.

How then does this form of experience, Understanding, develop, how does it reveal its activity more concretely? It takes first the form of what we call Laws connecting the diversity of the object, and leads to the gradual distinction of a sphere of Phenomena or Appearance from a sphere of Noumena or Supersensible reality. Force is merely the general form of unity of the objective world as presented to Understanding. When this takes definite and detailed shape, *i.e.* when its meaning develops, as by the process of experience it must, it becomes more specifically a law-determined and law-constituted world.¹ At first sight this seems an unfamiliar way of stating the nature of Understanding. But let us clear away misinterpretations. Ordinarily speaking, Laws are spoken of as being "made" by Understanding, and at the same time we look upon these Laws as being not *ours* but "determining the *object*." Now what is meant by Understanding, "making laws" of objects, and objects being "determined" by them? It is clear that the Laws are held to be *in one and the same sense for* Understanding and *in* objects. The attitude of reflection and common sense bears this out. But this surely means that there is a fundamental identity

Under-
standing
its
process :
I. Laws.

¹ That is, Force and its "expression" when developed take the form of laws "constituting" the objective world and controlling their detailed content.

between these two aspects of the experience of Law? Understanding cannot be cut off from the object if the Law is the same on both sides. We do not, of course, raise the question how complete or true a Law may be, or what are the conditions of obtaining a true Law, nor again how are Laws applied and verified—all that is the business of psychology, or, again, of the analysis of the method of reflection in special cases, to determine. We are dealing with the ultimate question:—what is the very *ground* on which the fact of Law rests, and from which it arises as an experience? It is not *given*. It is not *created*. It must therefore be rooted in the very nature of experience. It first arises at the level of Understanding. Hence the view often expressed that Laws are “formed by” and are the expression of “intellect.” But this can only be half a truth. For Understanding must have an object, and Laws could not even appear without the object. There must be, therefore, an objective side to this activity of Understanding. That objective side is a unity revealing itself in diversity, an identity which is one in its difference and revealed wholly in difference: and this corresponds to Force. Hence the view also held that Laws are the *nature* of the object.

Corrobor-
ation of this
view :
Subjective
side.

Now reflective activity itself, not to speak of primitive anthropomorphism from which science comes, indirectly corroborates this. For Laws are there looked on as endowed with a certain “power” which “manifests” itself in and through them. They are not static but dynamic. Consciousness of “power” has been said more than once to give rise to the very idea of the dynamic relation of “cause and effect.”¹

¹ See e.g. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, ii. p. 237 ff.

And this same consciousness of Force is found to be the beginning in human experience of the demand for inner coherence amidst change. These facts indirectly throw light on the above view : but of course do no more. That explanation goes much further than empirical considerations can reach. It concerns the very being of Law in human experience. To say that Laws have their "source" in human Understanding requires us also to say that they are the form which the experience of Understanding takes when its unity specifically determines its different manifestations. To employ a metaphor, Understanding can be looked on as a primordial cell which differentiates itself into distinct units homogeneous with itself. These units we call Laws : they are simply ways of Understanding, expressions of its single activity. Understanding and the Laws by which it works are related as potential to actual, function to execution. Laws of arranging the diversity of things are not artifices contrived by our mind : they *are* the mind in one of its phases, its phase of Understanding. And whether in specific cases they are correct or not, has nothing to do with their ultimate significance and nature.

Such Laws, again, are looked on as having an objective existence. The objective side is similarly constituted. Force is here the primordial cell corresponding to Understanding on the subjective side. The breaking up of the unitary activity of Force into specifically different units means the realisation of unity in diverse expressions or manifestations of Force. These various unities pervading diversity are the Laws which are "at work," as we say, in the objective world. Hence it is that the Laws of

things are looked upon by reflection in ordinary experience as at once ways of "understanding" things, and ways in which things "work." These are just the subjective and objective aspects of the same concrete experience.

One-sided
views.

No doubt we speak of the Laws as being "*outside* our minds" or understandings, and may even go so far as to say these Laws are merely found by us and are independent of us.¹ On the other hand, again, we often speak of the Laws of things as simply our own devising and having no counterpart in the actual being of things themselves.² The very fact that such contradictory positions have been held suggests that each is emphasising some abstraction and ignoring the concrete experience. And the history of philosophical criticism has brought out their one-sidedness repeatedly. Both views imply a Dualism between subject and object, which, as we have seen, leads knowledge into an *impasse*. The fact that one emphasises the objective nature of Law, and the other the subjective, does not make the one view better than the other. It is merely a difference of stress on the side of the Dualism which comes into prominence when, on the one hand, we think of the universal bindingness of Law, or, on the other, of the process by which we come to be aware of it, a process which itself necessarily implies the changeableness of any particular Law. When we think of the former, Dualism leads us to say Laws are "external" and "independent" of us: when we think of the latter, Dualism leads us to say they

¹ In this case we are thinking of the objective universal unity of Law as distinct from its realisation in any particular subject's experience.

² In this case we think of the process in the individual's mind of coming to the experience of what Law involves.

are "our own" and dependent on us. But analysis compels us to admit that the Laws are at once subjective and objective, because experience is both at once. And this does not leave the necessity or contingency of Laws unexplained. For (1) when this refers to particular laws, the question can only be decided by the course of experience, and to decide it either one way or another does not affect the ultimate nature of Law as a principle determining experience : and (2) the necessity of the element of Law lies ultimately in the fact that it is one way in which the ideal of a unified self-consciousness determines that unity to appear in the course of its experience, a unity with a subjective and objective side at once.

(1) Now this view has great significance in Results. other ways. Three points may be here noted. In the first place, it lets us see that by advancing to the stage of Law the mind is not leaving the nature of things behind and setting up a Dualism, but carrying things, the deeper meaning of things, with it. And just as objects "perceived" did not fall outside perceiving experience as such, the same is true of objects as "understood." Experience at this stage, as at others, has its own peculiar content, and, as it stands, is not opposed to some "beyond," some unknown, and unexperienced "real" which might for ever cast doubt on the value of its process. There is no such gulf; and hence no such doubt can arise. All that is of significance at the level of Understanding actually falls inside that experience; and the mind at that stage is completely at home with itself and its object. The Laws are literally Laws of objects. They have not one significance to Understanding

and something else to the object known. Experience does not keep its account of truth by double entry, does not require the services of some unseen interpreter to translate the course of things into the language of Understanding, or *vice versa*. The Laws which Understanding states are part and parcel of the whole experience in which they appear. In point of fact, if we examine common life we shall find that in spite of, indeed because of, the alteration or even abandonment of particular Laws of things, the ordinary mind does insist that the Laws by which at any time it understands things are actually constitutive of those objects, and as such it tenaciously holds to them while it can. To understand, in short, so far from setting up an opposition of any kind between mind and objects just means that these two aspects of experience have come into a deeper conscious unity than was possible at the level of Perception.

(2) Again, this activity of Understanding is seen at once to be the first indication on the part of mind of that power of manipulation which is one of the characteristics of freedom. Mind is here at a higher level than Perception, simply because there is a clearer contrast and relation between the unity and its diverse contents. This gives greater possibility of self-direction, selection, less control by the immediate content of the moment than we find in the life of perceptual experience. Hence we find in the sphere of Understanding the beginning, or at least the possibility, of what we call "suggestion," "hypothesis," "negation," "affirmation," distinction between "real" and "unreal," and so on—all of which, on the one hand, have a reference to a wider content than the

immediately present, and, on the other, imply, at least dimly, a consciousness of the central all-controlling unity of the self in experience. These are aspects of the life of freedom. We see this in everyday experience. A man feels more at home in the life of Understanding than in the sphere of Perception. In the latter he feels, so to say, tossed hither and thither as sense facts dictate; in the former he has a control over the course of conscious events, a power of resistance and adaptation which make for coherence and definiteness of mental life. Similarly, again, in common experience "men of understanding" are looked upon as just those who manifest and possess, within certain practical limits, a consciousness of order and law pervading the things which make up their immediate environment. And it is just this aspect of Understanding which, as we shall see, points the way to a still higher step in the development of self-conscious experience.

(3) But, in the third place, we see here how this view of Understanding has at once modified and gathered together the whole teaching of Kant regarding the relation of Understanding to the ^{Kant.} objects of Perception. For Kant, Understanding, in dealing with the content of the perceptual world, is the parent of the law and order that pervades it. On the above view, the idea of law is likewise a principle of Understanding; but Understanding has lost entirely the subjective character which it has in Kant and which is the direct consequence of the dualistic assumption underlying his view of knowledge. Understanding, again, is here, as in Kant, the sphere of necessity and

objectivity in dealing with the content of Perception ; for in Understanding we find the immanent universal which is the ground of stable objectivity, and that essential relation of differences to identity in Law, which gives necessity to the content of things. But whereas for Kant this objectivity is looked on as something derived from and imposed by Understanding, on the above view the objectivity is not derived from, but the complementary aspect of, Understanding. Since subject and object only exist in the unity of experience, the one is not determined *by* the other but *with* the other. And that, in substance, we may take to mark at once Hegel's difference from Kant, and his conception of the relation between Understanding and Perception—the question which occupies Kant's Analytic in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Understanding is simply a higher development of the relation between subject and object than we have in Perception. In it we have a truer unity of subject and object than perceiving supplies ; and in that sense this stage of experience gives both a deeper expression of the nature of the subject and of the nature of objectivity than we find in perceptual experience. This higher truth is higher, not by lying outside but by containing in itself all that Perception aimed at. Again, Understanding is not simply found side by side with Perception in human experience, and when picked up and contrasted with Perception found to give a higher unity to experience. It arises as a *necessity*, on the one hand, from an implicit consciousness of a deeper unity than we find in Perception and, on the other, from our explicit consciousness of the inherent

incompleteness of Perception. It is directly related only to Perception, because it is the immediate outcome of Perception, is the next level to which experience rises to try to attain that complete unity not found at the level of Perception. In that way the stage of Understanding is "deduced" from the complete unity of self-consciousness, just as Kant (though in a different sense) asserted ; and it is demanded by Perception (which Kant also asserted).

The further important element which arises in the course of developing the meaning of this stage of experience is the distinction between "phenomenal" and "supersensible" reality. This arises simply from the contrast which comes to be made between the world of Law and the diversity of content in and through which Law is "manifested." We still have with us the continuous change of content which we found characteristic of Perception. This appears now as the ceaseless activity of Forces in process of manifestation. Objects come and go, the qualities appearing pass away into one another ; nothing in the world of things remains stable. But the world of Law has fixity and endures. The unity remains and is not destroyed by the differences into which it is resolved ; rather it remains *by means of* and *through* the changes in which it is manifested. It would not otherwise be a unity expressing itself in and through difference. Hence the antithesis. On the one hand, we have constancy amid change, which is of the essence of Law as a principle of unity. On the other, changing elements which for ever reconstitute but never destroy the permanence of that unity. Thus,

II.
Pheno-
menal and
noumenal
world.

e.g. the Law of Gravitation is held as a principle of unity, though the things and the qualities of things in which it is revealed to us pass out of our sight and disappear altogether. We hold by the unity, which is the essence of the Law, and not by its sphere of manifestation. The fact that other qualities and things take the place of those that are gone does not prevent us from holding by the unity as such; it confirms us in doing so. It proves that the unity is concrete, and the special differences do not affect our insistence on it as the vital reality of things. It is in this way that Understanding in ordinary life actually does keep its stability and security amidst the changing manifestations of a law-constituted world. The consciousness of unity is of greater significance than that of the varying elements, and its greater value for experience leads us to hold to it, be the change as great as it may. A man's Understanding and the Laws which constitute it, are thus, in the everyday world of human experience, the stronghold for the safety, for the coherence of his conscious life, even when the shifting array of temporal events, on which he has come for practical purposes to rely, is scattered in catastrophe. A being limited to Sense or Perception does not have that security, not because it can do without it, or fails to appreciate it (if that were so, then Understanding would be a questionable boon to the higher type of mind), but rather because it is completely under the sway of its infinite variety.

Nature of
this dis-
tinction.

Here we see precisely the ground of the distinction which comes to be made. Understanding, because it can lay stress on the unity of Law as con-

trasted with the diversity of its manifestation, can hold these two aspects apart as fixed distinctions inside its experience. It comes to look on the one as a sphere *per se* distinguishable, and in that sense separable, from the other. The manifestations stand on one side, the system of unities or Laws on the other. The one is looked on as the outer expression, the transient realisation, or, if we choose, the "unfolding" of the nature of the other. The other is looked on as the inner vital principle, the underlying substance, the active source of the detail of the world of things. Hence there are drawn, in the course of experience at the stage of Understanding, the distinctions with which we are in everyday life familiar—between "inner" and "outer," the "passing phenomena" and the "permanent noumena," the "immediate present" and the "remote beyond." These distinctions we find in everyday life, as well as in the reflective procedure of scientific thought which arises from it.

Now this lets us see once more what is meant by Understanding being the deeper truth of perceptual experience. It might at first be supposed that we were here simply reintroducing Perception with its change and flux of qualities and things, and calling it "appearance," while professing all the while to have passed beyond it. It might be supposed that this distinction between inner and outer, phenomena and noumena is¹ no more than a way of putting Understanding alongside Perception, and allocating one aspect of things to one function and another aspect to the other, leaving the two all the while not reconciled. But the truth is that this distinction is only *drawn inside the life of Understanding and cannot*

Under-
standing
and Per-
ception.

¹ Like Dualism.

appear at the level of Perception. He is not reviving Perception, but *building Perception into the structure of Understanding.* What is solely present in Perception, the variety of sensible qualities and the flux of things, is here merely a moment or aspect of Understanding, viz. its aspect of diversity, appearance, phenomena. For Perception there *are no phenomena* at all: for they *are wholly and only as they are in Perception.* There is no beyond, no noumena in perceptual experience; their *esse* is their *percipi*. For Understanding there are phenomena, because there is a deeper unity. They are phenomena *with reference to their inner principles of unity* or Laws. Hence, to use Hegel's expression, that variety which makes the entire content of Perception is "taken up" by Understanding and appears as a moment in its concrete life. It can be so "taken up" because Understanding, in virtue of this unity of Law, goes beyond Perception. And it goes beyond it, because that unity is not exhausted (as is the content of Perception) in the momentary present, or the immediately "given."

Phenomena and Noumena both fall within experience.

The supreme importance of this distinction, again, lies in the fact that thereby it is shown that the distinction between phenomena and noumena is not a difference (as Kant asserted) between what is part of experience and what cannot be so. *There is no beyond to experience at all.* The distinction is one which falls *inside* experience itself, and is constituted by the nature of Understanding as a stage of experience. Here, again, therefore we surmount the difficulty which was raised by Kant's Dualism. The Dualism made it logically necessary that there should be an unknowable sphere beyond experience;

hence Kant's noumenal world is a "limit" to experience. But in truth, the noumenal world arises only in contrast to phenomena. It is necessary, but only necessary as *a constituent element in experience, not as a boundary to it*. The "beyond," the "inner," is relative to the "immediate," and the "outer"; just as, and because, Force is relative to its "manifestation." As the immediate phenomenon is in experience, so is the remote noumenon. All experience cannot be immediate; there cannot be an absolute whole immediately manifested, without a contradiction in terms. Similarly, an absolute "beyond" to all experience, a noumenal world *outside experience as a whole*, is a contradiction in terms. It is thus, then, that we can do justice to Kant's distinction and yet dispense with the thing-in-itself.

The final development of the meaning of Understanding carries us to a further stage in the evolution of experience. In the process of Understanding, while we are dealing with universals, yet the unities or Laws expressly reveal the "inner" life of "things": the relation of subject to object has still a certain relative externality. As we saw, the Laws of things are looked on by the ordinary mind as having a being of their own "beyond" the conscious life of the subject, as "real" whether they enter it or not; and these universals may even be looked on as peculiarly "subjective." It is this conscious contrast which creates or suggests that opposition between Understanding and the Laws of things which was referred to before. The relation, however, of Law to its manifestation, when fully realised, carries us beyond this conscious opposition altogether. The relation of a Law to the phenomena

III.
"Explan-
ation."

it controls is, when developed, such that the difference between them loses all its apparent fixity. The Law is not simply "in" the manifestations or "through" them; it is the diversity which makes up its content. The relation between them is that of continuity; it is not external or fortuitous. This immanent continuity between these elements (the unity of the Law, and the plurality of the content of what is united) on its objective side appears as an incessant change or exchange between the two. The one slips into the other; the two are moments of a single process.¹ On its subjective side this continuity has also a peculiar character and significance—it is what in the sphere of Understanding is called "elucidating the nature of" the object. For "elucidating" or "explaining" is literally reducing or resolving the variety of the object into the unity of its Law, in such a way that the manifestation of that unity will mean the appearance of the variety of the object.² "Explanation" is that stage in the development of the nature of Understanding where the opposite elements which it distinguishes are through and through consciously identified, and where therefore the objective and the subjective side of this experience are explicitly made a continuous single unity. Explanation is not strictly a *function of* Understanding; it *is* Understanding at its highest stage.

¹ As it is put, there is no law without particulars, and no law except *in* particulars.

² From this comes the isolated nature of each "explanation." Each holds good by itself as it stands, even though we are aware of its limitations. We keep within the range of the object from which we start, and get at *its* Law. Elucidating seeks to go no further. Hence the fixity and apparent "finality" of the result in spite of its finiteness. This "finality" of what is "limited" is characteristic of the whole procedure of Understanding. Hence its difference from Reason.

Now, in Understanding, we sometimes say that the necessity in the connexion established by "explanation" is not the "thing itself" which is explained. But such a distinction is no sooner made than it has to be given up. For if this distinction can be drawn, the "explanation" is not completely established, while if the explanation is complete there is nothing left over from which it can be distinguished. The difference between "explanation" and the Law, whose meaning is expressed and realised in the "explanation," is for *knowledge*, for *experience*, merely verbal. To say "we have the explanation," and to say, "we have consciously elucidated the nature of the object," are one and the same. "To explain the Laws of a thing" is a redundancy of speech. The Laws as unities of a phenomenal world, and the Laws as forms of "explanation" are indistinguishable. But if that be so, then in the conscious experience which we have at this highest expression of Understanding, the subject is not aware of some object over against and *contrasted* with it. The subject is conscious, when connecting the content of phenomena by the Law manifesting itself phenomenally, of referring the diverse content to a principle at one with the self of the subject. The conception of Law may be at first abstract and separable from the phenomena, fixed in a world of its own, a "supersensible" world, and *on that account* can be, as we saw, consciously contrasted with and distinct from the subject. That is the important point. Law is only "outside" the subject when it is taken as an entity *per se*. But then it is inadequate to its *own* meaning; and hence may indeed be thought of as beyond the subject which is concrete.

When Law is concrete, *i.e.* is the controlling unity of its diversity, we cannot look on the law as outside the subject. Explanation and Law fall together as functions of a single experience. That is, when the experience is fully realised it is consciously a *single* unity of which subject and object are sides. The opposition of the object is now overcome just because the distinction between the Law and its manifestation is a transient and vanishing distinction. The conception, with which Understanding works, is therefore not something *of* which it is conscious, but *in and through which* it is conscious. In "explanation" all sense of otherness has been removed, and in the object, subject is conscious of its own unity. Consciousness of an object has thus passed into Self-consciousness. To put it otherwise, the unity at work in the experience of Understanding is a unity which both manifests itself phenomenally and refers phenomena to itself, a universal which dissolves into difference and again resolves that difference into itself. This means it is a self-referring, self-determined universal, *i.e.* a self-complete, self-limited, or infinite universal. That, however, is a *self-conscious* universal, for only what is conscious of self can return upon self with its diversity. Thus then, according to this view, the process of Understanding fully realised and expressed becomes self-conscious experience, and with this we have arrived at the truest relation of subject to object. All other possible forms of experiences are developed from this one general relation.

Results.

The significance of such a result is not far to seek. If the full meaning of Sense-experience was found in Perception, and the truth or goal of the relation of subject to object in Perception lay

in Understanding, and if the final issue of this is Self-conscious experience, then Self-consciousness is thereby shown to be the very ground of the consciousness of things, the very principle in virtue of which the consciousness of things becomes an experience. "Consciousness of an other, of an object other than subject, is itself," says Hegel, "necessarily self-consciousness; it necessarily means being reflected into a self, consciousness of a self in what is other or objective." Or we may put it thus. Self-consciousness is the highest expression for consciousness of objects: for such a consciousness at once expresses the fact of diversity between subject and object, and also that of unity between them. But these two elements or factors are really implied *in all forms of consciousness of objects*. The difference between Self-consciousness and other forms of relating subject and object, is that the former makes fully explicit both aspects, the unity and the difference, whereas other forms express the difference (consciousness of something) but only bring out the unity imperfectly and in different degrees. But if Self-consciousness is the highest expression, it is that at which they all aim, it is their τέλος, and hence it is the ground of their being what they are. In Kant's expression Self-consciousness is "the condition of the possibility of all consciousness of objects whatsoever." Mind can be conscious of objects because and when it is conscious of a Self. And consciousness of self is *logically* prior; *it is the ground for our being or becoming conscious of things*. This means that the consciousness of objects, in those cases where these factors are distinctly opposed, is an imperfect realisation (though a necessary one) of the principle

of Self-consciousness. The former *arises out of* the consciousness *of self*—that is its possibility and justification: it can remain fixed in the distinction and the contrast found there—if it does so it falls into error, the error which, *e.g.*, creates Dualism in all its forms: it may rise into complete consciousness of self as its process develops—and that is its “truth.”

This, then, in brief is the view of the knowledge of things of the “external” world on the basis of absolute idealism. It is a continuous refutation of Dualism, and is the transformation and re-expression of a principle which is essentially Kantian from beginning to end.¹

¹ It is worth noting that the position of Dualism is invariably based on and confined to the lower levels of experience, Sense-experience and Perception particularly. No one ever seems to think of treating Moral Experience, which belongs to the level of Self-consciousness, from the dualistic point of view, or of basing the dualistic position upon Moral Experience. Yet in the latter we have subject distinct from object as truly as in Perception. But there the two are so obviously “intimate” and “inward” to each other that it is absolutely impossible to dissociate them and set up a gulf between them. The question ought surely to suggest itself why, if this is so here, should there be really such a gulf *anywhere* in experience? Why suppose that experience can even *be*, if there *is* such a gulf anywhere? If the unity between the two is so obvious in Morality, may it not exist everywhere else in experience in the same way? If we regard Moral Experience as being of higher value than, say, Perception, as we do, the question might suggest itself, may this not be just because there we *have* a higher realisation of what experience *as such* is? and if so, should we not *start* from that point in our interpretation of experience as a whole? In point of fact, it is just such an experience as Morality which enables us to turn the flank of the dualistic position. If Moral Experience is not dualistically constituted, dualism as a general theory must be given up: and if Moral Experience is higher than Perception, no matter how much Perception justifies dualism, experience as a whole must be interpreted from the higher point of view. This is the essence of the idealistic method of attack on dualism and “Naturalistic” Realism. It would also be equally possible to turn the dualistic position by an appeal to such a form of Knowledge as that given in Memory, where clearly we have an object, but an object in no sense “outside the mind.” Memory is a highly complex form of consciousness of self, and cannot be explained at all on the dualistic assumption. The same is true of other forms of Self-consciousness.

CHAPTER VII

SELF-CONSCIOUS EXPERIENCE

WHILE the process of "explaining," realised by Understanding, implies the consciousness of self in its process, it is not carried out by any direct reference to the self as such. At best it only establishes the possibility of making self an object of which we may be aware directly and explicitly. It is, however, the only level of experience hitherto considered that could do as much. For here alone do we have as object of consciousness a single permanent conscious unity containing the variety of "things" as its very expression. We saw how the fact of diversity, so characteristic of Sense, and the form of all externality, reasserted itself in spite of the activity of Perception, through which unity was, at least partially, introduced into experience by the foci of Perception called "things." Here in Understanding a unity is at last secured which resists dispersion into diversity, and maintains itself *through* all difference in the world of "things." In virtue of Understanding experience is always held consciously together amidst all change of sensible phenomena. No matter how wide the range of phenomena, the

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unity is realised and is maintained in precisely the same way. The diversity is consigned to phenomena, the unity to what is beyond all phenomena. The same process of Understanding takes place in all cases, the same unity is secured (the unity to satisfy Understanding) wherever the process is realised. Being thus all-comprehending the subject finds itself at home throughout its objective world in the same way.

The result of Understanding is to give the subject the sense of its own unity.

Now the completeness and the sameness of the unity, realised as a conscious result produced by its own activity, react, so to say, on the subject exercising the activity, and create within it the consciousness of the unity of its own action. This consciousness of the unity of its own action is the germ of the consciousness of a self. When the unity is explicitly accepted as its own it becomes *ipso facto* self-conscious. So far as Understanding goes, this step is merely implicit. Understanding is a mode of the subject's experience, and the unity arrived at is only implicitly a self-unity. When that unity is accepted as its own, Understanding passes into self-consciousness. The consciousness of the unity of the activity becomes a consciousness of the unity of the subject exerting the activity.

Understanding by its process brings the self-unity into relief.

The possibility of this has been brought about by the character of the process of Understanding which involves manipulation of detailed phenomena, selection, refusal, affirmation, and negation as its conditions. All this tends undoubtedly to throw into relief the consciousness of sameness in the activity of the process, to bring out, therefore, the oneness of the subject as a conscious fact, and

thereby to set up self as *per se* an object in experience.¹

The unconditioned or self-conditioned universal which is the object of Understanding,—i.e. the universal whose nature is not determined, as in the case of Perception, by an external other, but itself determines all otherness, all phenomena—can only be so because the subject in it is conscious of itself, because the subject feels no otherness confronting and opposing itself. The content of its experience is a thought-content, and a thought-content is essentially a self-content. But

The unity of Understanding implicitly destroys all opposition of subject and object.

¹ It is significant that this result should be arrived at by way of the consciousness, through Understanding, of Law in experience. It lets us see why a self has no meaning unless as a conscious principle of order. The self involves the very idea of order or unity, because it arises in experience out of a consciousness of Law amidst phenomena. A "man of understanding" is at once one who "knows his way about" amidst the phenomena of his world, and also sustains the sense of selfhood, never loses his own sense of unity, in dealing with its ceaseless variety; for to do the one is *ipso facto* to do the other. On the other hand, we can see from this how "mental confusion" involves at once loss of the sense of unity in experience and dissipation of selfhood in the diversity of phenomena; and this confusion can pass through all degrees from temporary perplexity, where the unity is struggling to assert itself against the appearances, to permanent derangement, where the unity is altogether lost amidst them, and the subject falls back to the level of mere Perception. It is, again, by way of Understanding, that man rises to the levels above brute consciousness (Reason and Morality) and yet maintains contact with it by implying those processes of experience,—Perception and Sensation,—to which brute consciousness is confined. While, finally, the result throws light on the *distinction* between man's understanding and brute "intelligence." Understanding as such is short of self-consciousness while containing the germ of it. It may very well be that brutes can rise as high as to understand. Because they exhibit many of the forms of human Understanding, they are often thought to have the consciousness of self, while in point of fact they have no such consciousness at all. For consciousness of self involves Understanding, but the latter is not *per se* the former. The fact that the observer of brute intellect merely "*infers*" that it has the consciousness of self, looks upon this as something which *may be* for the brute intellect but is not a reality for *him*, is itself a proof that the consciousness of self is really not there at all. For the consciousness of self, if it is an *experience*, is bound to be expressed in specific ways, e.g. as recognising his own self, as Science, or as Religion; for these simply *are* experience based on consciousness of self. The fact that these do not appear in brute life *means* that the consciousness of self is not an experience for it.

while in such a universal, absolute difference of subject and object disappears from experience, in the first instance this thought-content carries with it the fixity characterising what is opposed to the subject. The thought of Understanding claims finality on its own account, and just as it appears.¹ Hence arises the need to overcome this independent stability confronting the subject. The process of doing so, however, is merely a relation of the subject to its *own* content, to its self. It consists in breaking down that resistance its own content offers to complete identification with the subject, and establishing self-consciousness on both sides—subject aware of self in object, object *accepting* and *recognising* subject as *its self*. The whole process takes place as a movement from implicit to explicit consciousness of self, and is necessitated because the conscious unity of the two sides (subject and object) of the experience is at once asserted and yet not realised completely. That the further development is to take place is an indication that, while Understanding has broken down the rigidity of the opposition between subject and object characteristic of the attitude of mere consciousness as such, which took the forms of Sensation, Perception, and Understanding, it does not of itself satisfy the unity which the disappearance of that opposition implies. In other words, Understanding is an incomplete expression for the unity of experience, and at most prepares the way for a fuller expression of it—an expression which, in the first instance, takes the form of the subject being aware of self as its *object*, instead of “sense-quality” or “thing.”

¹ *Vide* note, p. 204.

This consciousness of self, even in its simplest and earliest form in experience, assumes different phases, which indicate the stages through which it passes to complete realisation of the principle it contains. At the outset, however, it has to be noted, as the result of what has been said about Understanding, that this self, of which consciousness is aware, is here not one object amongst other objects of experience, but the one and only object for the subject. The self is its world, its whole objective content. It embraces within it all the content so far considered, all that made up the experience of Sense and Perception. These are now elements in the content of self only, and are to be treated as such. There is here no world of "things" and "qualities" in contrast to a subject; what *was* the world of "things," in the *former* stages of experience, has passed, by means of Understanding, into a content of experience whose character is self and self only. This level of experience is, therefore, so far as it goes, complete as it stands, and all that preceded is now to be re-moulded or re-interpreted from the point of view of consciousness of self. We live and move here solely within the range of consciousness of self. That is our world.

To begin with, then, the content of this world, because merely *implicitly* self, seeks to retain a certain being of its own which is at once felt as distinct, and yet as in truth "belonging to" the subject. The world of objects presented is mine, but yet keeps apart from me. It is implicitly mine, but can only *become* so by my act. Being implicitly mine it appeals to me to claim it as such; because it is implicitly mine I respond to that appeal. It

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seeks to be "me," just as I assert that it is so. I can take it and find myself in it; it surrenders its content to me. To use a psychological distinction, it is unconsciously myself and tends to enter consciousness as mine; I accept or assert this truth on my side, and lift its unconscious nature into a conscious result. The only meaning of the object lies in thus handing its whole being over to the subject as its own. The very life of the subject lies in determining that content as its self. The realisation of this demand and claim means securing the identity of the two by completely overcoming the distinction between them and establishing them as a unity. Now this reciprocal tendency of the one to the other for the fulfilment of the nature of both is the phase of experience we call *Desire*.

Desire.

In Desire there is a distinction of the factors subject and object with a felt identity between them and required by both sides. The tendency, combined with the sense of distinction, gives precisely that felt tension which characterises Desire. The tension implies at once that this distinction is a conscious fact, and that the identity of the factors forces itself through the distinction in order to get their deeper unity realised. The movement of the process in this experience is carried through just by gradually bringing out this identity as a conscious result, and establishing it as the primary fact in the situation. If that is not achieved the experience continues as a felt strain till it is either accomplished, or the Desire abandoned: the Desire remains unfulfilled, "unsatisfied." When it is achieved the tension, and with it the distinction, disappears: the Desire is fulfilled, and Satisfaction takes its place as an experience.

The whole process is thus double-sided from beginning to end: it is only possible within the sphere of consciousness of self. The distinction from which it starts is implicitly felt as a vanishing distinction, and can only be so felt because it is set up within, and, indeed, by the type of consciousness by which it is resolved. The object in Desire is not really something "external" to the subject. Its being consists in giving up its distinction from the subject altogether; and this it could not do if it were substantially alien to the subject. The subject in Desire does not really take the object to be foreign to its life. On the contrary, the subject seeks to annul any distinction the object seems to have, and to make the object's content its own, to break down the distinction separating it from the self, and build its content into the very substance of the self. There is no Desire at all where the object is looked at as *remaining apart from* the subject.

At the level of Perception this is possible. For in Perception self does not seek to *be* the object nor the object to *be* our self: there we seek to realise a unity which *preserves* distinction as a conscious fact.¹ Hence in Desire we do not really desire "things" *quâ* "things," for that would leave them still apart at the end of the process. The Desire would never be satisfied; it would never *be* Desire. We desire what has a self-significance. When we say we desire "things," we really mean that we desire what, while at first distinct from us, is, in the result, to become consciously part of our own content.

¹ Strictly speaking, as we saw, Subject does not even exist for Perception in the form of Self as such. Hence Perception is not an avenue to Knowledge of Self. *Vide* note, p. 225.

Or to put it somewhat paradoxically, we "desire things" in the sense that we desire the *disappearance* of their "thing" character, and the transformation of them into the substance of the self. The supposition that we can desire "independent things" is due to a confusion between the object as it is for Perception *before* Desire arises, and the object as it is after Desire takes place. Perception may certainly precede Desire. But we do not desire *because* we perceive; and we do not desire *what* we perceive. We desire in fact—the object in the experience of Desire, not the object in the experience of Perception; and the object for Desire is just that which loses the "externality" of a "thing" and fills up the life of the subject. A "thing" must become content of self before it enters the sphere of Desire.

Under-
standing
and
Desire.

Hence it is only so far as the self embraces in its sweep the content of the world before it, regards that content as implicitly its own, as what can realise its own life as such, that the attitude of Desire can be assumed. That this content is implicitly its own was, as we saw, established as a fact by the process of Understanding. Now Desire just brings out the significance of what Understanding has guaranteed. Understanding establishes that the world of object finds its meaning in the unity of the self; Desire carries out further, by the active life of the subject, the significance of this result. By Understanding, the subject finds the world its own: Desire *makes* it so by actively identifying all content with its self. Understanding *establishes* self as the ground of experience; Desire implies in its process the active presence of the self

as the principle of its mode of experience. Without the consciousness of self, there is no Desire. Desire is its first and simplest realisation as a distinctive factor in experience.

There is no implication here of a purpose which governs Desire, or of an end at which it aims. Desire in its ultimate form. That comes later. Here we are dealing with Desire *simpliciter* as a general mode of experience. Desire *per se* is a conscious actualisation of self, whatever be the value of the self otherwise. This ultimate nature of Desire is the basis on which all other more specific forms of Desire rest, and has therefore nothing to do with the consideration whether a desire is "good" or "bad." "Goodness" and "badness" imply other forms of experience which are different from and higher than mere Desire, and determine the character or worth of desires.¹ Desire is here merely the way consciousness of self is first consciously realised; and this must exist as a form of experience, before a desire can be called "good" or "bad," for it is the ground of anything being pursued as "good" or "bad." From this point of view the statement of Spinoza is true, that a "thing" is not desired because it is "good," but "good" because we desire it; *i.e.* Desire in general must take place first as a form of experience: goodness, as a special quality of the object desired, comes later. To begin with, all the implicit content of the self is, or can be, desired, just because the self, which Desire expresses, is, at this stage, one with all its object world. We can, as we say, desire "anything."² This is so because, from the point of view where the self is one with all

¹ Namely, Society, Moral Order. ² As it is said, "Desires are infinite."

the content of its experience, everything can be explicitly identified with it. At a *higher* level of self-experience, say Morality, certain elements of the content of self come to be qualified in one way, others in another, and may come to be selected and desired for their specific quality (as, *e.g.*, "good" or "bad"). But to begin with, the distinctive qualifications which arise from further experience do not exist. Objects are merely desired because they implicitly fall within self-consciousness, and are asserted in Desire to do so. The self is here quite indeterminate in value and meaning: it is mere self, mere unity of the subject as such. Hence, on the one side, the very indeterminateness of the self makes it possible for it to dominate any or all the content which is presented, everything that fills experience, *i.e.* "we can desire anything": and, on the other, that all content should be implicitly one with such a self is precisely what makes the content appeal to the self, makes it first "desirable" and then "desired," *i.e.* "everything is a possible object of Desire." If it were absolutely alien to the self the attraction would not arise: if it were absolutely one with the self there would be no point in its claiming to be so. The union of attraction and repulsion, which constitute the tension of Desire, arises simply from the contrast between an unfilled indeterminate self and the content with which it is implicitly at one—a contrast, therefore, which falls within the consciousness of self.

The process of
Desire.

The process involved in Desire is already indicated in what has been stated. When the contrast between a content which implicitly is, but explicitly is not, one with the self, becomes a conscious

fact, there arises the feeling of a unity unrealised because of some element opposing its realisation. This feeling is what we call a *Need*. Consciousness of a Need is only possible because of the felt unity of oneness with self. The felt unity, co-existing along with the conscious opposition, produces a movement to do away with the contradiction between the opposite factors. The conscious necessity compelling the removal of this contradiction takes the form of an assertion of the unity of the self, in spite of and through the opposition. Such a conscious assertion is the active *Impulse*, which is an essential element in the process of Desire. This activity is negative in character by its very nature; it arises because of, and in order to remove, an opposing content. It consists simply in destroying the characteristic separateness in the content. Since, however, that content is implicitly one with the self, such a process of negation can only issue in the assimilation of the content to the self. With that assimilation the opposition is at once removed and the feeling of self-unity established. This feeling of self-unity is what we call *Satisfaction*, and is that in which Desire terminates. Hence in actual experience we find that Desire can only work by destruction of content.

It is this active assertion of self in the process of Desire that makes Desire of such significance in the development of consciousness of self. For with the explicit assertion of this oneness between self and the content before it, with the domination of that content by the self and *for* the self, the self comes out at the end of the process of Desire more truly than ever the essential principle of experience. Here we

The result
of Desire.

have no longer a world of Understanding, with its distinction of elements into phenomena and noumena—a distinction created to sustain, as it were at all costs, the opposition of subject and object which mere consciousness adopts. Such a distinction must disappear in Desire, for the very principle that the unconditional universal Law or thought is the inner reality of which phenomena are the outer expression, has ceased to be merely “inner,” and has itself become “outer.” There is no longer any contrast between “inner” and “outer” when the self is all in all to itself, is consciously the beginning and the end of its experience. The self, which is essentially thought, has left the inner hidden realm of noumena “beyond” phenomena, and has become manifest as at once the inner life of the process of Desire and the outer embodied result of that process; for Desire, as we saw, falls wholly within the sphere of self-experience. It has ceased to be merely that *at* which we arrive as the result of Understanding, it is that *from* which in Desire we start. The world of objects making the content of experience is not merely found to be in union with the subject by Understanding; it is now determined consciously to be so by the subject. The subject no longer, on the one hand, makes an apparently alien world of objects harmonious with itself by forcing its way into the inmost recesses of that world, plays the rôle of noumenon in the form of thought, and so becomes at home with itself in the variety of the object—“understands” it: while yet, on the other hand, it keeps up the distinction of the object world from itself by drawing a line between inner truth and a sphere of appearance. The subject in the

case of Desire constitutes the very being of the object both in form and content. The objects are not simply *for* the subject ; they *are* implicitly *in* the subject, and claim explicit oneness with it. The self does not find them "without" and make them fall "within" itself. They are from the first implicitly within it. Desire can bring this to clear consciousness, and does so by finding, as the result of its process, that they fill up its life, "fulfil" or "satisfy" it. Just as in the case of Perception the *esse* of "things" lay in their *percipi*, so in the case of Desire the being of objects lies in their being desired, in their satisfying a self.

In Desire, then, self is the beginning and the end of the process ; consciousness of objects is self-consciousness ; the subjective and the objective side of experience are consciously one. But Desire *per se* does not exhaust the full significance of this experience. It represents rather the simplest form in which it appears, where objects get their meaning from the self which claims them as its own, and are therefore subordinate to its active identification of them with itself. Such a world of objects is implicitly one with a self, but is not *per se* a self *on its own account*. It has its being only for a self, but does not claim to be *per se* a self. The object, in short, is *per se* selfless, though claiming oneness with the self. Moreover, the self, which is here realised as a conscious result, is, just because of that character of its object-content, necessarily a particular self. For we have here in Desire a self with its indeterminate world of objects referring to it as their unifying principle ; and what is attained through Desire is the feeling of *this* self being

Desire not
complete
conscious-
ness of self.

satisfied by the object. It is the one subject ; all else is adjectival for this subject. Hence it is that, on the one hand, Desire is, as we say, always individual, and the satisfaction of self varies indefinitely, that "the desires of selves differ" ; and, on the other, that Desire has to do only with objects which can be subordinate to, assimilated by, a self, and is not a relation between selves as such. One self does not desire *another* self ; nor desire along with another ; but always and only for itself. Desire, in short, is a relation between a self and a selfless object.

The higher
form of
conscious-
ness of
Self.

But the process of Desire makes possible a higher and completer form of consciousness of self. By Desire the self is carried out and established objectively. The self is now not simply the implicit unity of experience. The subject is conscious of its self as an objective result. Its self is now *for* its self in and through objects. Through Desire self is therefore on both sides (subjective and objective) of experience. The way is thus prepared for an object to be a self *on its own account*, and still be *for a self*. One self may stand over against another self, be *for* it, and yet be a self. The experience of self-consciousness, in other words, can be sustained and realised by a relation of one self to another. This is made possible by the result of Desire. It is, however, an actual experience at a level above Desire and different from it. It is a level where a subject is conscious in its object, not of something without meaning until it becomes its own, but a self having a being for itself on its own account: not, however, a self other than the subject, but in union with *its* self, its *own* other. It is the

level where one self "recognises" and "acknowledges" its identity in another self—the level of *Recognition*.

The process of Recognition is simply the form of experience in which consciousness of self takes place when subject and object each claim to be self. Desire implies, as we saw, that only one side is self, the other is selfless, and hence is subordinated to self. The fundamental relation between two self-consciousnesses can only consist in each being self for itself and *also* for the other. But that means that each is "accepted" by the other in the same sense, since each just is what the other is—self. It can only do so because it is self. And it *must* do so, because it is thus merely asserting self in another form. Hence it is that we do not *desire* the self of another. We necessarily put it from us, for to be one self is just *not* to be another. So far as we are conscious of another self, we, in the first instance, simply allow it to be there before us. It cannot *be* ours without destroying *our* self. We cannot negate it, we can therefore only affirm it. Nor, strictly, can we "understand"¹ it, still less "perceive"² it. There is no "understanding" a self, not because it *defies* "understanding" and is therefore "inexplicable," but because "understanding" is simply not the way to become conscious of it even in the most elementary form of its existence, as "mere" self. If we try to "understand" it, we necessarily draw distinctions *within* it; we have to distinguish how it expresses itself and what it is in itself apart from its expression. But this cannot give what we want—namely, the

Recognition : it is distinct from Desire and Understanding.

¹ Kant also insisted on this.

² Berkeley held that knowledge of selves is obtained by inference based on "perception."

self as such with and in its expression, the self as a unity beneath all distinction.¹ Understanding must proceed by such a distinction and cannot rise above it. Understanding, therefore, is bound to fail when we seek to become conscious precisely of what implies the absence of such a distinction. Understanding fails to give us the self, because the unity arrived at by Understanding is lower than the unity of self-consciousness.² The failure does not prove the self non-existent or unintelligible. The attempt to accomplish such a task is itself meaningless. We do not want to "understand" a self at all: *we merely recognise or acknowledge it*. It would be useless, therefore, if in such a case we *could* "understand," for the result would not convey to us what a self *is*. We can only "understand" what has *no* self, what is over against us as an alien object. We can see the truth of this if we try for a moment to give a meaning to the expression, "we can understand what *our own* self is." It at once suggests an infinite regress as the only way of interpreting what is inherently a self-contradictory statement. If the application of Understanding to *our* self fails by its very nature, it fails for precisely the same reason when we have to deal with other selves. It is in general only in regard to the latter that we do make the attempt; for there a self is something more than self proper or mere self. It is an object which in one aspect, its sensible

¹ It is only a self if all its content is self, *i.e.* there can be in its case *no* distinction of what it is "in itself" and how it "appears."

² Hence the failure of analysis, *e.g.* in Psychology, to discover a self is inevitable. All analysis is a form of "understanding," and proceeds by distinctions. But this does not prove, as Hume and his successors held, that there is no self, and no unity. Such a contention is radically a *petitio principii*.

aspect, belongs to the sphere of Perception, and hence presents the same general character out of which Understanding arises. But it is meaningless to try to go beyond that aspect. Hence the illusory nature of the attempt to carry the process of "understanding" the subject higher than the sphere to which Understanding is strictly applicable as a form of experience.¹

The experience of being conscious of self in another self, therefore, is inherently different from both Understanding and Desire. It is not merely "knowledge" in the sense of mere consciousness of objects, knowledge as found in Perception and Understanding. It is a consciousness of another self reflected back upon the subject and becoming a consciousness of its *own* self in that other. It is *re-knowledge*—*re-cognition*. And this is made possible because self, as we have seen, is on *both* sides of the experience, is subjective and objective. We are not dealing at this stage with the more developed forms of self-consciousness, as these appear at higher levels of experience still, in, *e.g.*, Morality and the Social Order. Here we are dealing with the bare consciousness of self, consciousness of *mere* self. And at this level consciousness of self in and through another self consists in the subject simply accepting that other self as revealing its self to itself.

It is implied in this process that the relation is mutual. What holds for one side holds for the other; what is accepted by one is admitted by the other. The process of Recognition. Its three aspects.

¹ It is equally futile to suppose that we can "perceive" other selves; or that we gain a "knowledge of other selves" through "perception." The self is admitted not to be a "thing," and is never asserted to be in any sense "external." But if so, Perception, which has for its content "external things," is, *ipso facto*, *not* the mode in which consciousness of a self can appear.

other. "Acknowledgment"¹ means re-affirming from one side what is asserted by the other; "recognition"¹ implies the re-appearance in the one consciousness of the self-content which falls within another. All this lies in the very principle of a reciprocal relation between selves. It may be realised with different degrees of completeness, but every form of it involves one or other of the elements implied in the principle. To begin with, the self on both sides is a particular self, and the recognition is of one self by another single self. Being self, it is in one of its aspects mere or bare self; it contains implicitly, but is capable of abstracting itself from, all its own objective content, the content which it secures through the process of Desire. Again, being a particular self objectively present to another self, it has all the characteristics of a particular object: it is a "this self," with a "sensible" or "natural" existence of its own, in virtue of which it appears to another self as "this particular self." And, finally, being a self *for itself*, it is not simply a self *apart from* its content, and not simply a particular self through and *in* its particular content (as "object" for a particular self), but a self *containing* all its particularity as its own, a self *for itself because*, and *in the same sense* as, it is for another. All these elements have to be accepted and "acknowledged" before full Recognition of a self by a self is obtained. Only in the last is the self completely realised; for there it ceases to be merely an object for another, and to that extent dependent on another, for its

¹ The more complex forms of "recognition" and "acknowledgment" which take place in the Social Order are, in the long run, based on, and are developments of, this more ultimate form of consciousness of self.

meaning, and becomes independent, self-dependent, really "free." In this last stage it thus knows itself to be free and gets that freedom of self "recognised." Until and unless this is accepted on both sides consciousness of self in another self is not completely established.

The aspect of self as detached from all sensible existence is essential to consciousness of self. For it means the identity of self with self; and this is the bare but essential form of self-consciousness, "ego is ego." It is only obtained by the self abstracting itself from the contingency of sense. This self must be "recognised." But when bare self "recognises" mere self in another, the Recognition is as empty as the selves which constitute the relation. It consists in merely asserting and accepting selfhood. The one finds no difference between itself and the other. The only ground of distinction is the reciprocal act of Recognition itself. But for this, our self would *be* the self of another; the ego recognising a self would be aware merely of its own self. This form of Recognition has a supreme value, however. It is the formal aspect of freedom. It is, again, the insistence on the identity, even though abstract, of all selfhood; and this means the implicit *universality* of all selves. It implies, too, the essential *equality* of all selves, an equality exactly the same as the equality of a self *with* itself. And this is the ultimate basis of the equality of selves in the Moral Order of experience. Still, on this level of Recognition, no *concrete* relationship can be established and taken up between the selves; for bare identity of self makes all inter-relation impossible because needless. It is

Ego as
identical
with ego.

the simplest and least complete form of Recognition on that account.

Ego as
different
from ego.

The aspect of self, again, as embedded in or confined to its sensible existence, is likewise essential if the self is to be accepted as this particular self, an object *for* another self; and must be so recognised. Each self may "recognise" the other as "this particular self." In such a case, what we have is the bare *difference* of one self from the other. Each "recognises" itself as different in accepting the self of the other, and *vice versa*. The Recognition is not the asserting of abstract identity, but abstract exclusion. Each accepts the other, but as a natural existence, much in the same way as it accepts the existence of natural beings other than selves. They establish consciously the existence of each other as diverse, and in that sense opposed. They may exist *side by side*, but that is the only positive condition of their relation. If they come into active relationship, at once the difference asserts itself, and the result is struggle and conflict—negation of self. It is consciousness of self in a "state of nature," each opposed to each and all. They are equally selves only by asserting their difference from one another. This state is only different from the play of natural forces in being consciously exerted and consciously directed by self-conscious beings. This form of Recognition has, however, its value in emphasising the fact of *distinction* between selves *in spite of* all identity, and the fact of "contingency" of particular selves.

Inequality
between
selves in
Recognition.

These two aspects are distinct; and, moreover, they have not the same value as moments of the self, even though they are both essential to it. For

the former emphasises the fundamental element in self-consciousness, self-identity, abiding unity, freedom, self-containedness; the latter inevitably establishes the element of variety, diversity, all that is characteristic, in fact, of "sensible objects." Since they are thus distinct and of unequal value, and yet both selves, there can be a Recognition of the one as such by the other as such. This will introduce a consciousness of inequality between the two sides in the experience we are considering. It may very well happen in the course of the development of complete consciousness of self in another self, complete Recognition, that one self may emphasise one of those aspects, while the other emphasises the other aspect. One self may insist on the abstract self-reference apart from sensible existence, the other may claim to be, and be content to remain, bound up with the sensible embodiment of self. One may assert itself to be, and be "acknowledged" to be, detached from all "natural" existence, the other may claim to be and be recognised to be, inseparable from it. One may assert its abstract "freedom," the other its abstract "contingency." When this is the case, and a relationship of Recognition is taken up between two such selves, it takes, by its very nature, the form, not of an equality of one self before the other, but of inequality. The one is the higher and superior in value, the other is lower and inferior in value. The one sees the other merely as *his* particular objective self, as his *subordinate* self, as *his* sensible existence; the other sees the first as his *own* true, *free* self, whose sensible reality *he* expresses, but which he himself is not and does not claim to be. When this

relationship is set up and constituted as a concrete experience, we have what appears in the characteristically human relation of *Master* and *Serf*.¹

Master and
Serf.

This relationship is not here considered in its ethical aspect. That introduces other considerations altogether different from what is relevant here. Its significance in the present connexion lies simply in its being a specific stage in the realisation of the consciousness of self, that stage in which there is a conscious inequality of value between one side (the subject) and the other (the object), and where that very inequality becomes a condition of experiencing selfhood, of "recognising" self. The above argument does not, therefore, justify the relation of Master and Serf *morally*; it "justifies" it *epistemologically*, by showing that it has a necessary place in the development of consciousness of self, that it is a form in which this experience must appear if the one side is identified with an aspect of self different from the other. That it can and must appear is a proof of its necessary value: that it arises out of an *incomplete* realisation on *both* sides of the life of the self, is a proof that it may be and is transcended at a higher level of consciousness of self. Be it noted, however, that the relationship does

Serf not a
"thing."

not mean, as is so often supposed, that the Master, or consciously free self, is aware of the Serf, or "natural" self, as a "thing." That is both impossible and meaningless. For the Serf *constitutes* the Master a free and true self, just as much as the Master constitutes the Serf an unfree self: for

¹ It is one of the earliest forms in which the life of concrete self-consciousness appears, and one of the most enduring and subtle forms in which it is always maintained, as we can see if we reflect for a moment on the enormous part it plays in the life of every Society.

each recognises and accepts the self of the other. Moreover, each recognises the other as his *own self*, the one his self in the form of natural existence, the other in the form of free self. The Serf is *to himself* free, though *only* in and by his Master : the Master has *to himself* a natural existence, though *only* in his Serf. A "thing" never has such a relationship to a subject, because a "thing," in point of fact, only has a meaning at the level of Perception, where self-consciousness does not, strictly speaking, explicitly exist. The only possible attitude we can take up to a "thing" is to *perceive* it : that is the *content* of perceiving experience. We may, if we like, look on the Serf as the "thinghood of self," in the sense that here the Master treats the self as an object bound up with the sphere of sensible or natural, "external," existence. But it is not sensible existence *as such* that he deals with, but the *self quâ* natural existence. And this constitutes all the difference between a "thing" as such and a Serf as such. All this difference comes out, indeed, in the process of maintaining this relationship. For the Master to commit to the Serf the performances of his (the Master's) purposes ; to punish him for failure to execute them ; to allow the Serf even to "buy his own freedom" by labour or otherwise ; to set the Serf free—these and other conditions of the relationship indicate the contrast between "things" and "Serfs." But in fact to identify the two is to trifle with the nature of the principle involved in two cases. The one is a relation between conscious subject and "unconscious" or selfless existence: the other essentially a relation between two self-conscious beings, a relation which in principle

might very well either change sides in the course of experience, or disappear altogether, when the full realisation of self-consciousness is established.

The
relation
between
Master and
Serf.

The maintenance of this relationship in all its details—ruling on the side of the Master, service on the side of the Serf, command and demand on the one side, and obedience on the other,—follows logically from the fundamental character of this form of Recognition. Both are selves; and seek to maintain themselves as such. The one, the Serf, in his abstract consciousness of self, gives up freedom of self as such for the sake of the bare existence, the natural life of the self, which is in principle a subordinate moment of self-consciousness. The Serf thereby confesses he is incapable of asserting his own free self-identity as such. He must therefore subordinate the self he prefers to another self, since *his own self-consciousness implicitly demands this for its complete realisation*.¹ He cannot be this free self of himself, yet *must*, because he *is* self-conscious, realise it somehow; hence he does in through *another* self. In this way he does get his full consciousness of self, but does so only at the expense of a phase of his own real self-consciousness. Since he gives up *free* selfhood, he is *ipso facto* conscious of complete self only in *subordination* to that which is free. He can only be fully self by giving expression to that dependence. This he does by “obedience” and “service.” By doing so he gets his true self, for only if he does so can he get what he lacks and must have; since his complete self is implicitly and truly also a free self. Hence

¹ These two aspects being together the ultimate moments of complete selfhood.

the Serf's relation to his Master is not arbitrary but a necessity *for the Serf himself*. The same holds good, with the necessary changes, regarding the position of the Master in this experience of self-consciousness. The Master can exert his "authority" over the Serf, because he surrenders his natural existence and stands for mere freedom of self, albeit abstract freedom (a freedom which, because abstract, is, to begin with, contingent upon greater "force of will," "energy of self," or any exaggeration of a difference which makes abstraction easy). In exerting it he is performing for the Serf what the Serf as self-conscious requires and implicitly demands—the function of free self: and he is doing for himself what he also requires—the maintenance of his abstraction from the "natural" self which *is* implicitly his own, but is subordinate to him.

But while such a mode of obtaining consciousness of self can indeed play an important rôle in the evolution of this experience, and must appear to some extent wherever the experience is found, it is inherently inadequate to its full expression. It rests on an abstraction on the part of each side of the experience; and, if sustained, must perpetuate a fundamental contradiction.¹ It seeks to maintain an essential inequality of the self *with itself*; and this implies that the self is not really a unity, that its aspects cannot be explicitly what they are implicitly—a position which the very relationship above considered denies.

Complete consciousness of self is only possible where self is universal.

¹ A contradiction, however, on which a very large part of the life of a Society rests, and which is largely the very moving principle of its ceaseless activity. The "Labour problem," which concerns Society so deeply, is an instance in point.

Since on each side in the above experience, one aspect of the self is implicit and the other explicit, the complete realisation of consciousness of self is found where on each side the self, of which each is conscious, is explicitly *both* aspects at once, and each sees in the other, not a phase of its self, but its entire self, where each is *for* the other what it is for itself, and is *in* the other what it is in itself. This means, however, that each is conscious of itself, not simply as distinct from but as completely one with another, conscious of being self in the same sense as the other. It is then conscious no longer of simply "my self" and "this self" at all. In the form of "my" or "this" self it was particular. Hence in this completer consciousness of self it becomes conscious of universality of self or of self as universal.

Universal-
ity of self
made
possible by
the relation
of inequal-
ity of
selves.

This is brought about directly as the result of the very relationship of incomplete self-consciousness above stated. For the Serf, realising its natural self for the self of his Master, does so by carrying out the purposes of the Master (his free self) through and in his own natural life. This process is what is called his *Toil* or *Work*. In his "Labour" he moulds and determines natural existence by conscious purposes, which are in the first instance his Master's, but are secondarily his own. The Serf makes those purposes his own in "obeying" his Master. But since these purposes are at the same time the purposes of his *own* true or free self (his Master), in carrying them out he is really carrying out his *own* true self. That true self therefore becomes his *own self* through the purposes he adopts in virtue of his "obedience."

In the
Serf.

They are directly *realised* by *his* will as such, not by that of his Master. They are, to begin with, *abstractly* his, since his true self is abstractly apart from him, as his Master. But these purposes, while they *remain* abstract for the Master (since *he* does not carry them out), become concrete forms of action for the Serf. By carrying them out he thus becomes *concretely* possessed of his true self, no longer as something external but as his *own* energy of will. He thus *acquires*, through "obedience" to his Master, the self which he had first of all put from him, or abrogated in favour of another self. By Labour, therefore, the inequality, originally set up within his consciousness of self, is removed altogether, and his complete self is restored to him as a unity and as his own. When this is brought about, and comes home to the Serf as a conscious fact, he is in a position to assert his freedom, and so claim an equality of self-consciousness with his former Master, claim, that is to say, to be *for the other self* (his Master) what he is thus, as the result of his Labour, *for himself*. It is merely a question of time and circumstance when and how this shall be insisted on and fully realised; whether it comes from the side of the Master, who "lets him go free"; or comes from himself by "acquiring" it through some means or other; or is brought about, it may be, through external agencies of history compelling its full expression.

Similarly, from the side of the Master the same result has to be brought about. He is abstractly free; his concrete freedom is only realised by the purposes, embodying his freedom, being carried out. But since they are carried out by another self (the

In the
Master.

Serf), he will remain only abstractly free unless they are concretely his own as well. If he remain only abstractly free, while the Serf, by the process above stated, becomes concretely so, *he* will be inferior to the Serf. He is bound, therefore, in the interests of his own free self to secure, by some means or other, that *his* self shall be concretely free. This he does by embodying his purposes in natural objects as such, and, on the one hand, subordinating these to himself, while, on the other, "using" them as a means of establishing his freedom in the eyes of the other. This implies, *e.g.*, "hiring" the Labour of the other, and acknowledging in this the freedom of the other to give or withhold his Labour. It implies, in short, the surrender of the relationship of inequality between his self and that of the Serf, and thus brings about the transition to a state of equal and complete consciousness of self between the two sides.

Universal
self-con-
sciousness
the basis
of the
highest in
human ex-
perience.

When this is a fully conscious experience, both sides recognise each his self in the other as it is *for* the self of each. Each acknowledges his self to be no peculiar or particular self, but to be a self with universality of nature. Each sees in the other the reflex of his true self, of what he is *for* himself; sees himself, therefore, no longer as particular and isolated, but as universal. From the relation of selves as universal, springs all that is highest in human experience—the certainty man has of secure "rationality," out of which comes Science; the Moral Order of the world; his sense of being absolutely at home in the universe wherever the individual self-consciousness exists within it; his Religions, where he claims to live the life of an eternal self-consciousness. All these are but further developments of the funda-

mental principle of a consciousness of a universal self, which, again, means a consciousness of being throughout all its content absolutely at home with itself, of being entirely *for* itself, or completely free. Consciousness of complete freedom and consciousness of being a self which is universal, are therefore one and the same experience. All manifestations of universal self-consciousness are thus phases of freedom. Free self-consciousness is, then, the ground and end of all experience.

At first this complete consciousness of freedom takes an abstract form, as we find in the history both of the individual mind and the human race. To be conscious of a self which is universal—to be conscious that, in being for himself, the individual is for all selves, that he represents selfhood in general—can very well be asserted in highly abstract ways. It can become the source of boundless self-assurance and superb self-exaltation on the one hand, or profound self-abnegation on the other; and between theses two extremes lie all the various forms of exaggerated and self-confident isolation of the self from the richness of its concrete experience. Taken in an abstract form, indeed, no mode of experience is so capable of endless distortion, so fraught with peril and danger, so liable to pass the bounds set by the orderly necessity of a rational coherence. For the very consciousness of a self, which, in abstraction from all the details of existence of whatsoever kind, yet carries its universality within it, can dare to transcend all finite existence, and still find itself at home with itself, still find its objectivity within itself. It may so transcend all finite existence that reflection is unable to distinguish its claim to be

This
absolute
conscious-
ness of
freedom
at first
abstract.

universal from boundless egoism. It can so think away all else except itself, that it can claim to be all that is. It can mistake the mere claim to be all existence for the claim to be at one with universal self-consciousness, just as it can mistake the claim to be free from all existence for the consciousness of a universal self. The very universality of the self, in short, is the danger of this experience; for that universality has all the indefiniteness of an abstraction, and all the plenitude of reality. It may be made so indefinite as to be indistinguishable from nonentity; it may be made so definite as to be indistinguishable from the very opposite of universal self-consciousness and become an attitude of mere caprice.

Three
forms of
abstract
universal
self-con-
sciousness:
Stoicism.

In the main the abstract expression of this form of experience may appear in three distinct ways. The commonest and perhaps healthiest shape it takes is that of lifting the self away from all dependence upon, and attachment to, natural existence of every kind, and of finding, on the positive side, its life and being in the consciousness of bare universal self as self. This is the mood of elevation above all "nature" and natural conditions, of communion with self in its bare formal universality, with pure "thought," and of relation to the concrete realities of existence merely by way of exclusion and denial. This type is the attitude adopted by the Stoical self-consciousness in whatever form it appears, whether in the form historically called by that name or in the form of Asceticism which is logically allied to it. There is nothing of worth here but what comes from, and has the aspect of, the pure self. Only the self as universal is the truth; only the thought of the

self, the pure thought, has any abiding place in experience. "Things" and "objects" presented are obstacles in the way of the consciousness of thought for its own sake; or, at best, centres and occasions of reaction and recoil into the region of thought. They have only significance by being excluded from self-consciousness, and have no place in it. Life in connexion with them can only be endured on sufferance. To give up all connexion with them is not only no loss, it is positive gain; and, in consequence, the world of such things can be completely and even deliberately abandoned by the process of justifiable suicide. The positive life of the self is found in the life of thought, and with that type of self wherever it is found. Those who live this life together, in spite of contact with natural existence, make life in time and space tolerable for one another, and form a social whole by themselves—a brotherhood of immortals. But such a communion of pure self-consciousness is only imperfectly realised here and now, since "here and now" militate against its consummation. It is independent of every "here and now"; it is a whole, whose unity lies not in this life but only in the life apart from all natural conditions—a city of God.

It is easy to see that, since *every* self-conscious Scepticism. life is actually found only under natural conditions, only one step requires to be taken to carry the abstraction of self-consciousness still further. The self may abstract not only from all natural existence, but from all specific forms of existing self-consciousness except its own. Here, again, we have consciousness of self as universal; but the universality is strictly and deliberately asserted to lie only

within the limit of the individual self-consciousness as such. The whole weight and burden of universality is lightly assumed by the individual self, simply in virtue of his being conscious of self. He can abstract himself from all else, and that very fact is just the expression of his universality, is just the manifestation of it. All security and universality begin and end with his self as this individual self. But since every self not merely can, but, on this view, must, take up exactly the same attitude, there remains no point of identity or common ground at all for any one self-consciousness to share with another. And this is deliberately and consciously asserted to be the case, and is *accepted* as the true expression of a consciousness of universal self. When this position is taken up we have the attitude of thorough-going Scepticism, of Scepticism, not as a method, but as a mode of experience. Here universal self-consciousness is disintegrated and dissipated into the endless multiplicity of which it is capable, just because that is, in a certain sense, universal self-consciousness; and this endless diversity is *as such* identified with the universal self. In other words, each takes his own individual self as such to be the one universal self, and *ipso facto* takes it to exclude all others. For each, the truth is his own, is for himself only; therein lies the positive side of this attitude. For in Scepticism the self must always take at least its own attitude to be true for *itself*. But it acknowledges just as much that the same position can be maintained by others equally for *themselves*. But this acknowledgment *eo ipso* so qualifies its *own* truth, its own attitude, as to destroy all its positive value

for that self. The attitude thus carries its own negation within it, as an integral and essential moment of it. It is therefore, since it claims of itself to *be* true experience, self-destructive. And Scepticism only achieves its highest consummation as an expression of abstract free self-consciousness, when it is not only *aware* that this is its outcome, but asserts it to *be* the only possible form of experience; when it not only admits but demands this result. For this denial of all value in its own position is itself the supreme achievement of its type of freedom,—the freedom which consists in mere detachment for its own sake, in detachment not only from natural existence but from other selves. While Stoicism is the withdrawal of self from all particularity of content in order to find its sense of security, its sense of free universality, in the region of the pure self, of thought, wherever this may be obtained; Scepticism is the withdrawal from even this universal of thought, and hence has nothing left in which to find its sense of absolute freedom, except *this very power and act of withdrawal itself*.

It thus prepares the way for the final and unique abstraction into which free universal self-consciousness may pass. It may not merely abstract itself from all else other than itself, but in virtue of its freedom, it may put its very self outside itself, and attempt to maintain an attitude of detachment from its own self-consciousness. Nothing could exceed this degree of abstraction; and here all the peril, to which this form of experience is liable, takes a positive shape. In the previous cases there was always some region of self in which the self could feel its security, its sense of being at one with

self absolutely ; for in these cases it did not give up everything. In the first, it did not surrender the universality of pure self, and had the joy of communion with other selves who shared in pure thought ; in the second, it did not surrender the satisfaction of exercising for itself the privilege of abstract freedom, and that very satisfaction with itself in doing so kept it at one with itself. But here it has given up by its very freedom even *that* security of self, the security of having a self to assert for the sake of assertion. The result is, it is here consciously cut off from all security whatsoever. It is divided now not against something *apart from* itself, but against *itself* ; and is conscious within itself of its own alienation from itself, with no stable resting-place either within or without the range of its self-consciousness. Such an attitude is one of inherent self-contradiction, a contradiction not brought about by contrast to what is other than itself, but by its own self. It is therefore incapable of being removed by any process of self-conscious activity at all. It is pure self-negation, seeking at the same time to maintain itself as self-negation. The universality here appears not as something positive, but as the persistence in the same self of an essentially negative attitude. For this Self-alienation is itself regarded as necessary, as the very expression of free self-consciousness. It cannot therefore be got rid of, but remains as a permanent state of conscious self-diremption and self-dissolution. When Stoicism turned in fear or contempt from natural existence, it had a city of refuge to which it could flee and be at peace ; when Scepticism turned in distrust from all that it

regarded as alien to itself, it could still trust in itself as such. But here there is no place of refuge, no foothold for trust to rest upon. Hence there is nothing left but to accept as the only attitude, a consciousness of self-despair, self-distrust, self-pity, self-contempt,—a sphere of experience where the very power of freedom has become a source of terror in having the privilege and the necessity of exercising it. This sphere of self-created and self-constituted unrest may take different forms.¹ It may appear as passive quiescent self-despair; or the self may seek to protect its life from the ruin which lies within it, by the very struggle to restore the unity of its experience at all costs, whether through active contact with natural existence or active communion with other selves; or, again, the self may live a life of “gnawing self-consciousness,” only saved from disaster by seeking some consistency through endless self-analysis.² If, however, the state of self-disruption ceases to be felt as a conscious whole, and referred to the self as its own, the self may become divided absolutely into separate areas altogether, and one partial self set itself up against another partial self, and each claim to be the whole. When this, the extreme form of this self-consciousness comes about as a permanent condition, the self has lost even an implicit sense of unity. The universality of the self is reinstated as a “diseased” state of self-consciousness.

All these abstract forms of consciousness of universal self, by their very abstractness and the

¹ Cp. *Sartor Resartus*, “The Everlasting No,” and “The Centre of Indifference.”

² Cp. Amiel's *Journal*.

The uni-
versal self
must be
concrete.

results to which they lead, indicate that the self here must take its freedom not abstractly but concretely. The self as universal must be a concrete universal, must find itself as a whole in its other as a whole. When this is done, it will not merely insist on the bare certainty of being universal, a certainty which is essentially one-sided, but will find its universality in the concrete content of its life. Its self-consciousness will not be simply asserted subjectively but objectively as well. It will find its complete self in its object, and will not seek to assert itself by withdrawing from objectivity. It will be completely at home on both sides of experience at once and in the same sense. This, indeed, it finds when it develops fully what that principle of universal self-consciousness really contains.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SPHERE OF REASON—SCIENTIFIC EXPERIENCE

WHEN experience has become explicitly a consciousness of self, when it has been shown that this very principle of self-consciousness has been all along involved in its process, even at the lowest stages at which the mind is conscious of objects at all, it might be said that our purpose has been achieved. For thereby it has been proved that the duality in which knowledge emerges does not destroy, but involves the unity of the elements in all knowledge, subject and object; and hence knowledge is real and is of reality all along. The whole difficulty regarding knowledge is just that it seeks to convey the unity of mind and objects, and yet, at least to begin with, exists through an opposition between them. The activity of knowledge would be meaningless, unless it were undertaken to bring out the unity between those factors constituting it. As we often say, knowledge must be "true," *i.e.* the mind's process must "agree with" the "nature" of the "object"; or, again, knowledge must, to be *knowledge*, and not mere temporal sequence of events in conscious life, have "validity," *i.e.* what is arrived at must be guaranteed or accepted by the character imposed on its process by the world to which its

The unity so far achieved.

activity refers. Whatever we may think of such expressions, they do at least emphasise this fundamental aim of knowledge—the attainment of a unity between factors *prima facie* contrasted and opposed. Now it has been established so far that the duality in knowledge, even in its most extreme form, does involve this inherent unity; that this unity is what each stage aims at expressing; that it is the determining condition of its activity at any one stage, and of its process from a lower to a higher stage; and, finally, that this unity is proved to be *involved* by the fact it is *evolved as an explicit result* of the process of knowledge towards its goal. In the consciousness of self this unity is no longer implicit but expressed. With the attainment of this result, therefore, all preceding forms of experience find their validity ratified, and itself takes its place as their highest truth and supreme end.

The
principle
not formal:
Kant.

Why, then, do we not stop there in this interpretation of knowledge? This was undoubtedly all that Kant aimed at establishing, and, so far, successfully established. For he showed that *unless* this was involved there could be no unity in knowledge at all; or, stated otherwise, that the possibility of unity in knowledge rested on the reference to the self in every act of knowledge. But unity in knowledge is just truth in experience; and hence the attainment of truth at all depended on the implication in our knowledge of this reference to, this consciousness of, self. Kant was content to prove that this must be so, if there is to be a “possible experience” at all; and being interested solely in showing that experience *was* possible, he was satisfied with the *bare* fact that this reference

does or must take place. For him, therefore, this reference is essentially and necessarily *formal* in character. This is valuable so far as it goes ; but, after all, it is merely the *beginning* of an explanation, not the working of it out—its principle, and not its full expression. Moreover, that formality, characterising Kant's principle, limits, or is limited by, his range of interest in the problem. For Kant the *only* question about knowledge arises out of the duality of the factors involved (subject and object), as this appears in its extreme and most obvious forms. His problem is to explain how there can be necessary unity in our knowledge as we find it at the levels of Perception and of the Understanding of "things," where quite clearly the mind seems to stand on one side and objects over against it on the other. And, no doubt, that problem is as obvious as the opposition between the factors which suggests it ; while, again, it is the form in which common sense and natural science find it most urgent. If, therefore, he could explain *how* unity was possible *there*, he would satisfy a serious demand. A formal solution, then, was sufficient to show how it was *possible*, and with the demonstration that those extreme opposites had a ground of unity, nothing more seemed required. The knowledge involving such opposition could be allowed to proceed on its own course with the validity of its process guaranteed. The mere justification of its validity could not of itself add to the *amount* of that knowledge, nor could any knowledge *resting* on that dualism be increased by deduction from a principle merely establishing its validity. In short, the demonstration of the worth of ordinary knowledge could afford to be and remain

purely *formal*, since it lay altogether apart from the process of that knowledge itself, and was not continuous with that process. The demonstration belonged to a different attitude of experience altogether: it was a philosophical *theory* of knowledge, and therefore, while it was a *kind* of knowledge itself, it was not the same in kind as was the knowledge dealt with by that theory.

Kant's
formal
principle
involves a
discon-
tinuity
between
philosophy
and
ordinary
experience.

Hence for Kant there is a sharp distinction between philosophical knowledge and the knowledge of ordinary understanding and science. There is no continuity between them whatever; they are simply different processes. The fact that the result of philosophical inquiry is thus purely formal is in harmony with his whole attitude towards speculative knowledge. For him ordinary knowledge and science could extend our consciousness of the meaning and content of the world; philosophical thinking could not. Thus *all* the *extension* of our knowledge of the world was regarded by him as the object of the former, and was their sole prerogative. With that philosophy had nothing to do. But if all knowledge of objects comes from them alone, what can be left for philosophy to do? Clearly nothing but to deal with purely *formal* questions regarding knowledge itself. Kant has in some way to acknowledge the claims of philosophy to be a necessary attitude of the human spirit, and must therefore give it some fact to deal with. But he will not allow that it extends knowledge of objects, therefore its subject-matter must be knowledge as such. And since it is excluded from knowing the content of experience, there is absolutely nothing left but the pure form of knowledge to discuss.

Any kind of content lies beyond its province to consider. But the pure form of knowledge is simply the principle involved in *all* knowledge. Hence, to show what this is and how it works is all that a theory of knowledge can give. Here we see once more the reason for the purely formal character of his principle of self-consciousness. His problem was formal by its very character, and his solution is formal as a result; even though, so far as it goes, it is satisfactory. It is thus that he makes the compromise between the distrust of speculation which had arisen in him so strongly after his acquaintance with the barren metaphysic of preceding philosophy, and the necessity after all to satisfy the speculative impulse in man in some way or other. But he creates, by so doing, an impassable gulf between the knowledge analysed by philosophy and philosophical knowledge itself.

The effect on his theory is twofold: all continuity of principle between ordinary knowledge and science on the one hand and philosophy on the other is ignored or rendered impossible, and that principle above ordinary knowledge, which enables him to criticise and justify its validity, remains undeveloped. It cannot be developed by Kant, for it has no content: it is purely formal. If it tries to develop itself into knowledge, it merely shows its ineptitude, Kant holds, by falling into "antinomy." Yet in some way it is a reality. Hence Kant hands over its positive reality to another plane of experience altogether—the practical moral will—and leaves the negative results, which are all it can intellectually attain to, within the theoretical attitude of experience.

Its effect
on Kant's
theory.

Paradox of
Kant's
position.

It is evident at a glance that Kant's result is paradoxical. In the interests of what for Kant were the highest phases of experience—those of Duty and Religion—he places Morality in a region beyond the reach of knowledge; as if human knowledge were something to be either afraid of, on account of its critical concern for truth, or ashamed of, because of its incompetence to reveal it completely. On the other hand, in the interests of knowledge Kant has been at considerable pains to demonstrate the inherent necessity and universal validity of Science. Surely it is evident that if knowledge is inherently justifiable as a mode of experience, it cannot be denied the right to extend its activity as far as it pleases; and if Morality is similarly a real aspect of experience, it has nothing to fear from Science, and nothing is gained by protecting it from knowledge. It seems a singular defence of the validity of Morality to relegate it to a sphere which is unknowable, while the only way of defending it must be by some form of knowledge itself. In point of fact, knowledge takes its revenge, as it always must in such a case, by depriving the result of any concrete value.

The
necessary
correction:
conscious-
ness of self
concrete
not formal.

All this is altered by taking a single step. The principle securing the unity of knowledge and involved in it all through, does not externally join subject and object; it internally fuses them. It does not link them; they are phases of it as a living unity. They are not parts which are fitted into each other; but rather parts of a single cell. They are, in fact, elements derived from its complete reality by a process of analysis either implicit (in the development of experience itself) or explicit (by conscious

reflection). This interpretation of the principle is involved in its having been shown to be that truth, the attainment of which has been the aim of all knowledge from the start. Hence, when this first arises as a conscious form of experience, the outcome of the preceding stages of experience, where subject and object were in obvious contrast, the principle is not a formal unity at all, but *a concrete mode of experience*, which, while it contains what preceded in the sense that it is *their* truth, has a life and being of its own whose content has yet to be revealed and expressed. We cannot, therefore, stop with the explicit attainment of the mere consciousness of self involved in all the knowledge that has gone before, —unless that self-consciousness is, as it there stands, the exhaustive expression of all that self-consciousness means, and experience cannot be further developed. That this is not so is evident, first, from the fact that the self is here the most concrete of all realities; in the second place, because there is still a vast amount of experience left untouched by the preceding phases of experience (Perception, etc.), and needing, therefore, interpretation by self-consciousness; and, thirdly, because—the consciousness of self being a mode of experience—it has expressly to build all that the preceding phases of experience (Perception, etc.) contained into the structure of its life and make them consciously its *own*. It has, in fact, to recast experience as hitherto known into *explicit* consciousness of self, just as, *e.g.*, Understanding took up the content of Perception and moulded that after its own form.

Hence, then, the attainment of self-consciousness as an explicit mode of experience is the beginning

Develop-
ment of
conscious-
ness of self.

of a further advance in the interpretation of experience and in the deeper consciousness of what the self contains.¹ But from this point onwards we are always within the sphere of an explicit consciousness of self. The self is aware of itself in all its contents and movements, and of nothing else. The object world is consciously one with the subject world, and the course of development consists just in making this conscious unity more and more complete, more and more concrete, more and more adequate to all its content.

What it
contains.

Now, just as Kant placed Morality and Religion in the sphere of pure consciousness of self, so here part of the life of self-consciousness proper is realised in these forms of experience. And just as Kant relegated Morality and Religion to the world of Reason only, so our argument will show them to arise out of the life of Reason. But these of themselves do not exhaust all that self-consciousness contains, as Kant seemed to hold. There are other movements as well; and a complete interpretation of the principle will show what these are. One marked divergence from Kant appears in the fact that a place can be found at one of its stages for the philosophical attitude, the activity of Speculation. This in itself may be said to be an obvious result to secure; yet Kant's view of knowledge leaves it unexplained. The question is bound to arise in Kant's theory, What kind of knowledge is it in which Kant's own philosophy consists? *quis custodit custodes?* For Kant, however, as we have said, there is a gulf fixed between science and

¹ This is the way in which actual experience reveals the reality of the higher forms of self-consciousness.

speculation. But by developing the principle which Kant left purely formal, the principle of explicit Self-consciousness, we can establish a continuity between the two, and thereby close the circuit of human knowledge as the expression, *i.e.* the experience, of self-consciousness.

All the forms of explicit consciousness of self contain and express the conscious union of self with its object and conversely. Wherever we have a conscious explicit identity between self and its object, there we have self-consciousness. The chief forms of this unity we have still to state. We must always bear in mind that self-consciousness is not *bare* identity of self and its object, and that self-consciousness takes specifically distinct forms just because it reveals its reality in different degrees of completeness.

To begin with, we have the simple certainty on the part of the self that the content known is not merely not alien to itself, but is essentially one with it. The self, as we say, is at home with itself in its world, in its experience. It is adequate completely to reveal the object before it; "finds itself" in its object, and finds the object to be in absolute agreement with its own nature. There is no "beyond" in the nature of the object which is hidden from the eye of the self, and hence no distinction between an "*appearance*" of the object and the "*inner meaning*" of the object, between what the object is *for us* and what it is "in itself." This distinction was formed at the level of Understanding, and created, as we saw, by the character of Understanding, and its way of going to work as a form of knowledge. Here that contrast has disappeared, and the object is

First form
simple con-
sciousness
of self in
the world
of Reason.

through and through transparent to the self as a self, to the self as a universal and as a unity. But this is just what we mean by a "rational" experience, by knowing "rationally," by knowledge in and through *Reason*. The first and simplest form, therefore, in which self-consciousness is adequately expressed is in the life of *Reason* as such, in Reason-knowledge.

This agrees in principle with Kant.

Let us explain. We must observe, in the first place, that this is just what Kant's own view logically implies. For him, too, Reason is higher than Understanding, and hence to it is assigned Morality, to the criticism and knowledge of which Understanding, which is confined to knowledge in the sense of natural science, cannot attain. And Reason belongs to the region of pure consciousness of self proper; it is, in fact, that self-consciousness as a purely formal function in experience. For self-consciousness, on Kant's view, is just the principle of unity in experience, *i.e.* the principle in virtue of which subject and object are absolutely harmonised. This means that in self-consciousness subject is one with object, and must obviously be so, because it is conscious of nothing but self. But this is as much as to say that in it mind as a unity is one with its content as unified. And this is precisely what is found in the life of Reason as such. Hence it is that absolute unity in experience is relegated by Kant, in the various forms in which that unity is demanded (Self, World, and God), to the sphere of Reason.

The

difference :
(1) Reason
involves
diversity of
content.

All that is equally true here, with a difference. The forms of unity in which Reason appears are not restricted to those few mentioned by Kant. These are only particular expressions of the one fundamental fact that in the life of Reason subject

and object are consciously one. Reason is a special form of experience, and *wherever* it works at all, there we have the same sense of unity, the sense of being at home with our object. It deals, *e.g.*, with the "world," the world of "nature" in the sense in which science and common knowledge speak of "nature"; and there it does insist on the unity of the world (to use Kant's expression), *i.e.* the inter-relatedness of all the parts in the whole, and to make a whole. But to do so is just to insist that the self is *at one* with the world, for it is the unity of that self which is simply expressed objectively in the "unity" of the "world." Hence the world is one because we are conscious of the self in the world; or, conversely, we are conscious of the world as one, because we are conscious of the one self in it. The self at home with the world, or the world at one with the self, both mean that the world is a unity as the self is a unity. But whereas Kant took that unity in a purely formal sense, we ought to see that unity concretely and all along the line in dealing with the world. If to be at one with the world is to find that same unity everywhere in it, the unity of the self with the world is necessarily differentiated into as many "forms of unity" or "conceptions" as are required to exhaust that sense of unity we have in dealing with it. Or in other words, the life of Reason does not consist in simply asserting the bare unity of the world and the bare unity of the self with it, but in manifesting that unity in detail. Thus it is that the work of Reason must be manifested in various forms: as many forms as are required fully to exhaust the nature of Reason in dealing with the world before it.

(2) Reason
is a form
of know-
ledge not
a limit to
it.

This leads to a second point. Kant had restricted knowledge to Understanding, and hence for him it was a problem what to do with the unity of Reason when he could only deal with it by way of Understanding. The error here lay in restricting the idea of knowledge to the process of Understanding. Dismiss that, and his problem is at once changed and his solution disappears. We then see that Reason is not some function beyond knowledge, working somehow in vacuo, yet working because it must, since it is an activity of the human spirit. Reason is literally knowledge, a kind of knowledge, still distinct from that of Understanding (and therein lies the agreement with Kant), but not subordinate to it, a form of knowledge *sui generis* and working on a plane of its own. This follows from our having taken self-consciousness concretely and not formally; but it is evident that at once it effects a change in the conception of knowledge. For on this view Reason expresses truths of its own, works in ways of its own, and works towards its own ends independent of check or direction from any other authority whatsoever. No doubt, what it reveals is final for it alone, not for any other level of experience: but that is true of any phase of knowledge. It is true, *e.g.*, of Perception. But its being a phase of knowledge, while it reserves its validity to its own special process, does not surely put it on a level with any other form of knowledge. It is a higher form than any that have hitherto appeared, just because it is first of all the culmination of the movement of knowledge as it has hitherto proceeded, and, secondly, because it deals more adequately with experience (*i.e.* is in greater

harmony with the nature of self-consciousness which all experience implies) than any other of the preceding forms of knowledge. Thus Understanding does not criticise it; it rather (as Kant himself held) corrects Understanding.

This view of Reason as itself a kind of knowledge is nothing novel. It is actually accepted by every-day experience of a non-philosophical kind. We do hold that in the life of Reason man is "at home with the world," in a way he is not, *e.g.*, at the level of Perception. We consider "a reasonable soul" the highest expression of human life. We do maintain that "nothing can resist the might of reason," that in the long run everything must give up its meaning to the spirit of reason engaged seriously in finding out that meaning. This is the postulate of scientific procedure. It is what we mean by speaking of the world as "intelligible," as a "rational" world, which can be "made one with our own reason," and must give up all claims to be independent of it. It is the moving principle behind all scientific effort, urging it on in spite of, indeed *through*, all its mistakes in grasping the meaning of things. We generally hold there is nothing hidden in the natural world that shall not be made known some time or other to the eye of inquiry. And we consider that man to be highest as a man who achieves this end most completely. In all these and other ways we find in everyday life that the sphere of Reason is not merely held to be the highest expression of the knowing consciousness, but that it *is* itself a form of knowledge. It is the region of conceptual coherence and demonstration. It is the principle of deanthropomorphisation, that principle by which we transcend

This agrees with common thought.

metaphor drawn from Sense (*i.e.* *our* senses) and Perception, and rise to *Conceptions*. These are not limited to or by Sense, and so are not restricted by the specific individuality of the knowing consciousness; they are *universal* and not (as all metaphor is) *individual*.

The process of Reason—
Knowledge.

We are thus merely doing justice to the claim which every one makes for the life of Reason. How, then, does Reason as a process of knowledge work? Let it be remembered first that while Reason is thus knowledge, it is not simply a "function" of the self; it *is* the self in a specific mode of experience. It can only be said to be a "function" of it in the sense in which any aspect of experience is one moment of its life amongst others; not in the sense that the self "uses" Reason as the "instrument" by which to "know" "things," or is a kind of activity exercised by the self, "possessing" such a capacity. Reason *is* the self-conscious life of mind in one of its realisations of itself. Reason-knowledge *is* self-conscious experience. Hence, in evolving the process and content of such knowledge, we are all the while *expressing* the very nature of self-conscious life as that appears here. Reason-knowledge is, in short, just the self *quâ* knowing a content as itself.

The object and subject not separate.

Again, we must not in this knowledge separate the Reason which knows from the object which is known, as if Reason were on one side and the object on the other, and each separated from the other by a gulf which the "process" of knowing tries to span. The antithesis here implied has been altogether left behind. It is found at the level of mere Consciousness certainly, as we have seen; knowing does there seem a way of joining subject

and object. It is just because the antithesis is there so abrupt, and knowing does seem to come between them, that we found the distinction arising between a world of noumena and the sphere of phenomena, already stated in dealing with Understanding. For that distinction is just the reappearance in the *result* of what was there from the first as a *condition of getting any result at all*. But at the level of Reason that antithesis, as we have seen, has disappeared as an opposition of elements. It is merely now a distinction of content *within a conscious* unity, not an opposition of elements demanding a unity. A distinction certainly there is and must be, otherwise there would be no knowledge; for knowledge without diversity has no existence. We have subject and object here in Reason, as elsewhere: Reason is a plane of experience which has these for its constituents. But in Reason subject and object *consciously fall inside the unity they imply as moments of the single act of self-consciousness*; or, stated otherwise, the single activity of being conscious of self contains as its ultimate constituents subject and object, and *therefore* these are by and in that unity explicitly identified. But, it may be asked, in what *sense* identified? In the sense that the object is the meaning of the whole in one form, the subject its meaning in another. The subject is the unity *to* the self, the object the unity *for* the self: the complete act of Reason is just one in which that is to itself what it is for itself. Only so is it at once a whole and a self-contained whole; anything else would be partial and incomplete. We can see this at once in any ideal statement, *e.g.* "two and two are four," "the perpetual motion is untrue of physical energy."

Here we are not saying something true *for us*. It is, as we say, "the very nature of thought," is "the very meaning of the thing," "anything else is impossible," *i.e.* the content of the subject is nothing in this connexion but what the object reveals. The object reveals just what the subject reveals; or, again, the unity of experience is explicitly realised in these statements. There is no opposition, no conscious distinction between what *I* think and what the object is—there is *absolute* identity of both sides.

Subject
and object
as aspects
of the same
unity.

Hence it is characteristic of Reason that, in dealing with its life and activity, we do not start from the subject and find what it says "about" the object, and then compare what it says with the "nature" of the object to see if it is "true," if they "agree." Nor, on the other hand, do we start from the object simply and find out what it contains, and then submit this for "acceptance" by the subject. There is no place for *comparison* when both are explicitly identical in content and process to begin with; and there is no meaning in "acceptance" when *the subject is consciously there in the very being and nature of the object all along*. Wherever this is the case we have the life of Reason, and conversely. The *being* of the object is the content of the subject, the process of the subject is the life of the object. To use a familiar but somewhat misleading expression, "thought" and "being" are in Reason consciously one through and through, in form, process, and content. It is therefore immaterial whether we speak of the content of Reason as the nature of the subject or the reality of the object.

At the same time, it must be noted that while all the phases in the development of explicit self-

consciousness have this characteristic of Reason, all are *rational*, they are not all *mere Reason*. Thus one such development of self-consciousness is what we call Spirit and spiritual life—phases which appear as Morality and Religion. These are rational, but they are not Reason as such: they are developments from Reason, but with a characteristic distinction of their own, the nature of which will appear presently.

Reason
only one
phase of
conscious-
ness of
self.

What, then, are the forms in which the life of Reason, as such, appears? It is the simplest expression, as already said, of the explicit conscious unity of subject and object. Experience operates in this way, it is a form in which experience is realised, a "language," so to say, in which experience may be expressed. This was true of the level of Perception—there was a perceptual world, a world of Perception; so, again, of "Understanding." And it is because all these "worlds" are phases of self-conscious life (which is always a whole, a *unity*) that this is possible, that each is different, and all are necessary. The life of Reason is one such distinctive expression of experience.

Now the way the life of Reason appears is first of all the activity of what we call *Observation* in its various forms,—Observation of "nature," of "physical" objects, and of "organic" life, Observation of the self-conscious individual as such (in Psychology), Observation of the self-conscious life in relation to its organic embodiments (Psychophysiology). In all these cases we have no sense of an *antithesis*, an opposition between the "observing mind" and the "observed object"; we are in immediate touch with the object, the object is the content of the subject's life. We "describe" what

Forms of
Rational
life: (1)
Observa-
tion.

the object is, not "in terms of" our individual life, but as it is *in itself*. There is no distinction between what it is *in itself* and what it is *for* us. In Reason what we say *is* what the object means; what the object *is*, is the meaning expressed in the process of "describing" it and stating the "conception" it "embodies." It is only when there appears to be opposition between subject and object (as *e.g.* in Perception) that we can in ordinary life even speak of the object having a being of its own with which what we say "agrees." For then the object is said to be something "in itself" as the subject is something in itself, and this "agreement" between the two indicates and *preserves* that externality implied in the opposition. But when that opposition is consciously given up, the object has *no* "in itself" which is not *to us*, which does not "appear," and no appearance which is not *its* very nature and meaning. This is just what we *find*, *assume*, and *express* in "observing" an object, and in stating its content. The scientist does not ask, when "observing," whether his way of proceeding is justifiable, whether his attitude is a "true" one, whether it "gives" the object, and so on. To do so would stultify and render impossible his whole procedure. He may and does ask whether his "observation" is "true," *i.e.* whether, when observing, he is eliminating what might render the results invalid, or not a complete expression of the object. But to ask such a question *assumes* that in *Observation itself* he is at one with the object observed. A "correct" or "incorrect" Observation is only possible, even as a *distinction*, if Observation *as such* is a specific mode of having experience. For "correctness" implies

a standard imposed *on* Observation, and therefore *assumes* the nature of the observing process as a process of self-conscious life, but does not determine what that nature is. Now all science rests on that assumption and is the outcome of that attitude.

Moreover, it is because of this fusion of subject and object in the process of Observation that he can and *does* distinguish different objects, that he has different "principles" and different "conceptions" to state the nature of the "object-world." How is it that we do not confound, *e.g.*, inorganic and organic, organic and self-conscious individuality? It is not simply because we have a variety of different "objects" and require different "ideas" to express them. It is not because, in point of fact, we do "find" them different, and the mind has to bring out of its inner consciousness different "thoughts" to express their difference. Where is the *necessity* for and the satisfaction *in* the different "thoughts"? It is because, all along the line in the activity of Reason, subject and object are so fused that certain "notions" are alone adequate to express the *unity* of Reason in one case, and other "notions" in another. And it is because this unity is realised at different levels of *coherence* that, *e.g.*, "mechanism" adequately expresses *one* form of that unity, and "teleology," or the idea of end, another. It is not that the object "suggests" (as Kant seemed to imply) the notion which the mind is to "employ"; but that the life of Reason *contains* the different notions as modes of the unity of subject and object. The essential point is that the absolute unity of Reason *can* arise neither from one side only nor from the other side. It is not the subject which "imposes" Differences of content of Reason the result of Observation.

its content of the object, nor the object which "prescribes" or furnishes its nature to the subject. It is the one activity of Reason which realises its unity in the different notions. But why different? why not always the same conception expressing the unity of Reason? Because Reason is concrete self-consciousness; and just as the activity of self-consciousness expresses its life through the variety of modes of experience as a whole, so *in each particular mode* that activity can only be exhausted by appearing in different shapes and forms peculiar to, and revealing in each case, the characteristic nature of that special mode. Self-consciousness as Reason, therefore, reveals the process of its activity precisely *in* the fact that the unity appears in diverse forms, in this case diverse *Conceptions*. Or, again, all these are required to exhaust the full meaning of that unity, simply because experience is being read or "expressed" in terms of the unity of Reason; and experience has variety because self-consciousness must appear in many ways to reveal its full life.

The
specific
difference
between
Concep-
tions
necessi-
tated by
Reason.

"But why a particular one at one time and another at another?" Again we answer because there *are* various forms of the unity (Conceptions); and which is to be expressed depends on the level of unity to be realised. What in particular the form of that unity shall be at a given time is a matter for the history of the individual observer, and does not affect the epistemological question regarding the necessity inherent in the general process involved throughout. Reason, for example, takes Teleology as the special conception in dealing with organism,¹ instead of, say,

¹ *i.e.* Teleology is the subject-side, Organism the object-side of the experience of Reason in one of its forms.

Mechanism, because the unity of Reason requires both in order fully to reveal its activity, and certain aspects of the content of Reason are exhausted by one notion, others require another. Or, to put it otherwise, Reason in working out its full significance, realising all it contains, passes from one form of unity to another. One of these is mechanism, another teleology. They are not so much *imperfect* attempts to express the complete unity of Reason as *definite and necessary moments* in which that unity *must appear in order to express* its complete nature.¹ Mechanical law is not an imperfect teleological principle; it is one form of the unity of Reason, but less complete than teleology. Both are derived from the same source, and both are required to exhaust the life of the process. We cannot interpret the *same thing* teleologically *and* mechanically. That would be a superfluity, an absurdity, if *both* were complete interpretations. What we do in using them is to reveal the unity of Reason in these different ways, because only so do we exhaust the activity of Reason. Hence it is needless to propose (as is so often attempted) to "reconcile" mechanism and teleology, as if, to begin with, they "conflicted." They are different *to begin with*, and in order to reconcile them we would either require a higher notion, or we must sink their differences altogether. But a higher notion is *still another notion of Reason*, and hence the same difficulty would arise again, viz. what to do with the differences we are "reconciling"; while if we sink

¹ We have merely to ask ourselves why, on the one hand, we are not content to use only one conception in rational experience, and why, on the other, we feel compelled to go further than a given conception carries us, to see that this must be so. We cannot appreciate the above view unless we see that it seeks to answer this question.

their differences we are ignoring their value as moments of Reason, and making the problem of "reconciliation" meaningless. They *are* "reconciled," in the only way necessary, by the very fact that they are essential moments of the life of the one Reason. The coherence and unity of the life of Reason is itself the guarantee that the conceptions do not really conflict. And this coherence is manifested just because it does *not* "apply" these conceptions to precisely the *same* identical content. Hence it cannot conflict with itself. It is *realising its unity in a different way* in each content, and therefore they are diverse. Its unity *is* expressed in each of them, hence they do not *need* to be reconciled. We do not look at the *same* thing with *each* conception as it occurs: that would be confusion. A difference of Conception *is* (for Reason) a difference of content, and a variety of content is variety in the life of Reason. The only "reconciliation" the Conceptions need is obtained by connecting them all as phases in the realisation of the life of Reason, which is the underlying principle determining each as it stands, and the variety of form they severally possess.

The
further
develop-
ment of the
activity of
Reason :
Categories.

But we have already anticipated the development of the activity of Reason as a specific attitude of experience. It starts as we saw with Observation. But that is the form the activity assumes. What is its content? This is easily determined. We have here consciousness of self, the expression of a unity through and in differences (subject—object). But the self is by its very nature a universal, *the* universal in experience. The different specific ways in which that self, when it is explicit, appears, must therefore be through universals. To

be conscious of self is thus to be conscious of universals, and to be conscious of universals is to be conscious of self in one or other of its specific manifestations, *i.e.* its detailed content. But again, at this stage we have explicit unity of self and object in its *simplest* form, in its ultimate irreducible elements. All of them are expressions of that unity, but as *mere* unity; all of them are universal, but *pure* universals as such. There must be a plurality, because the self is a "realised" unity, not a formal unity. As a formal unity there is, as Kant said, but one universal, viz. the pure unity of self-consciousness. But as a "realised" "concrete" unity it must be manifold, break up or evolve into diverse functions of uniting activity. But a universal which is a pure universal, a unity that is a *mere* unity is a *Conception*, a *Category*. Hence the content of Reason, the substance of Observation, consists of Categories. With these Reason "works"; in these it expresses its active function as the unity of subject and object in its simplest form.

Here, again, this view is at one with Kant, but instead of taking the Categories to be connected with the formal unity of self by the quasi-external act of judgment, "I think," the Categories *are* the *I thinking*—functioning as the explicit unity of subject and object. Instead of the unity of the self making an experience "possible" through the "application" of the Categories, the Categories make the unity of the self *actual* in experience. Instead of the Categories requiring to be picked up externally and contingently by reference to the history of thought and logical doctrine, the Categories are simply the necessary elements into which the unity of the experience is

Categories
are the
Ego made
specific.

resolved. The Categories are not limited to a certain formal and arbitrary number ; the Categories are indefinite in number, are, if we choose, endless in number, for Reason is not to be exhausted in *any* detail of experience. The Categories, again, are not to be *deduced* by showing that experience is impossible without their *use* and application ; they are *derived* from the unity of Reason, evolved from it *in and through its activity in experience*. Instead of the Categories being necessary because they are all connected in the same sense with the unity of self, and have the same degree of significance and validity accordingly, they are necessary because the unity of Reason must in exercising its activity express itself in each, and they have a different significance and value according to the degree in which they realise this type of unity of subject and object. Finally, the self is not, as Kant held, a principle *above* the Categories simply, it is the principle *in* them ; it is the Category of all the Categories, the Conception of all Conceptions.

Concep-
tions
develop
into Laws.

With Conceptions, then, the determinate activity of Reason begins. They vary in character according to the unity expressed, and vary because the unity is concrete, as already stated. They become what in Observation are called the "marks" or "aspects" of an object, and correspond on the plane of Reason to the "qualities" spoken of in the case of Perception, or the "appearances" which we have in the case of Understanding. By these "marks" or attributes we "describe" the object and differentiate one object, *e.g.* in physical nature, from another. But this is merely the beginning of the evolution of the content. The Conceptions employed are isolated, separate.

The complete unity on the other hand must be all-pervading, must control the diverse elements, show the inner Principle connecting the various Conceptions (attributes), and show these elements to be merely differences inside a further unity, a deeper unity of Reason. This deeper unity will contain them as moments, control their relation to each other, their place in the whole, order their situation and mode of appearing, and so give them the special significance they have as "marks," "aspects" of the object. They will get their special meaning and value from it. Relatively to them it will be more fundamental, because determining what they are and how they are. But this is precisely what we mean by a governing *Principle* or *Law* in the sphere of Reason. With the formulation of Laws, Observation (Conception) passes into *Judging* and *Demonstrative or Systematic Connexion*. These Laws are Laws of Reason, just as the Conceptions which, because of their variety, demand them, are Conceptions of Reason. And these Laws are in principle the complete expression of what Reason realises in its activity as a unifying principle. They are not static unities, but dynamic agencies, ways in which the life of Reason functions. They are "operations" of the active unity of Reason. They do not *regulate* objects; they *constitute* objects; for they are phases of the world of Reason *inside* the unity of which, as we saw, its objects fall. They are not the *forms* of Reason but its *substance*; and so are not the "forms of the object," but the *reality* of the object. They are not imposed by the subject; they are the very content of Reason, which is *at once* subjective and objective in the *same sense*. They are not "discovered"

by Reason; they are expressions, evolutions of the *content* of Reason. They are the culminating point of its movement as Reason, because in them we have the full expression of Reason as unity *in* diversity, the principle uniting the various Conceptions, the unity of the unities (concepts) characterising the world of Reason. Further than that Reason *quâ* Reason, mere unity of subject and object, does not go. When a further stage is taken, Self-consciousness passes beyond the stage of mere Reason to another mode of self-conscious life.

Differ-
ence and
concrete-
ness of
Laws.

The various Laws differ as the Conceptions differ, and the Laws of the inorganic world differ from those of the organic, as these again differ from those of conscious life. But the Laws are in all cases necessary developments of the very *nature* of Conceptions, of Categories. They derive the universality they possess from the same function of Reason. But they are at once a more comprehensive and a more concrete universality; they have a greater degree of individuality, with a greater degree of specification. They are a deeper unity because they are connexions of Conceptions. They make Conceptions coherent which appear to begin with as separate. What we said of the "reality" of Conceptions holds with a similar and a greater force of Laws, which develop out of the function of unity implied in Conceptions. The Laws are not obtained by piecing Conceptions together externally, but by deepening the unity of Reason which *Conceptions themselves* express. In that sense these Laws are literally the evolved expression of the Conceptions which we found to be the simplest content of Reason. Just as a given Law of an object is higher

than a given Conception determining an object, so there may be and are wider and wider Laws, embracing in them Laws less wide in extent. What these are it is the business of rational scientific procedure in given cases to determine. That the attainment of them is possible, is both guaranteed and necessitated by the one function of Reason operating all through. The achievement of the end of Reason is the establishment of a completely articulate intelligible world of Reason—the Ideal of Science.¹

It will be seen from all this how closely this view is in touch both with the process of Science in the strict sense of the term, and with the ordinary treatment of scientific procedure in treatises on scientific method. Science begins by “observing” the “facts,” determines their “characteristics,” connects their constituent elements together, and finds the “laws” or “principles” “governing” their connexions. All along it is working with universals, its primary elements are conceptions. It is said no doubt to start from *particulars*; and this is true. But it is particulars as “instances” of a type, of a “class,” of a general conception, not bare particulars (which indeed are strictly non-existent for Science). The whole process of Science just consists in developing the nature and inner unity at work in these elementary conceptions.² Its “judgments,” “inferences,” its

This view corroborated by actual Scientific procedure and the Logic of Science.

¹ Hence the difference between the consummation of Understanding (Explanation) and that of Reason (Systematic Connexion). Whereas in the former each “explanation” was complete by itself and had a finality all its own; in the latter nothing short of complete system can have finality. Anything less is *consciously* a fragment of a whole with only a “partial validity” on that account. This is because the unity of Reason works all through in the light of its absolute unity.

² Hence the view, which has been so fully worked out by, *e.g.*, Lotze and Bosanquet, that Conception is simply implicit Judgment, Judgment is implicit Inference, Inference is implicit Systematic or absolute Connexion.

“theories,” its “laws” are simply the evolution of the conceptual substance in and with which it works, and are universal from beginning to end. They are universal because all are phases of the life of Reason, and they form a continuous process gradually evolving a deeper, more comprehensive universal,—a unity with greater complexity in it, and greater control over its elements,—simply because it is the one movement of Reason operating all through, and this aims at a single result—complete self-expression.

The Logic
of Science
and the
theory of
Experi-
ence.

The ordinary discussions of scientific method (Logic in the narrow historical sense) are, again, merely statements of what this process consists in, how it takes place and achieves its result, the kind of certainty obtained in different forms of the process, the different ways of expressing unity (different judgments and inferences), etc. The difference between such a treatment of scientific method, and the present statement of the nature of the scientific mood of experience, is that the former takes for granted the general character and validity of scientific process as an empirically recognised fact ; while the latter raises and answers the very question as to what place Science and scientific activity have in the life of self-conscious experience as a whole, where it appears, and what it essentially is, *i.e.* what it is as a mode of the one ultimate principle at work in all experience. The former, no doubt, by starting, as it does, with an assumption, cannot escape this other problem, and really introduces into its interpretation some implicit or explicit conception of the general aim, worth, character, and significance of scientific process. So important, so fundamental

indeed, is this underlying theory of the purport of Science as the phase of experience, that it is found impossible to discuss scientific procedure apart from it. The discussion, in its limits and in its form, is shaped by that conception as to what place Science occupies in experience. Hence the totally diverse treatments of the character and process of Science which we find in different textbooks of what is commonly called Logic. It has therefore to be acknowledged, and is in point of fact admitted, that the kind of treatment of the Logic of scientific knowledge given in ordinary treatises on Logic, depends in the long run on some underlying but unexpressed "theory of knowledge," and has only an approximate value till that theory is made evident. In Hegel's System the treatment of Logic is literally nothing more than the connected exposition of the content of pure Reason. Thus he does justice to the ordinary view of Logic, and yet mends its defects by stating what place Reason has in experience as a whole.

Finally, it will be seen that the development of the activity of Reason works up in its own special medium the stages we formerly found in the sphere of consciousness as such (as distinct from self-consciousness). These moments were Sensation, Perception, Understanding. To these on the level of Reason correspond the forms of *Conception* proper, *Judgment* (the relation of conceptions, or the distinction of conceptions inside a unity holding both—these expressions mean the same so far as we are concerned), and the interconnexion of different conceptions through the Law or Principle determining all as its elements, the phase of inferential

Reason
and the
previous
functions
of con-
sciousness.

Demonstration. Reason thus completely exhausts through processes of its *own* activity the substance of knowledge formerly assigned to uniquely distinct attitudes of experience (Perception, etc.). For all these phases spoken of (Conception, etc.) are merely stages in the development of Reason alone. Hence the ease of transition from one to the other; and hence the certainty of the work of Reason at every stage.

CHAPTER IX

THE SPHERE OF FINITE SPIRIT—MORAL EXPERIENCE

THE complete realisation of the life of Reason has a twofold result. Let us bear in mind again that Reason is not an abstract adjective of human experience, but a concrete mode of its life. Further, its life is individual from beginning to end, just because experience is one, a whole, concrete. To become conscious, then, of self in and through the object is not merely to have the form of unity, but to have the content and substance of that unity, to have a world which is not merely consciously moulded by, but consists in, the self. There alone does it realise an individuality which is absolutely self-contained in each individual, where Reason is actively and consciously the moving principle. Its world is not so much its own: it is that; for it is "at home" in that world. But it is its very self. What it is conscious of and what is consciously at work is self. Nowhere can it find anything but the self-same substance of its own life. There is nothing "beyond" it to oppose it: everything falls within it, is identified with it, made part and parcel of it. What it touches recalls its own nature, responds to its own impulse; what it does is the revelation solely of that nature. To use of the world of Reason a phrase employed by Hume after

Twofold
result of
the nature
of Reason:
Experience
self-deter-
mined.

Berkeley, there is nothing to be met with in heaven or earth but the mind's own ideas. This is the inevitable result of the life of Reason within which subject and object are consciously identified. All this means is that individual experience is here self-completed, self-determined, self-constituted, not implicitly but explicitly. It is "independent" because there is nothing beyond it to limit its activity: it is "self-dependent" because its movement is self-initiated and self-constituted. It begins from and ends in its self. That is one result.

The self is
universal.

The other result is that, because the content is solely self, and the self (for the reason before indicated) is essentially universal, the attainment of self-contained individuality is *ipso facto* the explicit realisation of what is consciously not mine in particular but is universal. But to realise this level of self-consciousness is to attain to and establish as a factor of experience *Universal Self-conscious individuality*. If the world it realises is its own, and yet, from one end to the other, self, this must be so. The substance of this world is a single universal self-consciousness. It is not simply a *number* of discrete selves, all of them conscious; it is *one* universal self-consciousness. If universality were merely numerical plurality, its world would not be a unity, and could not fall within a single experience at all. It is a collective, a comprehensive unity, not a numerical aggregate of units.

The individuality attained in the life of Reason is not, therefore, a particular isolated existence. Isolated existence is transcended by the fact that the substance of its life is universal. The expression, "my own" self-consciousness, "my" Reason, is,

properly understood, a *contradictio in adjecto*. I am only truly self-conscious by implying a consciousness of a self beyond my existence. The distinction between a "me" and a "thee" falls inside this world of completed self-consciousness, and is generated by it. I am conscious of self by reference to a self-world, a world realised and constituted by self. My self-consciousness *is* mine by relation to a self beyond me in particular, by *contrast* with a wider self-consciousness. I "possess" it, because what I possess has a reality containing me in particular, and on which I can lay hold, and in living in and by which *I* am absolutely self-contained and complete, as Reason requires. Even in the case of some particular "property" which *I* possess, I cannot call *this* "mine" unless there is a wider whole of property in which I am merely sharing, and on which I in particular lay hold. I may *distinguish* "my" property from "yours," but I do not *separate*, cut off my property from yours. For if each did this there would be no "property"; there would be merely an external relation of one exclusive entity to another. But to say *my* property, is to make something literally a *part* of me, a *quality* of me, a "*proprium*," a determination (internal), and not an "*accidens*" (external) to me. Similarly, but in an infinitely deeper sense when I speak of "my" self-consciousness. I am *I* (universal) through a universal self which I am conscious of as one with *me*, but which is wider than "me," and by being in which I live in a self-complete and self-contained world—the world of explicit concrete self-consciousness.

Distinctions of individual selves fall within this universal self-consciousness.

The sphere, where we begin and end with self-conscious individuality and with that only, is the world of Spiritual life, which exists in the definite

The sphere
of this self-
conscious-
ness is the
Moral
Life.

This illus-
trated :
" Free-
dom."

historical form of the Moral Life and the order of Society. The attainment of rational individuality, of individuality constituted by the activity of concrete self-consciousness, is the foundation of Morality.

If we take any of the general characteristics ordinarily regarded as belonging to Morality, we shall see this at once. The moral life is said to imply "Freedom." To be free is to be "at home with ourselves along with others," to realise ends which are ends of our own choosing, and in which, when realised, we shall both find ourselves and have our self acknowledged by others. But that result does not merely *imply* Society as if our moral life were our own individual affair, and Society were there simply to confirm us in our purpose. *It is literally the activity of a social, of a universal self-consciousness, at every point.* The end is "ours," we "choose" it : *i.e.* it is the expression of our self, of the self we are conscious of. But this means that it is ours *as distinct from the end of some other self*, whose existence and reality are therefore essential to make it possible for us to *call* it "ours" in particular. We find ourselves in the end itself as well as in the choosing of it. But the end achieved is a *self attained*, just as the process of achieving it is self-expression. The end achieved, again, is, because achieved, no longer merely particular but a self "*objectified*," universalised, with a significance not merely for *me*, but for all who know it. We demand that the end shall be acknowledged as "ours." This means that the end is "accepted" by others (or "rejected" as the case may be), *i.e.* the end is *not merely "my" end*, but the end for a universal

self-consciousness. "My" self therefore is not merely mine at all, but one with that universal. A negative confirmation of the same principle is seen when we pursue an end outside a social whole, and without the slightest reference to it. The end is said to be mere isolated "impulse," and the life directed by impulse is on the plane of merely organic activity, or is "the life of an animal," whose activity is without any significance beyond the moment of realisation, because not implying a self which endures consciously beyond the moment.

If we examine any other characteristic aspect of Morality, *e.g.* "responsibility," "duty," "virtue," etc., precisely the same result will be brought to light. The very terms connote universal self-consciousness; so completely does man, by his thoughts and procedure in the moral life, recognise that Morality is without significance apart from this implication of universal self-consciousness. Morality *is* in fact its detailed explicit actualisation.

So of other elements of Morality.

Hence the view so often put forward on other grounds that man alone is capable of Morality. This is a distorted way of stating the case, because it seems to imply that Morality is a thing *per se* up to which certain creatures may "rise," and by chance, as it were, this creature, or one of these creatures, happens to be man. The truth rather is that Morality has no existence at all anywhere except as the realisation in detail of universal self-consciousness. This universal self-consciousness is a mode of human experience, and Morality emerges with it, *is* its result.

"Man alone is capable of Morality."

It is said, again, that man is a moral being because he is essentially a rational being: that

“Morality
implies
ration-
ality.”

is, the principle of the moral life is to be found in the nature of Reason. With this view the course of the above argument agrees: for Reason is the basis of self-complete individuality, and such individuality has all the functions and characteristics of Reason from the beginning to the end of its activity. But self-conscious individuality is something more than mere Reason; it emerges after the completion of the life of Reason. Morality is not Reason pure and simple (as pure Science can be said to be); nor is the moral life explained merely by referring it to Reason. It is rather the self-differentiation of a universal self-consciousness into specific individualities, each having substantial existence for itself. It is not an *adjective* of individual life, but the substance of individual life. In short, it does not consist in Reason as bare Reason, but in Spirit, of which Reason provides the basis, but is not the exhaustive expression. Morality is the expression of spiritual activity, and Spirit is just self-conscious individuality, which only is a self in and through universal self. If we draw the distinction between Reason and Spirit formally, it would be that Reason is the consciousness of the immediate identity of subject and object, the consciousness of that identity as it is *in* itself, whereas Spirit is the consciousness of that unity as it is *for* itself.¹ It is

¹ The distinction between the two is parallel to that between “Understanding” and “Desire.” In the former, as we saw, the consciousness of self was implicit, in the latter the explicit principle of the process: in the former the self was “found”; in the latter “carried out”: in the former we had the “intellectual” attitude, in the latter the “practical.” So here in Reason “other selves” are implicit: hence the possibility of speaking of “my” Reason: in Spirit they are explicit and their unity therefore established by a process of mediation. Hence arises the “practical” activity of realising the unity of Spirit through selves, each universal and for itself: and this is the Moral Life.

therefore at a higher level of experience than Reason. The identity of self with its object, which constitutes the life of Reason as such, is *implied* in the life of Spirit, for its world is also self-determined. But Spirit rests on the consciousness not so much that I am in myself all in all, am one with my immediate content, the world of "nature"—certainly a great achievement; but that I am one with, *i.e.* am *for myself*, universal self-consciousness—which is a supreme triumph of experience. Out of that sense of unity, surely one of the most marvellous and profoundly significant of all the attitudes of experience, Morality arises, and appears as a historical experience in time.

It will be seen how this conception of the place of the moral life in experience both agrees with and is different from that of Kant. For Kant moral experience was realised on a higher level of conscious life than Science, and belonged to the sphere of Reason. Moreover, Morality was only truly Morality in the form of "pure will," "pure practical reason"; *i.e.* it had its source in and expressed the essentially universal principle of experience. Again, the realisation of the moral life consisted in carrying out an end whose very meaning was universal, a "maxim" or "law" of "duty." Such a universal carried the individual beyond his particular existence, and only had a moral significance if it did so. But it did not merely carry him beyond, it built him into a rational whole of reason in which others shared. It was by reference to this whole that his action was to be determined, and that his action became really moral. This whole was a whole of rational beings *quâ* rational. He was to act as a typical

Similarity
of Kant's
position.

rational being, *i.e.* in a way other rational beings would act. Only so, obviously, *could* there be a *whole* of rational beings, and by doing so *ipso facto* there *was* established a whole of such beings. His action therefore presupposed, implied, and bound him up with other rational beings. His moral action was action in and for a universal reason. This Kant expressed consistently enough by saying that a moral action was one which was done in and for a "kingdom of ends," a kingdom of rationals, a social whole, in short, of rational beings.

The difference from Kant : Kant's unity is formal and external.

All this is contained in the above argument. But there is a difference. For Kant this world of reason was, like its source in pure self-consciousness, *formal* only. Hence his social whole had a unity, but a formal unity. The universality was an *adjective* of the individual action, a characteristic of his will-act, not the substance of his concrete practical life. This was true of all the individuals who acted morally. They remained individuals separate, unique, isolated *quâ* individuals. Their *connexion* was through their *common* obedience to what was universal : they all aimed at universality, and in this universality therefore they all *shared*. It *regulated* them and bound them together as individuals ; but it, as such, did not constitute their very substance. Their moral reality was not determined by the unity of the universal ; the unity was *derived* from them and their common action in following it. It was thus external to them. They remained unique, impenetrable units of moral activity through, and, in a sense, in spite of, their following the same moral law. Hence in analysing Society in the *Meta-physic of Morals*, Kant takes the view that Society

is the result of a "contract"—a logical result of his conception of the place of universality in the moral life. For "contract" is an external relation between individual wills agreeing to certain common conditions. Thus, like the universality of his law of duty, Kant's social whole, his whole of rational wills, is a purely formal unity. The formality of the social whole is, indeed, another expression of the formality of the principle of the law of moral action. They *can* be only connected externally if the universal is an adjective or attribute of each individual's will-act. The order, the unity of society, is *above* the concrete wills, in a "supersensible world": actually in experience, they are unique, sensibly separate units. Their unity is due to each uniquely, and *per se aiming at* universality in action. The *fact* that they all do so is the only identity holding them together. And such a unity is not merely formal, it is as good as contingent. For if universality is an attribute of the individual's will-act, an attribute which, *because* it *ought* to be, either may or may *not*, as a matter of fact, exist, the universality is separable, not essential. It may or may not be possessed, and the connexion with others, which depends solely on that kind of universality, becomes a mere accident of individual endeavour. Indeed, just as, on Kant's admission, an act of pure duty can never be found really in experience at all, so the contingency of the existence of a real society of personal wills is a logical issue from the contingency of the realisation of all true duty.

The position of absolute idealism is sharply con-
 trusted with all this. The universality of moral
 action is not an attribute of it, but its very essence,

The
 unity is
 concrete.

because Morality does not have any being at all until the self has achieved conscious universality and actively lives in and for it. The universality is not made by the act being moral. The universality is *there*, and *thence* comes the possibility of Morality. The universality is not a quality which may or may not be; for the self which is realised in the moral life is inherently universal to start with, and is logically prior to the realisation of that life. Morality comes from the existence of self-conscious individuality, expresses the content and movement of a universal self-consciousness. And the universal self-consciousness, while it does not exist apart from self-conscious individuality, is *per se* as real, as actual to start with, and all along, as the latter. There is logically no *separation* possible between the two. A *distinction* there is, as we shall see, but that is not separation. Hence Society is not *derived* from individual activity as directed by universal ends. It is merely maintained by that process, and is as much a "fact" as the individual's activity. Individuals as distinct entities are in Morality differentiations of the universal self-consciousness which they *all* imply, and which they *live* by maintaining. Hence Society is not contingent on individual action. It is essential to the real concrete existence of its individuals; it draws out their true nature. The universal, the Social Unity, is, like the self, not regulative but constitutive. Society is therefore *not* the result of a "contract" between separate wills; this universal self-consciousness just *is* a Society, a whole of wills. Moreover, it is logically impossible for it to be the outcome of a contract. For *any* contract, to have the ethical significance

of a contract at all (something which is binding on wills), *can only arise if Society exists*, or if it is assumed to exist in order to determine the place of the ethical fact of contract in the moral life of individuals. To explain Society by the notion of a "contract" is therefore a *ὑστερον πρότερον*. Again, the content of the moral life, properly understood, is not, and cannot be, limited simply to the individual realisation of the idea of duty. If it were, then the moral life would be, as Kant admits, a perpetual failure, and Society could never really exist at all. But Society, a universal self-consciousness, does exist, as an order of self-conscious individual wills. Hence its substance must comprehend a wider range of content, and a more concrete system of detailed acts of will, than can be gathered under the notion of duty. It must, as we shall see, comprehend, *e.g.*, rights and institutions, *all*, in fact, that is concerned with the concrete relation of self-conscious will to self-conscious will; while this again, in itself, implies man's relation to and connexion with nature and natural conditions of existence. In short, whereas Kant starts from uniquely separate individuals, and regards these individuals as setting up a moral order by coming into relation to each other, it is really the attainment in experience of universal self-consciousness that makes possible the co-existence and co-operation of self-contained individuals for the maintenance of a single social whole. They can only have this completeness found in morality because of their consciousness of *being* universal selves. The detailed development of all that this individuality contains, a development carried out in the light of, by constant reference to, and by implication of,

that universal self-consciousness, is *itself* the attainment of what the moral life *means*.¹

The
develop-
ment of
this form
of experi-
ence.

The road of development of this plane of experience is already indicated by what has been said. Self-consciousness appears as self-sufficient in and through individuality, and does so in virtue of the fact that universality here is not an attribute of separate centres of self-conscious life, but a substantial universal self, constituting the very basis for the completeness and sufficiency any particular individual feels. There are thus two opposed or contrasted factors involved in this mode of experience. These are the life of the universal self-consciousness,—substantial and actual universality; and the life of each moment of it,—the distinct individual centres sharing in and living by that universality. We cannot cut these two asunder. The difference between them is rather one of emphasis on an element of what is precisely the same concrete reality in *both* cases. The specific individuality has a twofold character by its being consciousness of self by self; *one* self is what we have called the substantial universal, the *other* is the determinate limited individuality each possesses, and which makes each distinct from another. The first is the same *for* all and *in* all; the second is restricted to a certain area or sphere of that totality. Similarly, the universal substance “duplicates” *its* self in virtue of its being a *self-conscious* whole, a whole in and through consciousness of

¹ This conception of the essentially social character of self-conscious individuality is also maintained by Fichte, whose development of Kant's principle preceded Hegel's. Fichte, however, by separating the sphere of rights from that of duty, and by assigning to duty an “infinite” or endless task, fails to work out the essentially concrete nature of the conception, and seems, in fact, to reinstate isolated individuality at another and a higher plane of existence.

self; the one self being the universal self as such, which is the same for and in all, and the other the specifically distinct forms in which its concrete life appears — the determinate individualities. This mutual implication of each side in the other is what is meant in the general statement, "there is no society apart from the individuals," a statement which has to be supplemented by another, "there are no real individuals apart from society." But though the distinction is thus one of emphasis, it is not merely a logical but a living distinction,¹ because self-consciousness is an *active* unity, *for* which each element is an essential moment.

Now the process involved in the complete realisation of the unity of these two phases is just the whole activity of what we call Moral Life. On the one side we have the process of the universal substance moulding and determining the inter-relations of its parts by uniform conditions of regular order. It must act thus, and *can* only act thus, *because* its substance is purely universal. The result of its activity must, therefore, appear simply as "uniformity," "order," "law." It appears in the form of what we call Social Law and Custom, the Ethos of a People. With this the individual in a People is at home; in this he participates. A People is a self-conscious unity maintaining its equilibrium by certain uniform or habitual ways of acting. The totality of these constitute an "ethical," *i.e.* "habitual," "order" all its own. In virtue of being in accord with it the individual finds guaranteed the

Two aspects of the Moral Life: (1) Social Law and Custom.

¹ Out of the distinction in fact *arises* the process in which Social Life consists; for the process consists simply in adjusting the two factors so as to form a stable and permanent whole.

security, permanence, and uniformity of purpose in his own individual existence, and with these, therefore, the happiness and peace that come from efficient and successful realisation of those universal purposes *which make it possible for him to possess* the self-sufficient individuality above spoken of. It is not something attached externally to or *aimed* at by a People, as if it were outside the life of a People. It *is* the methodical working out of the life and destiny of a People as a self-conscious substantial reality of history. It is not "made" by individuals as their "effect." Once established at all, it is prior *in time* to each individual within its life. But it is *logically* prior in any case to his individuality; for it is the ground of his being what he is, the *goal* or end at which he aims. Without aiming at that universal end he would not *be* a self-conscious individual. For the very essence of the individual lies in identifying himself with that universal, which is a substantial concrete self, not something away beyond him, but actual and living, and therefore exerting its power and claims directly upon him. It makes him real, makes *him* an individuality complete in it and self-contained by it. This active, universal, spiritual substance carries on its own ends *through* individuals as its moments. They are its "speech," its "expression," as, for example, to take a prominent case, when it speaks its purpose through a judge or a monarch. It is the operative principle determining the position of individuals in the whole, the relation of their several positions to one another, the bounds set to each, and the claims exerted by one on another,—*i.e.* it is the source of Rights in every concrete form. It breaks

up its supreme concrete unity into specifically distinct spheres of universal activity, *forms* of universal self-consciousness. While remaining the all-pervading unity throughout, connecting the one with the other, in each of these forms it lives in a different way, realises a distinct mode of universal self-consciousness. The spheres which are usually distinguished in this whole are the life of the Family, Civic Life, and the life of the State. These are, in the actual realisation of the whole, confined within certain limits.¹ Each implies the others in a fully realised universal spiritual existence, and implies the others through the *one* substance within which they *all* fall. They have different degrees of universality; the self in each is more or less universal. Thus the Family is less wide than, and can in that sense be said to fall within, the Civic Life. The Civic Life stands in a similar relation with regard to the State. But this is not to be understood as if the Family were a part of the Civic Life *simply*: it is a part of the *one* Whole containing *all*. The Civic Life is not simply a unity *of* Families: it is a unity *through* Families. Similarly of the State. It does not strictly *contain* the others; for *itself* is contained in that complete unity of self-conscious life which comprehends all. But it has specific functions with reference to the others, which these others *per se* could not exercise, and which constitute

¹ It is important to observe that the State is an *aspect* or form of this self-conscious whole. We are apt to confound the "State" with a "Society." But Society, Social Unity, is the genus of which "state," "family," and "communal life" are merely species. The "State" is an ethical *function* of a social whole, with a definite activity or "will" of its own, having limitations as regards other "wills" in the social whole. Hence, *e.g.*, the question of the "limits" of "state interference." But all "wills" fall inside the social unity and are exerted in the interests of that social whole.

it a *special* mode in which the self-conscious Whole appears.

This universal, self-conscious life is the source of Law, or realised Order, and fully expresses and contains all the ends which are implied in the realisation of self-conscious individuality in human history, the ends of self-conscious life in relation to self-conscious life, the relations of Persons to Persons. Its purpose in experience is actually to reveal and maintain all these ends, and *so* to make possible self-complete individuality.

(2) The attainment of specific individuality.

On the other hand, again, there is the process by which the activity of every specific focus of self-consciousness draws into his own life the universal life of the Whole just spoken of. He *focuses* the Whole because he is self-conscious, and his self is essentially and implicitly universal, *i.e.* aims at *being* a whole. From this point of view, all that the Whole actually contains is potentially in each. Each does not merely *reflect* the Whole. It consciously aims at *being* the Whole, getting all its universal content within its own active individual life, making the substance of the general mind and will *its* own mind and will. To make all its *own* purposes universal as that is universal, and to feel its self in its individual existence not merely *one* with the Whole, but a *whole* all by itself—that constitutes for it a world of self-consciousness all its own achievement. It is, in a way, to make itself independent of the Whole, by taking into itself all that makes the Whole self-complete. It is a process of destroying distinction by *becoming* self-sufficient, and, on becoming self-sufficient, to be, in a sense, independent of the tutelage, care, and

guidance of the Whole. To do so is to set up an authority, a guide, or controlling agency *within* its own individual life, and make itself complete as it stands, to *judge* for itself, *act* for itself, and find its actions ratified and approved by the "sanction" within its own bosom. In doing so, it *may* come even to regard the Whole as external to itself. It *can* do so, *because* it is self-conscious, and can withdraw into the recesses of its own individuality and put everything else "outside" it. If it makes this distinction an opposition, conflict or struggle may arise between the separate focus of active self-consciousness and the concrete totality of spiritual self-consciousness above spoken of. Such conflict is an imperfect and necessarily inadequate form to which its process may lead it, and often does historically lead it. Its true aim and complete realisation, however, are found where its own universal content is absolutely in *harmony* with that Whole, and yet is entirely *explicit to itself*, constituting a self-contained world. With the attainment of this as a conscious attitude it has *ipso facto* exhausted (*to itself* as a *conscious* fact), the substance of this universal life, and has lost its individual *self* in the Whole. It has risen to absolute Self-consciousness. And through this it passes beyond the sphere of the Moral Order as such and enters another mode of self-conscious experience—the mode, as we shall see, called Religion.

The process, by which each aims at attaining this separate world of self-guiding, self-controlling universality, constitutes quite a distinct plane of the moral order from that spoken of as Custom and

Morality
proper :
Con-
science.

Law or the Ethos of a People. It is the world of individual self-legislation, the world of Conscience, the sphere of "Individual Morality." As the former is the ethical sphere of universal Custom, Right, Virtue, this is the sphere of Individual Principle, Sentiment, Duty. The former is the operation of general order in and through all—explicit Law and Convention; the latter that of specific Choice and Responsibility. In both cases it is a universal, self-conscious life: in the one case realised by all, for all, and through all *in the same sense*; in the other realised by each *for each* and *through each* in the *specific* way characteristic of the different self-conscious individualities into which the Whole falls. We are merely reading the same type of experience (unity of self-conscious individuality) in opposite ways, the one from the point of view of the Whole as such, the other from the point of view of the specific focus as such. To use Plato's metaphor, it is like writing the same truth in larger and smaller letters. The Whole concentrates the life of every one into moments of its own activity; the specific focus concentrates the life of the Whole into processes and moments of its own special self-conscious individuality. Hence, *e.g.*, as we have Law in the former case, so we have it in the latter; and in both cases Law expresses a relation of self-conscious life *to* self-conscious life. In the former it is expressed openly, written down, and carried out publicly (after the manner of a *universal* self-consciousness *per se*); in the latter it is not expressed in words, it is known by the individual "immediately," it controls the impulses, etc., of the individual will, and is not recognised by any one but himself.

Just as, further, in public or social Law, the authority and compulsion of the unity of the Whole are exerted on each through force, physical it may be, or in the quasi-automatic routine of "conventional understanding"; so in the individual soul we find authority exerted on the course of the individual will through the power of Conscience—the universal which shapes the unity in the individual life.

Different terms have been employed to express these distinct phases of the realisation of self-conscious individuality; but they are merely distinctions of aspect of what is fundamentally *one* type of experience. We may call the first *objective* self-conscious unity, the latter *subjective* self-conscious unity. But it must be understood that these are not separate but only *distinct* aspects of what is all the while one and the same. It is right to call the former objective, if we mean that objective is one and the same for all in the same sense, much as, *e.g.*, when we call $2 + 2 = 4$ an "objective truth." It is not true if we mean that there is no objective element in the latter: for without such an objective aspect there would be no experience there at all. Similarly with the necessary changes regarding the term "subjective."

Different
express-
sions for
these
aspects:
objective
and
subjective.

We may speak, again, of the first as the sphere of *universal* "freedom," "free Society," the latter as the sphere of *individual* "freedom." But the very idea of freedom implies that it is *both* universal and individual. A freedom which is not the freedom of, and in individuals is a form of, bare necessity. Hence the fallacy of "state socialism" in the interests of the moral life. And a freedom which is not freedom in and through universality, *i.e.* through a whole of

"Free-
dom."

other self-consciousnesses, is not freedom but caprice, and cannot produce order.¹

The final achievement of Moral Experience is Freedom through Conscience.

When each individual self-consciousness absorbs the life of universal self-consciousness, and makes its universal content the very substance of its own life, we have the final stage in the development of this level of experience. Spirit is only spirit in individualised form, for the aim of spirit is a unity conscious of its unity in all the differences that enter its life and determining such differences by its self as a unity. Hence the very idea of complete self-consciousness, which dawns after the development of Reason, only becomes realised when every individual form in which it appears manifests its whole meaning and purpose, is constituted by universality as its very self, and is a self-determined whole. Spirit is the sphere of Freedom, because in it we have conscious determination of a self by an order, a universality, which is its own nature. Spirit is not free *by means of* individuals, but in and through individuals. Hence the complete achievement of spiritual existence is found when Freedom is expressed fully in every self-conscious life, in every spiritual individuality. Thus the goal of self-conscious individuality is found where specific individuality is *at once* specific, and contains within it the universal life of self-consciousness. It cannot be free and complete if it contains less, for only *in* complete universality of self-consciousness lies freedom and self-sufficiency, and only in that universality is its true significance found. On the other hand, it is in

¹ We find the distinction between these aspects also expressed in the contrast between the "general will" and the "individual will," or, in plural form, "the will of all."

specific individualities that the whole is actualised. Only, therefore, when each absorbs the meaning of the whole, is the whole truly itself and truly expressed, is it *free* self-consciousness completely developed. Hence it is only in the stage at which individuality appears in the form of Conscience working through duties, etc., that self-conscious individuality gets its full realisation.

But this must not be misunderstood. It is not meant that the goal of self-consciousness lies in the maintenance of the "rights," the "position," of "private conscience." The very term "private conscience" is an unconscious irony. Conscience has no significance, no worth even in its own eyes, unless it is either implicitly or explicitly universal, *i.e.* contains something which others hold good and respect. It is not a principle of distinguishing one individual spiritual life from that of others. It is a principle of deeper *union* between individual spirits. If its content is universal, it must be because others either can or ought to share in it. Even Conscience cannot be allowed to act inconsistently. But consistency of action implies universality of law or principle, *i.e.* one holding not for each moment, but for all moments, and *therefore* for all minds. Moreover, the very substance of Conscience is obtained through relation to, and through the development in ourselves of, a *social* consciousness, a universal self, a general will towards a universal end. If we call it a "higher law," it is a "higher law" of union with the general mind, not a higher law to cut us off from it. Otherwise it would not be higher but lower, would isolate us from the whole, turn us into units of nature, not Spiritual Individualities.

Qualifications :
"Private"
of Conscience.

What it contains, and what it "dictates" are modes of action or principles of action in reference to a universal self. But a universal self, is a self including "others." It is not so much that Conscience develops and may vary with individuals. That is true, and is often used as an argument against accepting Conscience as final. But Conscience does not exist except as the Conscience of an individual in a social whole. It arises out of it, not through detachment from it, but through taking into the self the very universality which constitutes the whole, and thus making a moral order within *each* Spirit. It would not arise but for consciousness of self, and consciousness of self is meaningless apart from consciousness of "others," of a universal self.¹ Self-consciousness is a principle of distinction as well as of unity. Conscience lays stress on the fact of self-distinction: nothing more. But distinction, difference, has no meaning except inside a unity. This is borne out by the fact that agreement between "consciences" is not at all held to affect the "unique" reality of "*each*" conscience, but rather tends to confirm it in its security. In other words, consciences may *agree*, be *universal*, and yet be "individual consciences." Hence it is not an argument against the "authority of conscience" that consciences differ, any more than it is an argument against the distinctive and separate validity of each because they may agree.

¹ This is seen in the very term *con-science*. It is "knowing," "along with" — "self" and "others" being implied. The term lays primary emphasis on the former; hence the "inwardness" of "conscience." This "inwardness" of "knowledge" gives the "certainty" so characteristic of "conscience." The German word *Gewissen* lays stress on this aspect of "certainty" alone. The English word brings out rather the element of "knowing," and so emphasises the essential universality of "conscience."

They are not valid *simply* because they agree; they agree because each is valid. And they are not invalid *because* each is distinct; they only differ *because* they are somewhere invalid. Distinction lies in the nature of the case, since each is a specific focus of the total life of the universal self-consciousness.

Again, it must not be supposed that self-conscious individuality is something abstract. Experience is realised as a specific unity in this form. This experience is not abstract. Just as Reason was a manifestation of experience from a certain point of view, so is self-conscious individuality. It takes within its life *all* that has previously been considered to fall within specifically distinct modes of human experience. Hence it does not exclude but includes what is called "nature." It looks at "nature," however, not as an immediate *object* to be "observed" and "categorised" by Reason, but as a *constituent element in the life of individuality*. Self-conscious individuality and nature. It must do so, because here consciousness of self does not merely make its own world, but *is* its *whole* world. There is nothing opposed to it in the sense of being outside it, beyond it. Everything falls within it in some form or other, and is built into its unity. "Nature," "things," etc., are present here, but present as *moments* in the complete unity of active self-consciousness. This is seen in the fact that, on the one hand, the material of "nature" as a whole, the physical and organic world, is incorporated into the active life of a People, and appears as the "land" it "inhabits," and "possesses" (the physical basis of "Fatherland"), and, on the other, the climate, physical features, and conditions, etc., determine

the character which the order of its life assumes. It forms the arena in and by which a People manifests its specific level of culture and civilisation, attains its specific concrete individuality as one Nation, a Nationality amongst others. Nature here is not "moralised," as if it were something which was *made* moral, and yet was something apart from the moral life all the same.¹ Its *significance* here, its very *existence*, lies in the place it occupies as a moment or phase of universal self-conscious individuality. It is built into the substance of its life, and is determined by and exists *for* the ends of self-consciousness. *It is here treated teleologically, because it literally falls inside a teleological whole.* Self-consciousness is not consciousness of self, individuality is not self-complete, *except* in so far as "nature" and "natural conditions" are permeated by its own ends, *i.e.* by the self universal and all-containing. What "nature" is or may be apart from it, *i.e.* at a different level of experience from individuality, *is not* "nature" as incorporated in it. It has become something else. Just as Perception is not mere Perception in the life of Reason, or Reason mere Reason in self-conscious individuality; so "things" (the content of Perception) are not for and to that individuality what they are for and in Perception. They are "things" for and in the life of individuality; they are constituent conditions of its purposive activity. Hence it is that here, in individuality,

¹ This is the position adopted by Fichte, who thus seems to reintroduce at the end of his theory of experience the very dualism he began by denying. The fact that the "other," "nature," falls *inside* self-consciousness, which Fichte seeks to demonstrate, does not abolish the difficulties of dualism. Rather if this "other" remains for ever an "other," as Fichte maintains in his view of Duty, dualism is the more firmly established. It becomes a contradiction *within* self-consciousness itself.

what is a "thing" for mere Perception becomes an object of "worth," and only that; it becomes, *e.g.*, a piece of "property" built into and expanding the life of a self. That *is* the object's *meaning* at this level of experience. It is no longer a mere "thing" at all; it is the focus of a purpose of the self, and its whole significance is determined accordingly. And this holds true of all that "nature" is and contains. Hence the reciprocal relation between climate or land and self-conscious life, a relation which appears in the constitution of a kind or level of Civilisation. Earth ceases to be mere "earth"; it becomes Country, a Home, a centre of local enthusiasm and national patriotism. Self-consciousness is not on one side and "nature" on the other in the life of self-contained individuality. They are an indissoluble unity, the one *is through* the other. An area of the "physical" world on which a Society lives its life, becomes merely the bodily (spatial) expression of the animating spirit, the universal self-consciousness which is there "situated." It bears precisely the same relation to universal self-consciousness as a whole, as a unity, which the individual *body* bears to the individual *soul*. Just as we say the body of a self-conscious individual life, of a man as such, is not a mere physical body, but has a value for itself which a natural body has not, and has no meaning apart from that self-conscious unity "animating" it, moulding and directing it; so the area of the "physical world," within which a universal self-conscious, a social whole, is actively operative in realising its purposes, is *meaningless* and inseparable from the self-consciousness shaping its constitution for its

purposes. If it is looked at *apart from* that self-consciousness it becomes something quite different altogether, and must, therefore, appeal to a different and a lower level of experience, *e.g.* Perception or Science ; just as if a human body is "deprived" of its soul it becomes something else—namely, inorganic matter—and so falls within the sphere of another form of experience. It is then interpreted by a mechanical or chemical principle, not teleologically.¹

Nature is here the expression for spirit.

Thus, then, self-conscious individuality is not a reality apart from "nature"; it *contains* "nature" as a moment or element in its active unity. It is for this reason that a Society is such a concrete unity as we know it to be. We find that the reality of the State is made actual in and through processes of "nature." It does not, and man in the moral life feels he does not, treat "nature" as something alien to himself. Nature is regarded as a part of his self, to do with it as he pleases. Hence, at this stage "nature" is looked at and "used" by spirit as spirit's counterpart and embodiment; and all that would otherwise be processes of "*mere* nature" become processes of spiritual life.

From this simple principle follows, on the one hand, all the varied life and content of a Society,

¹ This is how it comes about that if we once treat "nature" as *apart from* "man," *i.e.* apart from man *quod* spirit, we *must* grasp its unity and meaning by a non-teleological principle. And this is precisely what constitutes the "mechanical" view of nature. Hence it is not because "nature" is a mechanism that it is alien to spirit. It is *first* alienated from spirit and *then* regarded as a mechanism. Hence the absence of the mechanical view of nature in the case of, *e.g.*, Eastern Peoples. This is corroborated in an interesting manner by the history of the scientific or naturalistic (mechanical) view of "the world" in Western thought. It was the breach between nature and man's spirit, made primarily in the interests of Religion, that created the dualism on which all natural science rests. Nature had first to be put outside spirit before it could be treated *per se*; and when it was considered *per se* it could only be treated as a "brute fact," and construed "mechanically."

of universal self-consciousness. Events cease to be merely "events"; they become moral realities. Organic functions become moral meanings. Inorganic elements and attributes become the content of moral laws. The routine of events in time and space becomes the routine of a moral order, reliable, predictable, irrevocable from generation to generation—it becomes the embodiment of Custom and Tradition. The "merely natural" organic relation of sex becomes the spiritual unity of the Family as an ethical institution. The "natural law" becomes a humanly spiritual, or spiritually human law; the relation is universal, permanent, as the self-consciousness whose end it subserves. Land and water become "property" "belonging" to selves, and transferred from one to the other, and from generation to generation; they become embodiments of spiritual activity. Events and processes of nature become, *e.g.*, marketable commodities on which the whole economic order of a Community rests. Even mere "contingencies" of the world, disaster and accident, are turned into the content of spiritual purpose, determine the course of its life, and the relations of individuals to one another. This we see, *e.g.*, in a very elementary form, in what we call "Insurance." The stability of "nature," its "uniformity," is the physical counterpart and outer expression of such spiritual facts as, *e.g.*, rights of property, which always have universality of significance. The mere events of organic activity become "acts," with an objective significance for all; they express ends; their character has a "worth." And whether the "acts" proceed from man's organism or from the organism of any living being, subsidiary to

The content of the moral order.

man's purpose, does not affect the general character they bear with reference to the self-conscious life of the whole within which they fall.¹ In short, it is just by the manipulation of all the sources and resources of natural existence that a Society, the universal self-conscious individuality, embodies its universal life, realises its being.

And of the
individual
Moral life.

The same holds, on the other hand, of the specific individuality of each self-conscious unit. His self-conscious life contains, as part of the material of its substance, the physical and psychical elements which make up what we call his "natural" existence. These are summed up under the general idea of bodily activity, the functions of a "natural" or "animal" "soul." The individual, looked at objectively like the rest of "nature," is a part of it, responding to environment in all its forms, or, what is the same thing, gets its place "determined" by the pressure exerted on it by all the manifold variety of nature. The individual existence of an object as part of nature varies with the type of its individuality. In a sense, one may say, everything endeavours to respond to the whole, because each is a part of it; and the degree of its response determines its place and worth in the whole. The lowest individual is that whose responses are lowest—mere position and simple motion: the highest, that which can touch the resources of "nature" in all its forms,—the completest animate existence. Self-conscious individuality being the completest, gathers all that makes an individual "natural" into itself; and being self-contained is not opposed to or contrasted with "nature,"

¹ *E.g.* a man is held "responsible" for the "acts" of "his" dog, and for the process of growth in "his" plants when, say, they interfere with other people.

but *implies* it as a moment of its life. We may say, if we choose, that self-consciousness has a "physical embodiment," if by that we mean, not that self-consciousness is something that "by chance" is embodied and is indifferent to its form of embodiment, but simply that it manifests itself physically. We may call this its natural "expression," as we often do; but the expression is not to be divorced from the self-consciousness expressed. The self-conscious individual is actual by *containing* its natural life. Its "nature" is not something apart from self-consciousness, but the content of it. Nor can we say that he has, *quâ* self-conscious individual, a "natural" aspect and a self-conscious or "spiritual" aspect. To say so is to confuse quite distinct points of view. For in such a case we are looking at the individual as an object before us, from the point of view of *scientific* experience. But that is only *one* form of experience. *Here* we are dealing with *another* form which has to be taken as it stands, taken as individuality is *to* itself and *for* itself, *not as it is for some other form of experience*. When we treat the individual self-consciousness like any other object, then obviously we may distinguish "aspects" if we choose. They are aspects *for us who are looking at it*: just as the qualities of a "thing" are qualities for the opposing and contrasted perceiving mind. But here we *have* an *experience*, which, *quâ* experience, is on the same level as other forms of experience, and must be taken *as* experience, as subject-object relation, not simply as object *for some other mode of experience*. In short, to distinguish aspects in that fashion is to take up again the attitude of "observing" and "theorising" Reason,

which by hypothesis we have left behind. Therefore, we must take this experience at the level of the individual self-consciousness *as a whole and as such*. No other is relevant to state its content, for no other is adequate; and no other but itself is needed to state what it contains. To find out its meaning is simply to ask what it *does*, how its activity is revealed. Now for a self-conscious individuality "nature" does not *exist except* as a phase or an element in its life. Its self is all that nature, but built into the structure of its self-conscious unity. It does not therefore, when it "acts," carry *itself* out to nature, and do something *in* nature. For nature is part of itself *to begin with*. In "going out of its self" it cannot think and never thinks of "nature" at all; it simply *acts*, and what it *does* appears to *others* a "natural" event, but *to itself is its own life*. Self-conscious individuality does not *to itself* separate its nature and its "spirit." Its *reality* is simply and only a *unity*, a unity which is self-complete and self-contained, and thus *cannot*, for itself, make such a distinction either practically or otherwise. Hence it is that in "carrying out" our ends, obeying our "impulses," performing "acts" as self-conscious individuals, we do not first think of our ideas and *then* think of bridging the gulf between our self-conscious life and some world of nature "beyond" us. There is merely a continuous process *inside the world of self-conscious individuality*, from the initiation of the idea to its "realisation." An "act" is not some event which belongs to "nature," while its "end" belongs to us: the *whole* is "ours," is "us." Nature is not, *for* self-conscious individuality, divorced from spirit at

all. "Nature" is "spiritualised," "spirit" is "materialised"; and nature is here non-existent except in the life of the individuality itself. It is one continuous whole with which we are in touch from one end to the other, a whole which begins and ends with the self. Our "bodies" are "part of" nature to *some one else*: but to *our* self-conscious selves they are "us"; and nature, being continuous with *them*, is *one* with us too. So does self-consciousness embrace all reality.

Hence it is that the activities and processes and events of "nature" become the content and material of the life of the individual spirit, and out of this he forms his individual moral experience. Organic impulses are not merely natural strivings, they are spiritual aims; they are ends of a self-conscious life. The life of Sense becomes the sphere of self-conscious purpose, to be directed by ends and ideals, to be constructed into a self-conscious, orderly whole. Its tendencies become suggestions of a larger purpose. After that purpose has dominated it, it can carry the purpose on in a manner suited to itself,—as we find in that automatic response to environment, which makes up so much of the mature moral life. The varied life of ideas which crowd self-consciousness and of themselves start the possible direction of effort in the form of "desires," "wishes," etc., are made definite and brought to unity and coherence by reference to some end or law which determines the direction or order of this activity. Events in self-conscious history are not natural events, but are "deeds," "acts," which are meaningless apart from the life they express, and must be judged accordingly. Thus out of this manipulation of the life of

Natural
processes
are moral
processes
in the in-
dividual.

sense and the life of ideas which constitute its individual existence,—a manipulation determined by the one end of explicit realisation of complete individuality in and with others,—self-consciousness builds up by individual effort that structure we call the individual moral life.

The
distinction
of the
individual
from
universal
self-con-
sciousness.

From what has been said, it is not difficult to see how, at first sight, universal self-consciousness should appear to each particular individual as something simply confronting him, opposing him, controlling him. We can see, too, how the first form in which the individual manifests his sense of individuality is in following impulses and tendencies just as they come: taking for granted *their* universality because they *are* his self. It is evident also that the way of reconciliation between these two, when the distinction between them dawns, can only be one of struggle between control and adjustment, so that the one universal life shall dominate all explicitly and not merely implicitly. The one seeks to realise universality absolutely in individual form, for apart from that it cannot exist, it becomes an "abstraction": the other seeks to realise individuality in universal form, for apart from that it is without significance. And both seek to do this because they are both moments in the one form of experience, self-conscious individuality.

The
develop-
ment of
self-con-
sciousness:
Freedom:
History.

Into the stages through which this process of struggle and reconciliation passes we cannot enter in detail. They mark both stages in the development of the individual life, and phases in the historical evolution of human Society. Just as the individual struggles towards complete self-dependence by checks and restraints imposed by

the demands of his inherent universality: so the universal life of society secures realisation of its ends in individual lives, not by suppression but by expression of individuality. The starting-point lies in the fact that only in and with self-consciousness is individuality attained. This means that here we have the kingdom of Free Spirit. It is "free," because, in the direction and laws of this world, the self is working with and finds its own self, and nothing more. Its determination by all is determination by *self*; its harmony with all is expansion of self; its order is the expression of the self as the unity controlling all. And it is Spirit because it is for itself universal self-consciousness. That is its sphere, its content, its substance. Only as Spirit can our self-consciousness relate itself to another self-consciousness. Indeed, the order of Society, the ethical and moral "laws," may be looked on as just the universals of the life of Spirit, which constitute the individuals in Society what they are, which make *it* a whole, a unity, and give *each* his worth and place in it. Just as the meaning of a natural fact lies, as we saw, in the law it embodies and realises, so the worth and significance of a self-conscious individual lies in his realisation of the order of the self-conscious whole of Society. The aim of universal self-consciousness being the attainment of absolute freedom of Spirit, and the aim of individual self-consciousness being the same, the results of each must coincide, since the lines they severally follow converge towards the same end. Hence it comes about that the development of individual self-consciousness, the sphere of what we have called the moral order of Conscience, or "subjective morality," is a development which

produces, *not* isolation of individuals in the whole, but fuller, deeper, and completer unity with the whole ; so that in a perfectly ordered Conscience the individual as a unity is absolutely at peace with himself, self-directing, self-legislating, self-forgiving. His Conscience is developed by *contrast* with the life of the whole, otherwise it would not be a Conscience ; but it is developed by *reference to* the life of the whole, the unity of the individual with Society. Without this reference, it would not be worth while to have a Conscience at all ; and without relation to the whole, Conscience would not be created or arise as a factor and function of self-consciousness. Thus, in the long run, the achievement of freedom in a State, so far from being inconsistent with the existence of "individual Conscience," is never completely or safely realised except by means of it. So it comes about that the process of Human History (which is just Society preserving a continuous identity of structure through changing form of expression) is simply the development of the idea of free self-consciousness, free individuality—whether it be in the case of the history of a particular Society, or in the case of the history of Nations which succeed each other in time. It must be so, because the very existence of Society is based on the fact of self-conscious individuality, and this implies unity of self with self, and unity of self through self ; and that is Freedom. Further than the achievement of or the struggle towards this end, human spiritual life, as an active relation of free spirits, cannot go. To transcend this attitude is to pass from the region of finite spirit to that of Absolute Spirit. And this is done in a further and final form of self-conscious experience—Religion.

CHAPTER X

THE SPHERE OF ABSOLUTE SPIRIT—RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE—CONTEMPLATION

FROM the result accomplished at the stage of the Moral Life as such, it follows that Spirit is actively expressed as, and is actually shown to be, the one Reality. For the Moral Life, Spirit is self-contained, self-conditioned, and self-constituted. There is nothing opposing it or contrasted with it ; its purposes definitely mould and constitute all that is. "Nature" is reduced to terms of Spirit, is fashioned after its ends, and falls within its living substance. This is seen and maintained in the case of universal self-consciousness, as the life of a Society, which could not *exist* as a fact in time and space except on that condition. It is seen by each individual self-consciousness, when this realises the self-complete moral order of the life of Conscience, and lives and acts within that entirely self-contained realm. There it comes home to the individual that the life of Spirit is and contains all actuality with no "beyond" whatsoever, no other which is not a moment of that life. Its objectivity is not some "external nature" ; there is no externality at all. There is merely the universal content of Spirit manifested in concrete existence as a spiritual reality.

The outcome of the Moral Life.

It is only there *for* Spirit, not independent of it in any sense.

The outcome of Moral Experience is thus to establish consciously the reality of Spirit, or that Spirit is the one Supreme Reality. It could only do so by carrying that out as a definite result; and the proof that it is so is just the existence of Moral Experience as a process and as a determinate result of active self-consciousness. "Nature" has given way before the purposes of Spirit and been built into its substance by the active process of self-consciousness. The only reality left in experience therefore is Spirit.

Moral
experience
contains
the pre-
ceding
stages as
moments.

But, again, Spirit was the culmination of the development of self-consciousness, and contained in itself all the various aspects of self-conscious life previously dealt with separately as distinct planes of experience. These moments were, in general, Consciousness of objects *simpliciter*, Consciousness of Self as such, and Reason. All these fall inside Spirit as constituents of Moral Experience, and can, indeed, be rightly regarded as mere abstractions from it. That is the justification for Kant's insistence on the "primacy of moral experience." Those moments are, as such, abstract aspects of the concrete life of Spirit; they lead the way to it, are *its* elements treated *separately*. Spirit therefore is "absolute" in the sense that, being the culmination, it contains as *moments* of itself what were formerly treated of as *stages* in the life-history of experience. These stages *were really* the content of Spirit *spread out* in detail; that they are so is only seen when Spirit comes out as their result and goal. Their own true *meaning*, therefore, is only

to be *seen* in the light of, and from the point of view of Spirit. This is what has been at work all along, constituting them what they were, giving each their "truth," compelling each to surrender before a higher form, and thus making of experience *one* development. As each stands, it has a completeness and value of its own. When the result is reached, they sink to the level of constituent elements or aspects of the whole, the reality of Spirit. Just as, for a self-conscious experience, Sense-experience (as Kant showed) has only significance in and through the activity of thought (Understanding), and is compelled, as we saw, to give up its claim to finality by the fact that its truth is only found in Understanding, so *all* the stages previously traced in the course of the evolution of experience get their real significance when Spirit appears as the final Reality. They become thereby aspects of *its* self-contained and self-complete "truth." Spirit, therefore, is strictly all Reality.

But now, while Morality brings out this result, it does so in a special form which is the characteristic limitation of its expression of Spirit. In Morality, Spirit is actualised by a process involving effort, and a conflict between the content of individual and universal. It is realised by the activity of self-conscious individuals. But that is not enough to express its nature completely. It must not merely be an *object for* conscious individuals. Being self-conscious, it must be, as a whole, and in its completeness, conscious of its *own* self. It must not be, even in part, something merely implicit, an end *to be* made explicit by a conscious life (an individual moral agent); it must have a being *in and for* itself.

Religion
a further
stage of the
conscious-
ness of
Spirit.

It must not, in short, be broken up into what it is implicitly and what it is actually for finite Spirit, which seeks, in the processes of the Moral Life, continuously to realise its nature. It must be actual as a whole to *itself*, just as it is complete in itself. This, however, is not accomplished in the sphere of Morality. It is a further and a final stage in the evolution of Spirit. This complete self-consciousness of Spirit, its being Spirit *in* and *to* itself as a unity, is only found in its proper form in the *Religious Life*. Spirit is here the supreme Reality of experience as it is in Morality too. But here it is the absolute Reality conscious of itself *as such* and operating *as such*; independent of individual consciousness and so of the active realisation by individuals; free and self-contained. The expression of Spirit in this form is the life and movement of Religion.

Religion
cannot be
treated as
a form of
Moral Ex-
perience.

Rightly enough, then, it may be said, that Religion has its basis in Morality, or that Religion grows out of Moral Experience; for without Moral Experience there would be no possible consciousness of the absolute Reality of Spirit which is the central principle of Religion. But as clearly Religion cannot be, as Kant and others have held, mere Morality in another guise. It is more than Morality, and goes *beyond* Moral Experience altogether. It has a special life and peculiar development of its own. No doubt Religion has a direct relation to Morality: both are the experience of Spirit. But the substance of Religion is not Morality, since it is a different attitude towards Spiritual Life. To regard "moral laws as Divine commands" cannot therefore (as Kant supposed) really constitute

Religion. For it makes no difference to the content or quality of a moral law to call it a "Divine Command"; it is binding whether or not it is looked at as "Divine." But if this does not constitute a difference at all, it cannot be used as a basis for another attitude of experience. Unless Religion had a further content of its own, it would be a mere point of view from which to look at Morality, with no special significance and value in the structure of experience as a whole. Similarly, the conception of Religion as "morality touched with emotion," or "morality become enthusiastic," does not give us Religion as an experience different in kind from Morality: it is at most merely a higher *degree of moral* experience.

But in point of fact Religious Experience reconstitutes all the preceding content of experience, just as Morality remoulded all that experience had previously revealed. Hence Religion proceeds by purposes and ways which are specific for this form of experience. "Nature," *e.g.*, looked at from the point of view of Religion, is not the same as "nature" looked at from the point of view of Morality. In the former it is looked at as, *e.g.*, the "garment" of Spirit, the spoken "word," etc.;¹ in the latter it is the material substance of moral effort, and gets its significance accordingly from the purposes of the Moral Life.

¹ "Nature" in Religion is of necessity not treated as it is by Science; for they are different levels of experience and have each a different kind of unity to realise and sustain. To Science Nature is, as has been recently said (Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*), a conceptual construction; to Religion it is, *e.g.*, the "Manifestation of Spirit." This religious idea indicates the relation of "nature" to "Spirit" in a philosophical construction; for Philosophy puts the religious idea in speculative terms. Hence the meaning of a "transition" from "Logic" to "Nature."

Religion
an experi-
ence *sui*
generis.

Religion is
necessary.

Religion, therefore, is neither the "handmaid" of Morality nor a mere superimposition on the life of experience. It is a necessary form of the life of self-conscious Spirit, necessary because no other phase of experience expresses the complete life of Spirit in the way Religion does. And all expressions are essential if the meaning of Spirit is to be exhausted.

Religion
adopts
consciously
the point
of view of
Absolute
Spirit.

In Religious life, then, Spirit is not merely all Reality, but *the point of view* of the Absolute Reality is deliberately and consciously *adopted* as an attitude of experience. In Religion man places himself at the point of view of God's Spirit and looks, thinks, feels, and acts in the "sight" or in the "light" of it. That is the peculiar note or attitude of the Religious Consciousness as such. It lives in and acts *from* that position. Hence the absolute self-sufficiency and self-containedness of the Religious Life. In it all strife is stilled, all effort overcome, all contradictions removed. Death itself (which threatens the existence of individual free Spirit in Morality) has no victory and brings no bitterness of regret to the finite spirit. In that sphere can be found and contained the ecstasy of joy, the depths of pain. That life contains all opposites of feeling and thought; and in its own completeness can reconcile and harmonise all in the peace of the Eternal.

Religion
is at the
summit of
man's ex-
perience.

It is only when this is achieved that the summit of man's experience is reached, for only at this point of view is complete unity of self-consciousness attained and all its discords removed. Hence the supreme significance and importance attached to it in the history of human experience. Ex-

perience culminates there, because man is self-conscious and *demand*s a supreme *realisation* of that unity in his life. He is always in *some* way conscious of this complete and Absolute Unity in his life; but in one form of experience he can and does get rid of the antithesis, into which the *process* of realising his self-conscious life drives him, by deliberately adopting the point of view and position of the Absolute Unity itself. His being Spirit does not necessarily do away with the need to *continue* the realisation of Spirit through a *process* of events—the process of the Moral Life above described. Hence he reserves the *complete* conscious union with Absolute Spirit for a unique and separate attitude of experience—his Religious Life. This co-exists with and alongside Morality but is always distinct from it. Thus we find that, in the history of human experience, the conscious adoption of this attitude has come to be associated with *special* times and seasons, days or weeks, special ceremonies and cults; while all the rest of self-conscious life is carried on in its own way and on its own lines. Hence the separation of the “life of the spirit” and the “life of the world”; the former being confined to life *in* and *with* the Absolute Spirit as such, and the rest with the process of self-conscious life in time.

Man, then, takes up the religious attitude as a necessary and essential phase of his life as spiritual. Because *he* is Spirit, he does so; because the unity of his spiritual life is essentially implied in spiritual existence, he *must* do so; because the one Reality is Absolute Spirit with a life *for* itself, he *can* do so. Seeing that it does supply man with this supreme

Religion
the highest
expression
of the
rational
life.

consciousness of unity, it is both universal and necessary. If to be conscious of complete unity in experience is a characteristic of a completely rational life, a characteristic of *reason* in fact, then, so far from Religion being beyond the pale of reason, so far from it being either irrational or non-rational, it is the *supreme expression of man's rationality*, and without Reason could not arise at all.

Religion
an experi-
ence.

But be it noted that Religion is an attitude of *experience*, and has, therefore, its roots in experience and in the needs of experience. We must not suppose that in Religion the finite mind suddenly *becomes* God. To be one with God consciously, to take up the position of Absolute Spirit, is possible without man being God. Man is the religious being, not God. In Religion man merely takes up the attitude in which Spirit, the supreme Reality, is *for* itself: he is at the *point of view* of that Spirit: that is all. He can do so because *he is* Spirit. Hence the source of what has been called the "anthropomorphism" of Religion. The form and substance of Religion depend on the level of spiritual life at which the human Spirit exists; and this creates the different types of Religion. But the essential principle is that in Religion God is present *consciously* "in the soul of man," as it is said. Man, as a religious being, thinks of his life from that point of view. Religion takes its stand on the absolute actuality of Spirit, and man's individual life must be looked on as completely real, completely actualised only in that Absolute Spirit. Religion is the attitude in which that Absolute Reality is expressed as it is consciously *to* itself. Man's reality lies essentially in that Absolute Spirit;

and that Spirit becomes actual in the spirit of man in the form of Religion.

This is not anthropomorphism in any sense except that in which all experience is anthropomorphic. Strictly speaking, so far from Religion being purely anthropomorphic in character, it is the sphere where man is really deanthropomorphised. His peculiar characteristics as man are even eliminated altogether. Thus his "natural life," his organism, and its cravings in every form (which are constitutive of him as a member of Society, and indeed, as we saw, make the existence of Society possible, make up its substance—property, family life, etc.) are looked on as disappearing altogether when his Spirit is at-oned with Absolute Spirit. As it is put, there are in the "Kingdom of Heaven," in the life of Spirit as Absolute Reality, no distinctions of race, sex, or property, no "natural facts" whatever. "God is all and in all." Spirit is the sole and only reality. Yet it is just these distinctions of race, sex, and property which make up the substance of the Social Order, of all its complex spiritual activity. To regard Religion, therefore, as purely anthropomorphic when its process involves the *elimination* of all that specifically makes up humanity, is a mere abuse of language. Moreover, it is truer to regard all the *preceding* stages in the development of self-conscious experience as anthropomorphic than to regard Religion in that way. For there experience is presented with definite qualifications due to *limited* aspects of man's life—Sense, Perception, Science, etc. And, indeed, we often do treat them as anthropomorphic, as peculiar to *man*. For example, this is the case when we

The "anthropomorphism" of Religion.

show the limitations of our knowledge furnished by Sense, by pointing to the possibility of there being *other senses*, which we do not possess, and the possession of which would give us a different content in Sense-experience; or again, when we point to the limitations of *our* "understandings" in the pursuit of "truth."

All
experience
in a sense
anthropo-
morphic.

But, indeed, when we press the matter, we find that we have *either* to regard *all* experience as anthropomorphic *or* else to reject the position that Religion is peculiarly or entirely anthropomorphic. If we hold the former, then it amounts to saying that self-conscious life being man's is *only* man's, and is *therefore* all anthropomorphic. But that is a truism. It is surely not a limitation of either the worth or validity of self-conscious experience to say it is—self-conscious experience! The suggestion that it is anthropomorphic *does*, however, carry with it an accusation, a qualification, a limitation of its worth. It is admitted that man's experience is self-contained and self-constituted. For what else can it be? Who or what is to constitute it except man's own self? But if so, then, there is nothing *beyond it* to determine what that qualification is to be. For if there *were* anything beyond it, that would *necessarily* fall under that experience, be a qualifying object *for it*.¹ But if it is useless to call all experience an-

¹ It is sometimes insinuated because man's knowledge is not *all* knowledge, *e.g.* is not the kind of "knowledge" animals possess, that it does not give all truth, and therefore its truth is limited to its own level of conscious life, and cannot by the nature of the case give "absolute truth." Assuming it to be tenable that there are other kinds of knowledge to which he is unable to attain, he either knows what that knowledge *is* or he does *not*. In the first case the limitation is *self-imposed* and is not a qualification; in the second case it falls *outside* his experience and *cannot* qualify it. Is man's *life* less real in *any* sense because it is not *all* life at once?

thropomorphic, it is absurd to call Religion peculiarly so. For this is, in the first place, a phase of that *same* experience, and secondly, it is neither more nor less than the final expression of the principle present all through experience—that the essential reality of all experience is Spirit.

In Religion Spirit is present consciously to itself as Spirit; and the activity of the religious life is just the explicit realisation in self-consciousness of *all* that that principle means. It contains *all*, and is expressed as the all-containing Reality. It starts from that position *consciously*. Spirit for it is ultimate and alone actual. The aim of Religion is to be what Spirit as *absolute* means. That can only be done if Spirit is treated, not as something to be merely realised by a process, made objective through the *carrying out* of the ends and purposes of the self—which is the peculiar position of Moral Experience as the expression of Spirit—but as it is completely real *for itself*. It is no longer something *to be* achieved, but something which *is* achieved, is actual. It is no longer Spirit *to be* attained and maintained, but Spirit which is altogether objective and subjective at once, and therefore already *complete*. It no longer exists *in itself* as the truly real: but exists *in* and *for* itself as actual. In Religion this self-consciousness of Spirit therefore is the primal fact.

Hence it follows that in Religion there is no process such as we have in Morality, no active pursuit of ends and purposes. If that were so, God would be looked on not as self-complete but as the self-completing. God would then be *coming to be*, and Religion would not carry the movement of

The aim of
Religious
Experi-
ence.

Religion
does not
involve a
process of
Spirit.

Spirit further than Morality. God, however, in Religion is taken as the absolutely actual, and so is beyond and above all finite spiritual purpose, contains all process *in* Himself, because in Religion all activity *is only for* Himself. God does not *come to be* in the soul of man. He *is* there, and man is actual in and by that. To ignore this is to commit the error involved in the idea of a "religion of humanity." Humanity is *essentially* a process in time, in history; it is always "coming to be," but never is, as such, self-complete. God in Religion is the self-complete, the absolute One. Hence in God all temporal process disappears into and becomes a moment of His One Life. By no possibility *could* a "religion of humanity" permit what Religion, as such, first and alone seeks to do. By revealing the life of Absolute Spirit as it is for itself, Religion seeks to still the agonies of strife and struggle in the pursuit of ends of all kinds, moral or otherwise, and to realise a complete harmonious oneness of soul in what is Eternal and contains *all* finite ends as its own.

The
forms of
religion.

The only question, therefore, is as to the forms this Absolute Spirit adopts, and the forms religious life in consequence assumes. After what has been said, these are not difficult to state. We are not here, be it noted, either constructing a Religion or picturing how man "looks at," "thinks of" Absolute Spirit. In Religion, as was said above, we *are at the point of view of* Absolute Spirit, conscious of what it is *for itself*, conscious of how its *own* self-consciousness proceeds. Here, therefore, we state the *moments* or phases of *its* life, as the one self-conscious spiritual Reality. These moments, when so stated, form the levels at which the religious life

does and can exist in experience, and are found to exist in historical "religions." We are not discussing these "religions." We are dealing with Religion *as such*, Religion as an attitude of experience. Only by thus stating the moments of Absolute Spirit as such do we show the *necessity* in the content of Absolute Spirit, show that it is Spirit at all, with a life and content of its own. And only by doing so, again, do we show the inherent necessity in *every* type and form of religious life.¹

We must not suppose, further, that Religion is one thing and the life of Absolute Spirit another. The life of Absolute Spirit appears *just in* religious consciousness. It shows itself to consciousness *quâ* Spirit, because itself is Spirit and that is all Reality. The consciousness of it is Religion. The expression of its content is the active life of Absolute Spirit. These are merely two sides of the same process, the same phase of experience. Hence on this view, Religion does not so much create the idea of Absolute Spirit; rather Absolute Spirit creates the religious life. It appears to the conscious life of Spirit.

Experience, we saw, appears at different levels—*mere* Consciousness of Objects, Consciousness of Self, and Spirit. Absolute Spirit appears in each of these in its *own* specifically distinct moments. The different forms of Religion *are* simply its presence in these

Religion is
the life of
Absolute
Spirit in
man's ex-
perience.

The forms
of the
Religious
life.

¹ It is important to observe that the various phases of Absolute Spirit mentioned below are really present in all Religion. In certain cases one aspect is emphasised to the exclusion, it may be, of others, and so determines a *type* of Religion. But the difference is merely one of emphasis; the other aspects are really there in some form all the while. Thus we find in the "Religion of Nature" expressions characteristic of "Revealed Religion," just as much as in Christianity ("Revealed Religion") we can see the religious mind adopting the attitude of the "Religion of Nature."

different phases of experience. Its own Reality has distinct moments *because* it is Spirit. These moments are realised separately in the distinct planes of experience already spoken of. The conscious realisation of Absolute Spirit in them constitutes different types of religious attitude. Or, put shortly, Religion is the Consciousness of the Life of God in man's experience. God is Absolute Spirit and is conscious of Himself as Spirit, and is conscious of Himself in Spirit. The ways in which He is conscious of Himself constitute and form the types of Religion. These ways are found in those specifically distinct modes of experience.

The first phase in which Absolute Spirit appears—in immediate experience : God present in Sense—God as Nature.

To determine these phases of the life of Absolute Spirit we have merely to recall, first, that the Spirit here in question is just the Reality at work in experience all through, as previously traced ; and secondly, that that Spirit, because completely self-conscious, has three aspects, in each of which it is expressed, but expressed in different ways, because with different degrees of completeness. There is first the unity of its life in implicit form, mere unity without the distinction involved in self-consciousness being brought out. Spirit is *immediately* realised, or its life is there as an immediate fact. Self has not withdrawn into itself, and so created an opposition between itself and an "other." It is simply one in and with that other. It only becomes aware of *self* by opposition to that other. At this stage we are speaking of, that opposition is not established ; it is implicit, but not explicit. What we have is the simple continuity of a single life. It is Spirit at the level of immediate experience, the immediate experience whose general form we saw to

be Sense-life, and whose substance for Spirit is the equally immediate reality of "nature." It is not here *mere* Sense-experience, as we found this at the start of experience. It is *Spirit* consciously realised at the level of sense-life, or "natural" existence, "natural life." Consciousness of Spirit in this form is the special attitude of *Natural Religion*—Religion for which God is one with the life of "nature" simply as immediate sense-fact. In it God is "experienced," "felt," as manifested in the process of "nature," working "by" nature, affecting the religious mind by natural facts, agencies, and processes. Here the religious life is one with God's Spirit, as in all Religion. Spirit speaks to Spirit; only *as* Spirit is the religious attitude possible at all, as we have indicated. But, here, it is Spirit realised in the form of merely natural life as a whole, touching the religious mind almost in a quasi-external manner through natural portents, signs, wonders, and through the routine of sense-life.

This is an aspect of *all* religion, the highest as well as the lowest. But in certain types of Religion it is the *only* attitude assumed towards God, and it is there we find the full significance of this aspect. God *is there merely* the life of nature; God is the "spirit of nature." The religious mind communicates with God in terms of nature and nature only. The self of the religious mind is subordinated to natural processes, obeys their direction. God does not, in merely Natural Religion, "signify" or *symbolise* His presence *through* nature as a *means*. To take nature as a symbol is a conception which belongs to a higher form of Religion. God in purely Natural Religion is natural life: the "wood," the "grove," the "spring,"

This is a phase of all religious life, but is found abstractly as a separate type of Religion: "the religion of nature."

the "river," the "hill," are God's actual manifestation. To come in contact with them *is* to meet God. The worshipper's life is reduced or rather concentrated into that form too, and he bows before the majesty, the mere "might," of natural forces. He worships the sun, for God *is* the "Light." God is also the "Darkness," and meets the worshipper there in a different mood from what He is as the Light. Nature is a continuous whole, suppressing all individual existence in its vast process; the individual worshipper is therefore of no moment in comparison. For there is no comparison possible, since there is no distinction allowed. He, the individual worshipper, is of *no* particular importance, because he *is* merely a moment or appearance of the Whole, subject to its temporal and spatial conditions, and disappearing like the flower of the field, or the cloud in the sky, or the shadow on the hill. He feels God everywhere, yet God is nowhere in particular, and hence He is not *especially* concerned with the worshipper. "What is man that Thou should'st be mindful of *him*?" Nature is the vast process in time going on from everlasting to everlasting. Man is merely a vanishing part of it. Man's days are "like the grass": "he giveth up the ghost, and where is *he*?"

The
method
of the
Religion
of Nature.

Man puts himself in *absolute* unity with Spirit here by methods and processes drawn from nature. For the way to be in harmony with God, to be completely real *in* God (which is essentially the religious attitude) is to avail himself of the life of God, to bring God's life and reality into his own life. Hence the cult and ceremony of worship at this level of Religion are made up entirely of the

substance and facts of natural life. Conscious unity with the Supreme is secured by various modes of "conciliation," "sympathy," "affinity" between the worshipper and God. Sacrifice, which is one essential way of expressing the unity, takes a physical form — man sacrifices the objects of nature, flesh and blood, wood and stone, or even man himself as a natural object. He detects God's presence in the sounds that fill his ears, the sights that meet his eyes, and in outstanding natural events particularly. He decides his course of action by "propitiating his gods," by consulting "auguries," by listening to "voices." So, in as many forms as the complex multiplicity of nature presents, can man approach and unite himself with God who *is* natural life. Hence the *variety* which we find in the form of Natural Religions lies in the very *principle* of all Natural Religion. Nature is variety, diversity: hence a Religion, with nature as its content, has endlessly varied forms. Some peoples lay stress on certain elements and "things" of nature, others on other "things." The kind of Religion is largely determined by the character or sphere of nature in which man is living or with which he is in contact. Again, the uniform simplicity, the delight, and satisfaction so characteristic of the Religion of Nature are its inevitable attributes. The object of worship is always there at hand; an answer to an appeal can be had *at once*. The individual is never away from his God, is *everywhere* in touch with God. God can be had for the asking; for God is ever there to be petitioned. The harmony is not to be secured through some form of "unseen" reality. It is visibly, tangibly *there*, and perpetual contact with

it brings its perpetual reward of peace, acquiescence, harmonious submission.

The
second
phase—
God is
present in
self-
conscious
purpose :
God as the
Moral
Order.

Another moment in the life of Spirit is found when it consciously draws the distinction of self implied in its complete unity ; withdraws from the immediate unity of natural life ; sets up self as something to be asserted in *spite* of nature ; overcomes nature by opposing, or by reducing it to a mere means, an instrument for manifesting the life of self and its purposes. Spirit is conscious of self *as such*, as contrasted with all otherness, with *its other*. It places the foundations of its real life in the world of subjective activity, purposes, ends, feelings, etc. For it finds its self *through* nature, in spite of it, and apart from it. Nature is there a moment in the life of Spirit, for Absolute Spirit is *all*, and the consciousness of self as such *implies contrast*, and therefore the *existence* of what the self is contrasted with. But it is merely a moment, subordinate, an "appearance," a "means," an "instrument." God's reality does not lie *there* primarily, but in consciousness of *self*, self as such, as the unity of the purposes of life, a life carried on *through* means, but rising above all means, because indifferent to any in particular. Spirit is concentrated into its selfhood as such.

God as
self-
conscious
Individuality : the
Religion of
Moral Ex-
perience.

Here, again, we see what this must be, by looking back on the process of experience. Consciousness of self as object culminated in the form of self-conscious individuality out of which sprang the Ethical Order of the world. God in this form of Spirit appears, therefore, as absolute spiritual individuality as such. The corresponding religious life is the consciousness of God's reality in and

through the forms, processes, and conditions of Ethical and Moral Experience ; and unity with Him is established in terms of such experience. This, too, is an aspect of *all* Religion, but is emphasised in certain cases as the primary and only form of religion.

Nature has a place here, but quite different from that found in the case of the Religion of Nature. In the first place, the religious mind is not content merely to find God *anywhere* in nature as it is. Nature must be determined by and embody a *purpose* before God is reached and His life realised. Man therefore does not find his gods *in* rivers, trees, etc. ; he *fashions* his God with his own hands ; he creates Idols, Images, symbols of His life. As natural Gods were manifold *because* of the diversity of nature, so idols, images, etc., are manifold because man's purposes and interests are manifold, and the material of nature at his hand is endlessly varied. Hence the diversity of forms the Gods assume, and the variety of substance in which the Gods are enshrined in this second phase of Religion. Again, not every quarter prescribed by nature itself is accepted as a habitation for God. Man must needs *make* a habitation for God. He builds Temples, Altars, where God is primarily and peculiarly to be found to "dwell," and where alone He can be met, "appeased," "sacrificed to," "lived with." These, of course, are built of natural material, and this natural material gets religious significance accordingly. The temple and its material are "blessed" and "consecrated," *i.e.* devoted to the peculiar residence of God. Special reasons or purposes may induce man to build in certain places rather than others. Hence specific

Nature the material of a Purpose.

The method of this aspect of religion.

"Temples."

localities are assigned to temples by different peoples. All the religious life becomes peculiarly concentrated round these "dwellings of God"; for there God is to be met with rather than anywhere else. "God loves the gates of Zion more than all the dwellings of Jacob." This is the place of "His honour," "where He dwells."

"Times
and
Seasons."

Similarly, again, time is no longer a mere process, as in the Religion of Nature, carrying the individual along its stream. Time becomes purposely divided up into "seasons." "Holy days," "Festivals," etc., are determined purposely, so that the religious life may be gathered periodically round those religious dwellings. God, in short, is not in man's life in the same way everywhere and at every time: but *somewhere*, and at *some* times.

"Sacred
objects."

In the next place, certain objects of nature are peculiarly and purposely assigned to God, "dedicated" to Him and the worship of Him. In these He has a special interest, and His purposes are realised more clearly through them. Hence the value placed on certain animals to the exclusion of others for purposes of "sacrifice." Man's property and possessions, because embodying his purpose, have a special significance for God, and union with God is established by surrender of possessions, by bequest of property. Or, generally, man, by *doing* something *for* God, carrying out some *end* on His behalf, consecrates his self to God.

"Sacred
persons."

Similarly, self-conscious individuals themselves come to have a special significance, are "set aside" as special channels through which to interpret God's will, and to mediate between God and His people, to be His Spokesmen, His Priests. The choice

of such individuals is determined by the character of this phase of Religion. Those individuals, who have clearest insight into the meaning of the purposes and ends in life, are best able to guide a people into the best way to appease and gain harmony with God through the avenue of self-conscious purpose. For when this is done properly God is "well pleased," *i.e.* the acts of the worshipper have a value *for God Himself*; God is conscious of His own self in and through them.

In the same way God is bound up with a Nation or a People as an ethical whole. God becomes a *national* God, guiding by *His* purpose the progressive life of a Society. *He* guides its rulers with *His* wisdom, punishes its enemies with *His* hatred, directs the course of its life and history for His *own* glory and His realisation of Himself.

Further, because Spirit is self, and selfhood is the inner life of Spirit, God is realised and experienced in a very special manner in the purposive activity of the individual soul, in the life of Conscience, the "feelings," "hearts," and "minds" of self-conscious individuals. The very "thoughts of the heart" are read by and known to God. These thoughts are *inward to God Himself*. An alteration of mood, feeling, thought, is an alteration of the mind and thought of God towards and in the individual life. "With the merciful Thou wilt show Thyself merciful; with the upright, upright." It is not so much the act that counts, for the act is visible, is a means, a natural fact. It is the "heart" that is everything; "out of the heart proceed evil thoughts." God does not "delight in the sacrifice of bullocks or rams"; it is "a broken

"Peculiar Peoples."

God's law
is the law
of the
heart.

and a contrite heart" with which God is "well pleased," *i.e.* not something external but something internal, *purposive*, manifesting *self*. And hence the law of the heart is peculiarly God's concern. The law of the heart is "God's law"; and *God's law* is "perfect," because God's. It makes "wise" and "understanding" those who "simply" follow it and "turn not aside." The laws of the inner life of Conscience and the moral will *are* laws of God in the soul of man. "Duties," as Kant says (who takes this phase of Religion as the only Religion),¹ become "divine commands."

The cult of
this phase
of
Religion.

The cult and ceremony of this type of Religion are similarly constituted. Not sounds of nature itself are here voices of God; but sounds *ordered* by a certain conscious *purpose*, and conveying definite human thoughts, ends, ideals,—Hymns, Prayer, and Praise. In these Hymns God *Himself* "speaks": they are "sacred," "words from God." Not any object or place of creation reveals God to man, but specific objects and places. The ceremonious carrying out of rites and ritual in the Temple is His delight. God is approached in His Holy of Holies, in the *innermost* courts of the Temple—and then only but seldom—*because* He is *withdrawn* into Himself, and His self dwells in the "innermost." Not every one can consult his God by visiting the object of nature. God is only peculiarly real in purposive human intelligence, in self-conscious form, in His "divinely ordained" Priesthood. He speaks to man not *in* nature but *through* nature, by symbols. Nature is merely a means, a "veil" to conceal, or at best symbolise, God's Self. Because God is self and

¹ This is also Fichte's conception of Religion.

universal, He employs a symbol through which to convey this *universality* to man. This is found in the use of Language. Hence God speaks to man in the spoken, but, above all, in the *written* tongue of a people—because writing is more permanent than speech. God's life and purpose are therefore peculiarly found embodied in certain written documents, whether in codes, which express orderly ways of satisfying Him, or in statements of His purposes with man. Hence the value placed on documents in this type of religious life, on "Sibylline books," "sacred literature," "Scriptures." They convey the very Spirit of God: they are "inspired" by His "Spirit."

Finally, Absolute Spirit has yet another mode of self-realisation. It does not merely exist as an immediate reality, and does not merely withdraw into the inwardness of the life of self, keeping nature as a screen behind which it works, or a medium for its expression. It unites these two phases in the one form of Spirit in its concrete totality, becoming conscious of Spirit as a whole; Spirit *as such* is aware only of Spirit. Here nature is spiritualised and conscious in Spirit; Spirit is naturalised and conscious in nature of its *own* life. The unity of Spirit is in no aspect implicit but absolutely explicit. The difference (involved in consciousness of self) is no longer emphasised by the withdrawal of self from nature, and rising above it; the one side is transparent to the other. Spirit is absolutely at home with itself in all reality, and all reality is manifesting this one self-referring, self-conscious Life. We have here, in fact, so we may put it, at the level of pure spiritual activity,

The third phase : Spirit in its concrete fulness present to Spirit.

an immediacy *analogous* to what we had in the case of the Religion of Nature. In the latter it was the immediacy of natural life, and it operated accordingly; here it is the immediacy of purely spiritual life, and its activity is full conscious relation of Spirit as such explicitly to Spirit as such.

Spirit here
contains
both
Immediate
Existence
and Moral-
ity.

Spirit is in this case not divorced from nature, nor is nature subordinated to, degraded from the life of Spirit. Spirit is literally *manifest* in nature as such. Spirit, again, does not withdraw into the Moral Life, nor does it degrade moral activity to a means. In Morality it expresses its very self, its very life. At every point in the totality of experience, therefore, the one Spirit shows its own presence, its own Reality, because in all it is conscious *to itself of itself*. It does not show it *through* any aspect of reality as a "medium," but is real just in what it shows, and shows just what is real. What really is, is what appears and is "manifested" to Spirit.

Revealed
Religion.

The phase of Religion in which this experience is typically lived, felt, and realised is that of Religion as the "revealed" or "manifested" life of Spirit—it is Revealed Religion. It is an aspect of *all* religious experience, but, like the other aspects, is specially emphasised by certain types of mind and becomes a specific form of Religion. It is not Religion "revealed" "through" certain documents and literature. That kind of literature belongs to the second phase of Religion; for there such literature is an essential constituent of its cult and order. Such literature, in the way indicated, is "inspired." The religion of the Spirit as such, "Revealed" Religion, cannot possibly be "embodied" in any literature, still less *confined* to it. A literature is necessarily

a historical phenomenon contingent upon language and race and type of national mind. The life *in* the Spirit (Revealed Religion) is from everlasting to everlasting, is above historical limitations of any sort. It speaks the tongues of all nations, because it is above all race and national limitations. The one Spirit is everywhere to all that call upon It, commune with It, "in spirit and in truth." It is not national; it is international, absolutely "universal" Religion. It is *necessarily* so; for Spirit is here not confined by conditions of time and space or nationality which impose restrictions on its life and activity. It is for all time and all peoples. Spirit *contains* all, is *in* all in precisely the *same sense*; for it is the self-same Spirit which is present to *itself* everywhere and at all times. It may be aided and brought to light by literature as well as by natural processes: but it cannot be confined to them. Its religious devotees, therefore, are not of one nation, or tribe, or kingdom, but belong to all and are found everywhere. They speak many tongues with many thoughts, commune in as many ways as the Spirit manifests itself. They do so of their own right as members of, sharers in, this one Spirit. In doing so they realise completely all their spiritual significance. "Where the spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty," complete self-fulfilment: the law of the Spirit is that of absolute Freedom. Those who in all nations and lands show this freedom of and in the one Spirit form a society independent of national restrictions. They form a kingdom of the Spirit, a "kingdom of saints" (of those devoted to the Spirit), a Kingdom of Heaven.

It is
universally
the same—
absolute
self-
sufficiency.

The religious life here is realised in and through spiritual terms and conditions as such. Such terms have all the characteristic of Spirit. They express independence of particular time and place and nationality; they all have the same significance everywhere; and in them Spirit is conscious of itself always and immediately. That Spirit is always at one with Itself; there is no opposition in its life, no contradictions to be removed by any process. All the terms employed here express just that sense of absolute union and absolute self-sufficiency. The Life of the Spirit is an *orderly* unity; but it is at the same time a unity focussed into single pulses of life. It is also a *complete* unity, the Spirit is absolutely at the height of its life. Or, as it is put, life in the Spirit is at once "righteousness" (orderly unity), "peace" (simple sense of unity), "joy" (the unity of Spirit at its maximum of life). Such content must be the same for all who share the life of Spirit, for the Spirit is the same everywhere, and realises its life in the same way.

It is
"within."

The religious life is carried on simply within the unity of Spirit. It is not confined to, and therefore cannot be summed up in, any *act* however great or however complex, for this is necessarily bounded by time and natural conditions. Contrasted with such acts the life of the Spirit is "unseen" and "eternal." Or since the totality of external acts is still unable to express the uniqueness of the life of Spirit, the Kingdom of the Spirit is not to be expressed as "without" at all. The "Kingdom of Heaven is within," that is to say, "within" the life and unity of Spirit itself.

Again, since no objective expression, no act or

even thought, can exactly express the supreme unity of the life of Spirit in Spirit, the completeness of this relation of Spirit to Spirit is established, not by any particular or any number of particular acts or thoughts or feelings at all. It is a *universal* unity that is to be found; and it must be a single and complete relation that is always maintained, a relation above and independent of all time, yet one which is lived by Spirit in and through time. The hold on this "eternal life" has to be secured by an attitude of an eternal, a non-temporal kind, with an unique character—the attitude of *Faith*. The life of the Spirit is the life, not of "*action*" and "*thought*," but the Life of Faith.

The individual who lives this life of the Spirit has the absolute peace and unity of the Absolute Spirit. He is *one* in and with that Spirit. But he cannot do so "of himself" by his own deeds and acts and feelings; and cannot, therefore, show to himself and others that he belongs to and lives in that kingdom by any particular external expression of even the most universal character. His life in the Spirit, as an actuality, cannot be "justified" by anything he does, by any process of mediation. He is in *immediate* relation with God. He can only be "justified," get the sense of complete unity of the Life of Spirit, by that which connects him immediately with the Eternal. He is "justified" by "Faith."

Or to put it from another point of view. The life of Spirit, as an orderly totality of universal ends, which are *being continually* realised, is, as we found before, the Moral Order of experience. Complete realisation of that orderly whole is the complete

"The Life of Faith."

"Justified by Faith."

Justice or Righteousness by Faith.

achievement of the "ideal" of Morality, is the attainment of a completely "righteous" or "just" life. Such a life is only possible in and through relationship to Spirit (the Social Order). Now the religious relation of Spirit to Spirit does not annul, but only more fully attains, that relationship of Spirit to Spirit found in and forming a complete Social Order; for Spirit lives and moves by universal modes of activity. Absolute union with Absolute Spirit, therefore, implies absolute Righteousness, Holiness, Justness. That is the reality for the religious life in the Spirit; and it *is* therefore an actuality in and for the religious mind, since this union is the cardinal idea of Religion. It is absolutely essential for the free intercommunion of Spirit with Spirit, which makes up this religious attitude. There is no *opposition* between the "justness" and "righteousness" in Social Life and the "justness" or "righteousness" found in Absolute Spirit; rather the former is a ectype of the latter. Hence the "righteousness of God" should be revealed in and through "righteous" dealing with man. But by no possibility can the religious mind accomplish complete righteousness in dealing with his fellows, either in its own eyes (for acts and deeds are *endless*, and the task of the moral life is *never completed*) or in the eyes of his fellows, or in the eyes of God. He cannot, therefore, be absolutely "just," absolutely at one with Absolute Spirit, by any mediating process of action in time or any actual Social Order.¹ He cannot be "justified" by the "works" of the "law." Yet he is in immediate

¹ This distinguishes the point of view of "Revealed Religion" from that found in the second phase above spoken of.

union as *Spirit* with God as *Spirit*; for that is the absolute actuality of his life as a religious being. Therefore, since he cannot get the unity of a complete righteous life mediately, by a *process*, he gets it *immediately* and *at once*. And this is accomplished by a universal, all-comprehensive identification of self with God, by "Faith." He is "justified," "absolutely righteous," by *Faith*.¹

Further, the relation between Spirit and Spirit here is altogether mutual. Hence, corresponding to the immediate assertion of unity with Absolute Spirit on the part of the individual religious mind, we have an attitude on the part of God as One and All-supreme. Absolute righteousness is *claimed* by the religious mind as its own in virtue of union with Absolute Spirit through Faith. It is *granted*, equally spontaneously (for Spirit is free), and equally *immediately* (*i.e.* without anything being *done* or required), by God as a favour and a gift. The Righteousness is of *Grace*. The Kingdom of Divine Righteousness is thus at once a Kingdom of Faith and a Kingdom of Grace.

Again, man's life as Spirit is yet continuous in time and is lived, in one of its aspects, under temporal conditions. He always has to face the future, and the future contains always the possibility of change. But life in the Spirit is the life that overcomes all change, in the sense that it is one of absolute unity with the Unchangeable. For the life of Spirit, therefore, it is essential to take up an attitude to all

¹ Where stress is laid not so much on the unity, as such, of Spirit with Spirit, as on the actual domination of the varied and changing process of goodness by this one unity of "holiness," the condition is not one of "Justification," but of "Sanctification." The first is unique, single, all-complete—an "act" of God; the second a continual activity—a "work."

possible change by which the religious mind will see it and feel it and think it in the light of the one Absolute Spirit, with which unity is maintained. It must be an attitude which destroys all sense of what change universally brings with it, fear and disappointment. The sense of unity must be so complete as to *negate* or destroy all that fear *absolutely*. But it must at the same time be a *positive* attitude as well. It must be one which regards the unity as ultimately consummated, as *in the long run and in spite of all* achieved. It is thus an attitude continuous with the life of Faith, in which it is *claimed* to be so. The attitude to the Divine Spirit which expresses all this is the attitude of *Hope*. It is the attitude of *unity* with the Whole amidst and *in spite of* that flux and change which *necessarily* enter into the life of Spirit as a concrete, all-embracing *unity of experience*. Hence it is a necessary constituent of the religious life of the Spirit.

The Life
of Love.

Again, this unity of man's Spirit with God's is not simply an orderly unity—the unity of righteousness, which is a whole *through* parts—and not simply a summary unity,—a unity of change, which is a whole *in spite of* them. It is a directly presented, a simple, single *sense* of unity, a unity in the sphere of *feeling*, as distinctive from the sphere of order or *reason* and the sphere of endeavour or *will*. The supreme unity expressed in terms of feeling is *Love*. Love is double-sided, but is the same for each side. There cannot be Love without distinction, and there cannot be Love unless the distinction is held by *each side* in an indissoluble immediate unity. Hence the content for both sides is here precisely the same—a unity of feeling. There is

It is
"greater
than
Faith."

not in this attitude something from the side of the religious mind (Faith), and something else from the Divine Spirit (Grace). It is one and the same for *each*. The unity is completely continuous and identical for both sides. It expresses, therefore, more completely than Faith that absolute and continuous union of Spirit with Spirit. It is "*greater*" than Faith.

In Hope, again, with its contrast between apparent and real, changeable and unchanging, immediate and ultimate, the Life of Spirit has one aspect for man's Spirit, another for God's. But in Love all such contrasts disappear. There is one and the same Life at the same time for the Spirit of man and of God. It expresses and contains their essential union without a jar of opposition, and is therefore more adequate to the Life of Spirit. Love is "*greater*" than Hope.

Love, moreover, because *feeling* necessarily exists in the present, is a *present* reality. Since the union is an *eternal* union, the Love in which it is expressed is an Eternal Love, not confined to one moment but constant and enduring as Spirit itself. The Life of Love is an eternal Now. But Faith takes its stand on what God has been, on what is *behind* the seen and temporal, while Hope takes hold of what *is to be*, of what is *beyond* the visible and changeable. These are, therefore, conditions of man's finite spiritual existence, are required essentially because of man's conscious finitude; and would disappear with the absolute sense of continuous union with God. They would in that case simply not be required. Because Faith and Hope have that character, they are rather conditions than the

And
greater
than
Hope.

Love is the
consum-
mation of
the Life of
the Spirit.

consummation of Spiritual Life. But Love being eternal is a final achievement, *is* absolute union with God. For that reason also, therefore, Love is "greater" than Faith, "greater" than Hope.

The three
spiritual
factors of a
Revealed
Religion.

The essential attitudes of Spiritual, or Revealed Religion, may be said to be Faith, Hope, Love. All are forms of the one unity of Spirit with Spirit, and are continuous with each other. They express that unity in its different aspects. The first the unity of order, or "intellect"; the second that of anticipation, or active endeavour; the third that of feeling. The first is a unity embracing all the past of man's life; the second, all the future; the third, all the present. These are moments or phases of the complete realisation of Spirit, because this is concrete and embraces *all* forms of its life. And all are related and connected inside the one life of Spirit in union with Spirit. These attitudes, then, seem to exhaust the moments of a Spiritual or Revealed Religion as actually realised.

Symbol
and
Reality.

It has its cult. But here symbol plays a secondary and ancillary part, and the reality symbolised is never confounded with it for any length of time. That reality just lies in its spiritual content, in the "fruits of the Spirit."¹

¹ The life of the Spirit, as St. Paul, an apostle of the Religion of the Spirit, pointed out, is to be found in its "fruits," in the spiritual content realised, such as "Love," "Joy," "Peace," "Long-suffering," etc.—each of them expressing that Spirit is in union with Spirit.

It is important to bear in mind that the realisation of this form of religious experience lies in these states, these "fruits of the Spirit," which are the outcome of the essential attitudes above mentioned.

When this is grasped, it is at once seen that all else must have a merely derivative and conditional significance. In particular we can see how this throws light (1) on the relation of this type of Religion to its Doctrines, dogmatic or otherwise; and (2) on its connexion with the great organisation of man's spiritual purposes—the Ethical Order of Society. As to the first, doctrines no

This phase of Religion, like other forms of Religion, can also be realised by Sacrifice: but the sacrifice in this case is characteristically different. In the Religion of Nature it is the sacrifice or breaking up of a natural object. In the second type of Religion it is sacrifice of the inner self—a “broken and a contrite heart.” In the third the end can be

Sacrifice in
the case of
Spirit.

doubt are essential, in the sense that they are required to help the maintenance of the Spiritual Life. They do so by taking its intensely concrete Unity in its various aspects, expressing these in universally intelligible terms, and thereby at once steadying and focussing the content it possesses. They are devised by reflection for this end, and are subsidiary to its attainment,—whether the doctrine be general, like that of the “Trinity,” in itself a profound speculative analysis of Absolute Spirit, or special, like that of the relatively insignificant doctrine of “Infant Baptism.” When the doctrines are taken, not as aids, but as ends, conflict is sure to arise sooner or later—the old conflict between the Spirit, which “quickens,” and the letter which “kills,” and kills because it confines, restricts, suppresses the universal life of Spirit. As to the second, there must be direct relation between a Spiritual Religion and the Order of a Society; for both are Spirit in substance, and the former must have its cult in the latter, as the historical organisation in time of the human Spirit. The former must be established in the latter to gain definite security. But what is set up is not the Spiritual Religion as such, for that is absolutely universal and cannot be confined, like the second type of Religion, to any specific historical Society; it is the cult or Institution, Spiritual Religion as cultivated by a nation with definite traditions and ideals, that is “established” by a Society. It *must be established* to get its position recognised in a Society; but it can never be *confined* to such a cult, for this is specific and must vary. There is certain, therefore, to arise a conflict between the Religion and the Institution, owing to the perpetual necessity for adjusting the whole truth to a partial realisation of it. Hence the endless problem of “the relation of Church and State”—endless, because the State is progressively realising itself, whereas the Religion of the Church is a universal Religion of the Spirit, the same for ever and everywhere. The establishment of this Religion in a Society, while it is a necessity (since it must take root in a Society to live at all), is at best a standing alliance of incompatibles. The alliance may be maintained with varying degrees of success, but the incompatibility is there all the while, and is sure to come out as the development of the relationship between the two proceeds. Then the incompatibility will appear as an open conflict of authority between the claims of the Spirit to eternal recognition and the claims of the State to temporal power. In such a conflict sometimes the former will carry the day, as happened in the Scottish Church in 1843; sometimes the latter, as took place in the same Church in 1904. In principle, the conflict between Church and State in the sphere of historical organisation is precisely the same as that between “spirit” and “letter” in the sphere of Doctrine.

achieved, not by a sacrifice of what is a part, but by the surrender of the whole—the absolute giving up of Spiritual Life to Spiritual Life, the absolute sacrifice of Spiritual Individuality. But such a sacrifice cannot be simply negative as in the former cases. It is the conscious surrender of *all* because of, and therefore *in order to realise*, the complete union with all Spirit. To give up Spirit to Spirit, the eternal to the eternal, is still to *be* Spirit absolutely. The sacrifice is not annihilation but *achievement*; not destruction and defeat, but triumph—triumph, not merely over the limitations of “nature” (Death), but over the very limitations of Spiritual Individuality. To give up Spirit is thus a supreme accomplishment of the Life of Spirit, the triumphal end of Faith, the joyful act of Love, the absolute realisation of Hope. Hence it is the supreme sacrifice of human history. As such, its completeness is acknowledged to have been accomplished by one Spirit—the founder of a Religion of the Spirit, Christ. It is maintained that to do this as a historical fact, is to do it once for all, for all men. And, being done, it is held to ensure the triumph of Spirit in the history of the human race. It “saves” man’s Spirit from the ruin of nature and the negations of moral evil—it “redeems” mankind from all his finitude.¹

These
three
phases of
Religion
imply one
another.

We must not suppose that these three forms of Religion are *merely* historically apart.² We may find expressions of the higher forms in the lower, and we do find the lower forms coexisting with

¹ To work out this in detail is impossible here. The above is merely a partial outline of the life of Spiritual or Revealed Religion.

² See p. 321, note.

and appearing in the higher. Thus while religious life in Western Europe is ostensibly "Christian," *i.e.* Religion of the Spirit, in point of fact much of it, perhaps the greater part of it, is in actual experience Religion of Nature, or at most Religion of the Moral Order.¹ The religious life in the Spirit is only realised in very few individuals, and by the remainder is frankly looked on as an "ideal," to be aimed at rather than actually fulfilled. Still, even if it is looked on as an ideal, it is of profound significance. For the cult of Spiritual Religion has enormous value in the history of religious life, if only as a way of ever keeping before the religious mind what is its highest achievement, and of training the worshipper up to that individual self-abandonment to the life of Spirit, which is man's supreme achievement on earth.

In conclusion, it remains to be added that while Religion is certainly the most general way in which Absolute Spirit is realised in experience, it is not the only form in which its nature can be revealed. The Life of Spirit for its own sake, Spirit self-complete and self-contained, is experienced, though doubtless by a limited number of mankind, in the mood of Contemplation, Philosophical or Artistic. There are some few elect Spirits to whom the activity of *νόησις νοήσεως* is the way to the Eternal rather than the life of religious Love. There are also some for whom Spirit greets Spirit through the harmonies of sense more readily than by either Religion or Philosophy. With these, however, we

¹ The reason of this is doubtless to be found in the limited outlook of the general mind. It wants to see definite results, specific acts, "something done." The State and Family come home to the individual with greater fulness of reality than the wider life of an "Absolute Spirit."

shall not deal here. Within the limits we have set ourselves we seem justified in confining our attention to the most prominent and historically the most universal mode in which the "typical individual," whose experience we have been considering, realises the life of Absolute Spirit. That mode is undoubtedly Religion. Contemplation does not realise complete experience in the same way as Religion, nor is Artistic Activity the same in character or form as Philosophy. For the reason indicated, however, we need not deal here with those ways of realising Absolute Spirit.¹ Suffice it to say that in Contemplation as well as in Religion we have the realisation of a spiritual world complete and self-contained, where man's spirit works with a sense of freedom only possible when it is consciously one with the very life of Absolute Spirit. Hence the claim of knowledge to attain to Absolute Knowledge or Philosophy is in itself perfectly valid. Moreover, it is necessary that this should be so: for it is *by* Philosophy that all the processes of experience (Religion among them) are constructed. The development of experience as a Whole attains its end in the realisation of that mode of experience (Philosophy) by which all experience has been evolved. The culmination of an Absolute Idealism is the justification of the idealistic position itself, as the ultimate form of knowledge.²

¹ A discussion of part of the question—the distinction and relation of Philosophy and Religion—will be found in the writer's previous volume (v. *Hegel's Logic*, chap. xii.)

² This I have worked out in more detail in *Hegel's Logic*, chaps. vi. and vii.

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